

STATE OF MICHIGAN  
STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN

MEETING of the REPRESENTATIVE  
ASSEMBLY of the STATE BAR OF  
MICHIGAN

COPY

Proceedings had by the Representative Assembly of the  
State Bar of Michigan at Lansing Community College - M-TEC  
Center, 5708 Cornerstone Lansing, Michigan, on Saturday,  
April 16, 2005, at the hour of 10:00 a.m.

AT HEADTABLE:

ELIZABETH A. JAMIESON, Chairperson  
LORI A. BUITEWEG, Vice-Chairperson  
EDWARD HAROUTUNIAN, Clerk  
JOHN T. BERRY, Executive Director  
HON. GENE SCHNELZ, Parliamentarian  
GLENN A. PETERS, Staff Member

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1 Lansing, Michigan  
2 Saturday, April 16, 2005  
3 10:16 a.m.

4 RECORD

5 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Welcome everybody to  
6 our, I would like to say second, but it's kind of like  
7 our first meeting of the year.

8 First up is certification that a quorum is  
9 present. Clerk Haroutunian, can you certify that we  
10 have a quorum present?

11 CLERK HAROUTUNIAN: Madam Chair, a quorum is  
12 present, and the number is in excess of 50.

13 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you very much.  
14 With regard to the proposed calendar, I would remind  
15 everybody that we have special debate rules for the  
16 debate of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct  
17 and the Michigan Standards for Imposing Lawyer  
18 Sanctions that are included in your agenda packet.

19 I would also like to -- you have a paper  
20 rainbow in front of you, and I would like to draw your  
21 attention to 1.5, MRPC 1.5, which is pink and green,  
22 you have two copies. That was inadvertently not  
23 included in your agenda packet but was referenced on  
24 your agenda, and MSILS 5.2, that's the purple paper.  
25 That also was referenced on your agenda but not

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1 included in your packets.  
2 And then I would entertain a motion a to  
3 insert MRPC 1.15, that's the lavender paper under item  
4 Number 7. It's linked with MRPC 1.5. Also the yellow  
5 piece of paper, which is ADM File No. 2003-62, again  
6 inserted under item Number 7, for a Michigan Rules of  
7 Professional Conduct proposal.  
8 The beige paper, which is rules concerning  
9 the State Bar of Michigan, which would be inserted  
10 under item Number 6, and I will entertain a motion  
11 with regard to inserting those into the agenda.  
12 VOICE: So moved.  
13 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Second?  
14 VOICE: Second.  
15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: All in favor?  
16 VOICE: Aye.  
17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: No discussion.  
18 Additionally, I would like to introduce our  
19 panelists who are here to speak with regard to the  
20 rules and the standards. We have Don Campbell, Robert  
21 Agacinski with the Attorney Grievance Commission,  
22 Mark Armitage with the Attorney Discipline Board, John  
23 VanBolt with the Attorney Discipline Board, and John  
24 Allen with the Grievance Committee for the State Bar  
25 of Michigan.

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<p>1 With that I would entertain a motion to adopt 2 the proposed calendar and debate rules as noted. 3 VOICE: So moved. 4 VOICE: Second. 5 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion? 6 All in favor. 7 Any opposed. 8 We will move to item number two, which is 9 filling vacancies. Bob Gardella, our chair, if you 10 could come to the podium. 11 MR GARDELLA: Good morning. I will be quick. 12 The Nominating Awards Committee had a lot of work to 13 do this year. We had quite a bit of vacancies all 14 over the state. We worked hard, and we were able to 15 fill 15 of those vacancies, many or most of those 16 people who have agreed to be involved are here, and 17 what I would like to do is introduce each person, have 18 you stand, and then what we are going to do is 19 nominate by motion all of you and hopefully get 20 approval today. 21 In the 1st circuit, Valerie White of 22 Hillsdale, if you could stand. 23 For the 20th circuit Ron Foster of Jenison. 24 That's Ottawa County. 25 The 23rd circuit, Duane Hadley of Standish.</p>	<p>1 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion? 2 Hearing none, all in favor. 3 Any opposed. 4 Welcome to the Assembly. 5 (Applause.) 6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: And I would like to 7 thank Bob for a tremendous effort. I don't know if we 8 have ever in the history of the Assembly had such a 9 high number of membership. We only have five 10 vacancies in the entire Assembly. That's out of 150 11 seats. I think that's pretty amazing, so I would like 12 to say thank you to Bob for his hard work this year. 13 (Applause.) 14 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: This is my opportunity 15 to talk to you. I have a small confession to make, 16 and don't take this the wrong way, but I was kind of 17 hoping for bad weather today, because I thought in 18 January when we had the snowstorm no one wanted to be 19 here, and then the weather that was predicted for 20 today is supposed to be sunny and 70s, and I am 21 thinking no one is going to want to be here either, 22 and I thought if we could just have it kind of cold 23 and gloomy no one would mind being here. 24 But you are all here, and I thank you very 25 much for being here, and I think we have a wonderful</p>
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<p>1 28th circuit, Julie Benson Valice of Cadillac. Okay, 2 right over there. 3 36th circuit, Linda Pioch, Paw Paw. 38th 4 circuit, Christian Horkey of Monroe. 39th circuit 5 Anna Marie Anzalone of Adrian. 39th circuit, Adrienne 6 Iddings of Adrian. 42nd circuit, Wendy Davis Kanar of 7 Midland. She is here. Okay. 8 42nd circuit, Tina VanDam of Midland. She is 9 not here today. 10 53rd circuit, David Barton of Cheboygan, and 11 the 54th circuit, Judge Wallace Kent, Jr. of Caro. 12 There's Judge Kent. 13 Again, thank you for coming here. I think 14 you will find that the officers have put a lot of time 15 into the various proposals and issues that we will be 16 voting on, and we encourage you to take an active 17 role, as active as you can based on your schedules, 18 because we do have a very active group here, people 19 who are concerned about the Bar and our profession, so 20 we would compliment you for getting involved. 21 Normally we have limited time. I would move 22 all of the, all of the people that I have mentioned 23 here previously that they be nominated and approved to 24 fill the various vacancies in their circuits. 25 VOICE: Support.</p>	<p>1 day ahead of us. 2 So a couple of housekeeping matters. I 3 already recognized the panelists before you who are 4 here as resources for all of us. Also, I want to 5 remind those people whose first term is ending with 6 the September meeting or for those people who have 7 been appointed to fill a vacancy, all of you need to 8 make sure that you fill out your petitions and have 9 them to the State Bar by April 30th. 10 You had a little sticker, little sticky note 11 on your name tag when you arrived. We are trying to 12 make sure that you remember that you need to get that 13 petition in on time. We also have additional 14 petitions here if you need them. 15 You have a lot of colored handouts. I call 16 it your paper rainbow, and I would like to just make 17 sure that everybody is very comfortable with what all 18 of these papers are, and the reason why we did it in 19 different colors was it's probably a lot easier than 20 sorting through these and trying to find MRPC 1.5, 21 where is that, instead of just saying the green one. 22 Let me tell you the green or pink, because 23 you have two copies, is MRPC 1.5. That deals with 24 fees and will be again under item Number 7, so if you 25 want to take that and put it into your agenda book</p>

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<p>1 under Number 7 that would be when it's going to come 2 up. 3 The second is the beige one, which is rules 4 with regard to confidentiality policies for the State 5 Bar programs. That will go under item Number 6, so 6 the beige paper should go under tab Number 6. 7 The purple piece of paper is MSILS 5.2, and 8 that should go under item Number 9 with regard to the 9 standards. 10 You have a green document that is MCR2.403. 11 It's the same thing you have in your packet except for 12 that there were just two minor edits removing the 13 words "and disputed" and we wanted to make sure you had 14 the actual document in front of you, and also the 15 letters in support that we received after the agenda 16 packet went out, so that would go under item Number 5, 17 the green one. 18 Then you have a yellow piece of paper which 19 is ADM File Number 2003-62. That goes under tab 20 Number 7. 21 You have a lavender piece of paper, MRPC 22 1.15, safekeeping property. That also goes under 23 Number 7 linked to MRPC 1.5. 24 You have a white document that says, on State 25 Bar letterhead that says received from the State Bar</p>	<p>1 all of the new members that just joined us today so 2 that you have that resource. 3 You should also have a photo directly. I 4 would like to thank Nancy Brown for putting that 5 together. It was a huge effort, and it's a wonderful 6 resource to get to know your fellow Assembly members. 7 You have that at your seat as well. 8 I have two important messages for you. I 9 know that you do not want lectures. We heard that at 10 the annual meeting last year in our small group 11 discussions, so instead, what I am going to do is give 12 you facts. So these are the facts that I think are 13 very significant for you. 14 What you see before you today is a full 15 agenda. You see the clock ticking away, and you are 16 thinking about how long is it going to take us to get 17 through all of this, and are we going to be able to 18 beat the agenda and maybe get out before 4:30. 19 Let me tell you what I have seen. I have 20 seen hundreds of lawyers who are very, very interested 21 in these issues and the rules and the standards. 22 You see before you a rainbow of papers, all 23 these documents to review. What I see is that Jim and 24 Anne, State Bar staff, were here at 7:00 in the 25 morning to make sure that all of those papers were</p>
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<p>1 of Michigan Sections and Committees. This is 2 commentary that we received after the packet went out, 3 but we wanted to make sure that everybody was aware of 4 the comments that were submitted to us in writing, so 5 you have those in front of you. 6 The thick orange packet are comments that 7 were most on the RA discussion board after the text 8 was mailed out. Again, we wanted to make sure that 9 everybody had an opportunity to take a look at those. 10 So those are all there for you. 11 You have a blue document, which is a letter 12 from our Executive Director to the Supreme Court with 13 regard to Court Rules MCR 5.104, 5.402 and 5.403. 14 That is purely informational only. You can put it in 15 the back of your book if you want. What we are telling 16 you is that this is the finished product of what 17 happened at our October 2004 meeting where we approved 18 that this go to the Supreme Court, but there were 19 drafting things that needed to be completed, and this 20 is the finished product that is going to the Supreme 21 Court pursuant to the Representative Assembly activity 22 and action in October. 23 And then you have a salmon piece of paper. 24 Again, this can go in the back of your packet, but 25 this is an updated member list by circuit, including</p>	<p>1 there for you. 2 We have Glenna, who has been available for me 3 on cell phone way past working hours. We have six 4 RA committees who have been very active this year who 5 helped with all of the proposals that are before you 6 in the packet with regard to the rules and the 7 standards. 8 And you have 1 a.m. e-mails that you didn't 9 see that Lori and I -- Lori can attest to -- to make 10 sure that the product that you have here today is the 11 best for debate before the Assembly and for our 12 members. 13 What you see here is a distinguished judge as 14 our parliamentarian who is our former representative 15 parliamentarian. What I see is a parliamentarian 16 expert who gave up his entire Saturday with his family 17 for the second time, because he was here in January. 18 What you see in front of you are panelists. 19 What I see are experts on the rules and the standards 20 that we have brought to you today as a tremendous 21 resource that we have taken around the state for all 22 of the members of the Bar association to hear more 23 about the rules and the standards, who have selflessly 24 traveled over the past four months of these panel 25 discussions taking time out of their busy lives and</p>

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<p>1 practices to support the Assembly and the members of 2 the Bar association with regard to these rules. 3 What the Assembly said they wanted at the 4 annual meeting was substantive issues. You said you 5 want more substance before you, and what I see is 24 6 substantive proposals for you to deal with today 7 regarding the Rules of Conduct, the Standards for 8 Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Michigan Court Rules, and 9 the State Bar Rules. 10 I recognize that today is a really long 11 meeting, and I thank you all for being prepared and 12 looking at your materials today, and I hope you are as 13 excited as I am about the opportunity to deal with 14 these issues and shape the legal profession for the 15 lawyers in the state of Michigan. Wow, what a huge 16 task and undertaking that is. 17 So I encourage all of you to make the right 18 decisions for the right reasons, not just from your 19 personal perspective but on behalf of all 20 practitioners in the state of Michigan and in light of 21 the consumers of legal services in the state of 22 Michigan, and I welcome the panelists and all of the 23 speakers and proponents that we have with regard to 24 the rules, and with that I say let's get started, and 25 for the benefit of our court reporter, if you have</p>	<p>1 VOICE: Yes. 2 MS. BRANDON: I will start again. I 3 apologize. 4 My name is Jan Brandon. I am with the Civil 5 Courts and Procedures Committee. We are here this 6 morning with two rules. I will be addressing 7 MCR 2.403. 8 Basically this is an amendment to the case 9 evaluation process rule, and it addresses specifically 10 the no-fault issues. The design of it is to limit the 11 scope of case evaluation, issues that can be submitted 12 to case evaluation in no-fault cases. This has been 13 necessitated based upon the several recent Supreme 14 Court, excuse me, recent Appellate Court cases, which 15 casts some doubt on the ability of plaintiffs to 16 accept no-fault case evaluation awards. 17 The purpose of this is to restore meaning to 18 the case evaluation process and fairness to the 19 process. 20 Now, we have had long discussions in the 21 committee over this rule, and we have gathered 22 tremendous support from the legal community on this 23 proposal. We have attached in your packet the support 24 of the Negligence Section for the State Bar, which is 25 equally comprised of plaintiffs and defendants. We</p>
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<p>1 anything to say, I strongly encourage you to speak 2 loudly into the microphone and clearly and not too 3 fast. 4 With that, the next item on our agenda is 5 question-and-answer opportunity with regard to the 6 Representative Assembly Liaison Report with regard to 7 the Standing Committee on Libraries, Legal Research 8 and Legal Publications. Is Randy Davidson here? Does 9 anybody have any discussion or anything that they 10 would like to put on the record with regard to the 11 report? Again, we included that for you information. 12 It was only an opportunity to allow for questions and 13 answers. 14 I move on to item Number 5, which is 15 consideration of the proposed amendment to MCR 2.403 16 and MCR 3.602. That's under tab number five. Again, 17 you have one of your colored papers dealing with the 18 amended language and the letters in support MCR 2.403, 19 and I will introduce to you Wayne Miller, Si Orłowski 20 and Janet Brandon with regard to these proposals. 21 MS. BRANDON: Hi, I am Jan Brandon. I am 22 with the Civil Procedures and Courts Committee, and I 23 am addressing this morning the topic -- 24 VOICE: The sound system is not working. 25 MS. BRANDON: Oh, sorry. Is this better?</p>	<p>1 have the support of the Michigan Defense Trial 2 Council, and we have the support of Michigan Trial 3 Lawyers Association. 4 We also have the benefit of the foremost 5 prominent names in this area of law supporting us, 6 Wayne Miller, adjunct professor from Wayne State 7 University in the area of no-fault. A plaintiffs 8 practitioner is here with me to answer technical 9 questions. Simeon Orłowski is here from the defense 10 Bar to answer technical questions. We also have 11 support of two names that I know most of you in the 12 field that practice in this area know, George Sinas 13 and Jim Boron (sp). 14 This is a -- compromised language has been 15 adopted. Everyone is pleased with it. Everyone 16 believes there is a necessity for this to be passed. 17 And I do have Wayne and Si here with me to answer any 18 of your technical questions that you may have and we 19 ask your support on this amendment. 20 MR. MILLER: Good morning everyone. I would 21 like to thank this Assembly for your attention to this 22 issue, because it is a big problem for us. The best 23 way to demonstrate the need for change is just to give 24 you a quick example of how had work for us. I have a 25 client who has been terribly injured in a motor</p>

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1 vehicle accident. I file suit because the no-fault  
 2 insurer has denied coverage. They don't want to pay  
 3 for anything. I file suit seeking two things, damages  
 4 for benefits incurred to date and a declaration for  
 5 benefits that are going to be incurred throughout time  
 6 and into the future.  
 7 We go to case evaluation. We include in our  
 8 claim the benefits to date because we know what they  
 9 are, we do not include the benefits not yet incurred  
 10 for several reasons. We don't know what they are  
 11 going to be, and the no-fault insurer cannot be made  
 12 to pay them until they have been incurred. Also, the  
 13 case evaluators cannot award in this case what would  
 14 be equitable relief.  
 15 We get an award, and we are faced with the  
 16 decision to accept or reject. However, we cannot  
 17 accept the award. Even if the award is ample, many  
 18 times the value of our case, the best possible dream  
 19 case evaluation award, we cannot accept, because  
 20 acceptance, a mutual acceptance, will result in a  
 21 settlement of the case, including the claim for  
 22 declaratory relief, unincurred benefits.  
 23 So if we accept our case, the case is  
 24 dismissed under the rule as it currently reads and we  
 25 never get to the declaratory issue. We have to refile

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1 repeatedly in a serial fashion and we never get  
 2 resolution of the issue.  
 3 An even worse danger that we see happening  
 4 sometimes in a mutual acceptance situation is the  
 5 prospect that an insurer will claim that a mutual  
 6 acceptance acts as a redemption, acts as a settlement,  
 7 not just of the matters to date, but of the entirety  
 8 of the entitlement to no-fault insurance. Therefore,  
 9 we cannot accept these awards.  
 10 ICLE commentators, including myself and many  
 11 others, have been advising plaintiffs counsel for some  
 12 years now that they must reject these case evaluation  
 13 awards, and so case evaluation in no-fault declaratory  
 14 cases are routinely rejected, and the case evaluation  
 15 process has little meaning and a lot of expense. For  
 16 this reason then we have drafted this proposal that  
 17 has the support of both sides, because both sides in  
 18 good faith want to have a process that will work to  
 19 settle cases but not penalize plaintiffs in the event  
 20 of acceptance.  
 21 So we have on a bipartisan, so to speak, type  
 22 basis have agreed to support revision and we hope that  
 23 it meets with your approval as well. Thank you.  
 24 MR. ORLOWSKI: Good morning. I will be  
 25 brief. Before these Court of Appeals decisions came

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1 down approximately four years ago that suggested that  
 2 a mutual acceptance of a case evaluation award in a  
 3 no-fault case operated as a full and final release,  
 4 before that happened, when both sides would come into  
 5 case evaluation in a PIP case and both sides would  
 6 accept the award, we as defense attorneys knew what to  
 7 do. We would go back to the office, we would draft a  
 8 release that would release claims incurred through the  
 9 date of the case evaluation hearing. There would be a  
 10 stipulation and order without prejudice entered, the  
 11 case would be settled. Plaintiffs attorneys would  
 12 then be able to file another lawsuit if there was a  
 13 dispute about benefits incurred after the date of the  
 14 case evaluation hearing.  
 15 For the last four years or so this system,  
 16 the case evaluation system has broken down and has  
 17 failed with respect to no-fault cases. As a defense  
 18 attorney when I go down to case evaluation what I am  
 19 often confronted with is the plaintiffs attorney  
 20 asking do you mind if we make this a nonunanimous  
 21 award? And we as defense attorneys routinely, I think  
 22 I speak for the defense Bar, we agree, because we know  
 23 the position the plaintiffs attorneys have been put in  
 24 now. Many of them feel that they cannot accept a case  
 25 evaluation award because it can operate as a full and

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1 final release, including futures.  
 2 That's not the way the system was designed to  
 3 operate. That's not the way it did operate until a  
 4 few years ago. A couple of rouge cases came down that  
 5 ruined this system. We have to fix it. We believe  
 6 that this proposed rule does fix it, and we urge that  
 7 you adopt it. Thank you.  
 8 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussions?  
 9 VOICE: Call the question.  
 10 JUDGE SCHNELZ: That's not a motion.  
 11 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: All in favor.  
 12 Any opposed.  
 13 The motions passes unanimously with regard to  
 14 MCR 2.403.  
 15 Now we have MCR 3.602.  
 16 VOICE: Point of order. There was not a  
 17 motion made on that.  
 18 VOICE: Someone called the question.  
 19 JUDGE SCHNELZ: I ruled it was not a motion.  
 20 He just said call the question. She has a right to  
 21 call the question. She did.  
 22 (Applause.)  
 23 MS. VALENTINE: My name is Victoria  
 24 Valentine. I am here before you with regard to  
 25 MCR 3.602, the arbitration rule. I am a member of the

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1 Civil Procedure and Court Committee. I am not the  
2 proponent of this rule, so I hope you are not going to  
3 have questions for me. I believe it's pretty  
4 self-explanatory. I just wanted to present it to the  
5 Assembly and see if there is any questions or  
6 anything.

7 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any questions at all  
8 with regard to the second proposal with regard to  
9 Michigan Court Rules?

10 MS. VALENTINE: I will say basically it is a  
11 procedural amendment and not a substantive.

12 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Our parliamentarian  
13 had advised us that we now take a vote with regard to  
14 MCR 3.602, that proposal.

15 All in favor.  
16 Any opposed.  
17 That motion passes as well.

18 The next item up is item Number 6, which is  
19 consideration of the proposed amendments to the Rules  
20 concerning the State Bar of Michigan. There are two  
21 proposals before you, one is with regard to the  
22 pro hac vice rule, which is in your packet, and the  
23 second is with regard to the confidentiality component  
24 to State Bar programs. Speaking on behalf of this  
25 proposal is Josh Ard and John Anding.

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1 MR. ANDING: Good morning. I am here on  
2 behalf of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee,  
3 and we are presenting to the Assembly for adoption two  
4 rules, the first of which deals with the pro hac vice  
5 rules for the state of Michigan. This particular rule  
6 is being proposed in an effort to implement the policy  
7 of a rule adopted last November, Michigan Rule of  
8 Professional Conduct 5.5 dealing with multiple  
9 jurisdictional practice.

10 There are four components to this rule, as  
11 the materials reflect. From the Unauthorized Practice  
12 of Law Committee's perspective, we are most interested  
13 in those elements, of the four that are listed here,  
14 that provide essentially the ability to regulate  
15 out-of-state practitioners who practice in the state  
16 of Michigan. For purposes of this rule, practicing  
17 within the state is appearing in litigation, judicial  
18 proceedings in the state.

19 The three elements, the first, third, and  
20 fourth deal essentially with granting jurisdiction  
21 over out-of-state lawyers to the Grievance Commission  
22 and the Disciplinary Board so that there can be  
23 monitoring of activities, processing of complaints,  
24 and discipline if necessary.

25 The third item deals with the defining of

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1 temporary practices. Essentially three pieces of  
2 litigation in any year would entitle an out-of-state  
3 lawyer to still qualify as someone who is temporarily  
4 practicing within the state.

5 And then finally, the fourth element of the  
6 rule is an assessment of a fee, which of course is  
7 necessary to fund the regulatory activities.

8 The second element of this proposal is  
9 perhaps the one, not to foreclose discussion of the  
10 other elements, but the second element is perhaps the  
11 one on which there might be need for some debate and  
12 discussion, and that has to do with the requirement  
13 that there be an affiliation of out-of-state counsel  
14 with local counsel here in the state of Michigan.

15 This is consistent with the ABA Model Rule,  
16 that is this particular requirement, but it does  
17 implicate questions about multiple jurisdictional  
18 practice, MJP, in this respect: It suggests, of  
19 course, that a requirement of local counsel or local  
20 counsel affiliation by an out-of-state lawyer who may  
21 be regular counsel for an out-of-state company who may  
22 have a relationship with that lawyer that obviously is  
23 the result of many years of working with that lawyer.  
24 By requiring out-of-state or instate affiliation, we  
25 are, of course, increasing costs to that client. In

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1 some respects we may even be stamping on the toes of  
2 the client in terms of their selection of counsel.

3 The flip side of the issue in terms of a  
4 local counsel affiliation is local counsel may find  
5 themselves in a situation where, not taking an active  
6 role, they are not terribly familiar with the case and  
7 the nuances of the case and then may be stuck in a  
8 situation where out-of-state counsel either abandons  
9 the case or improperly prosecutes the case. So there  
10 is that potential that the local counsel who is  
11 affiliating may find themselves in a bit of a dilemma.

12 So these are the three or four components of  
13 the rule. I would offer questions, comments. I have  
14 Josh Ard here as well. So if there are any questions  
15 or comments.

16 MR. WILSON: Scott Wilson from the  
17 3rd circuit.

18 MR. ANDING: Hi, Scott.

19 MR. WILSON: Hi. I have a question. If this  
20 rule is, or if this pro hac temporary practice rule is  
21 put into place, will there be an adoption of the Draft  
22 Rule 18? Is that what's contemplated?

23 MR. ANDING: That's a point of reference.  
24 It's a point of reference. In other words, this is  
25 essentially a rule that incorporates many of the

Page 25	<p>1 elements of the four areas that are delineated for 2 consideration by the Assembly. 3 That rule, however, as is reflected here, has 4 had comments received from various practice groups 5 within the State Bar. It has been put out for 6 comment. 7 MR. WILSON: So my question is would we have 8 a chance to further comment on that rule before it was 9 adopted by the State Bar? 10 MR. ANDING: Yes. Yes. 11 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Let me clarify. If 12 the Assembly votes in favor of any of these proposals, 13 the portions of the proposal, then the State Bar would 14 act pursuant to that submitting rule to the Supreme 15 Court, and then the Supreme Court would typically 16 publish that for comment. You would have an 17 opportunity to go before the Supreme Court, but this 18 is our opportunity to speak on behalf of the State 19 Bar, with regard to the specific proposals that are 20 before you. 21 MS. KAKISH: Katherine Kakish, 3rd circuit. 22 It also relates to the Draft Rule 18. I do not have a 23 question, but I do have a comment. I notice an 24 ambiguity or a conflict. If you look to I(A)(2)(c) -- 25 MR. ANDING: Are you looking at the rule</p>	Page 27	<p>1 problem that it creates is that by requiring the local 2 Michigan attorney, it establishes some burdens and 3 responsibility on that local attorney who has really 4 no control over the case. 5 Typically what happens, the pro hac vice 6 attorney does everything, the local attorney does not 7 know what's going on, and if the client pays him to 8 know what's going on, it doubles the cost of the case. 9 And you have potential malpractice where the local 10 attorney now is almost responsible for whatever that 11 out-of-state attorney does, and I think it puts a 12 burden on Michigan attorneys. 13 I refuse regularly to act as local counsel 14 because I don't know the case, I don't know what's 15 going on, and I would hate to see us have a 16 requirement that would obligate a client to have a 17 local counsel at double the cost and create 18 significant malpractice problems. 19 MR. WILSON: Hi, Scott Wilson again from the 20 3rd circuit. I want to address that same point. I am 21 in favor of the local affiliation, but I think in the 22 drafting there has to be a clarification of what duty 23 is imposed on a Michigan lawyer, because I think, as 24 it's drafted in Rule 18(C), it talks about 25 contemplated actions. I think it should be made</p>
Page 26	<p>1 itself now? 2 MS. KAKISH: The rule itself of Draft Rule 3 18. Number 2 says that, and I read, An out-of-state 4 lawyer is eligible to appear, et cetera, et cetera, if 5 that lawyer (c) resides in this state, and then you 6 have some exceptions. 7 Then we flip the page, go to the next page, 8 to number 5, and 5 states, No lawyer, No lawyer is 9 authorized to appear pursuant to this rule if the 10 lawyer is a Michigan resident. 11 I see a conflict right there with the 12 residency, so I just wanted to bring that to the 13 Representative Assembly's attention. 14 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Just for 15 point of clarification, the actual draft rule is not 16 something that the Assembly would be involved in to 17 the extent that we are not really a drafting body, so 18 all we are doing is voting on the concepts that would 19 be put into a rule and then that would go to the State 20 Bar staff to draft consistent with the positions that 21 are taken by the Assembly. 22 MR. GILLARY: Randy Gillary from the 6th 23 circuit. Regarding the second provision requiring the 24 out-of-state attorney to relate with a local Michigan 25 attorney. I speak in opposition to that. I think the</p>	Page 28	<p>1 clear -- it's not clear who is contemplating those 2 actions. Maybe it should be specified to be proposed 3 actions of which the Michigan lawyer has been 4 informed. That would take care of the concerns that 5 the prior gentleman spoke to to make sure that if the 6 Michigan lawyer is out of the loop and isn't kept in 7 the loop, there won't be a duty imposed on that lawyer 8 through this kind of drafting. 9 MR. GREEN: Good morning. I am Roderick 10 Green from the 3rd circuit. I rise and speak in 11 opposition to the rule. I don't do a lot of 12 out-of-state work, but I have in the past, I have gone 13 to Ohio. I know that if I had been required to 14 affiliate with a local attorney, it would have made 15 the cost almost prohibitive for my client. So I am 16 really thinking in terms of cost for my client. Also, 17 probably maybe some loss of control over the case. 18 That's my main reason for speaking in opposition. 19 MS. STANGL: Terri Stangl from the 10th 20 circuit. I have three questions. On is do we have an 21 idea of the volume of attorneys that are doing more 22 than three cases per year? How did we arrive at the 23 number of three cases? And, finally, has there been any 24 assessment among staff requiring the Bar to administer 25 this in a timely way so any objection would be raised</p>

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1 early in a case?

2 MR. ANDING: The answer to the first question

3 is that, no, we don't know the volume. I think that's

4 fair. Because up till now we have had no way to

5 really monitor the amount of out-of-state activity.

6 The third question is how much staffing will

7 be required. Again, I think that's an offshoot of the

8 first question, and, again, we don't know yet. We

9 don't know how these fees will need to be allocated.

10 We don't know what sort of staffing will be required/.

11 And your second question was?.

12 MS. STANGL: How do we come up with three?

13 MR. ANDING: We came up with three as

14 essentially a number that was arrived at based on

15 comments given by various sections of the Bar, that

16 three seemed to be a number that was indicative of

17 someone who is practicing temporarily within the state

18 as opposed to someone who was not temporarily

19 practicing within the state.

20 MR. ARD: I should mention that that number

21 is used in certain other states too. I read a

22 discussion of the rule in Florida, and three was the

23 number that they were using.

24 MR. ABEL: Matthew Abel 3rd circuit. I think

25 it is helpful to have some clarification of pro hac

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1 vice rules. I have had out-of-state lawyers ask me if

2 I would help them, and they have commented to me about

3 how little direction there is for them as to how to go

4 about seeking pro hac vice status being an

5 out-of-state lawyer, so I think it's good to clarify

6 this.

7 I don't think it's necessarily helpful to

8 have to affiliate with a Michigan lawyer in that the

9 lawyer has to be competent in order to do the case,

10 the out-of-state lawyer should be competent in the

11 first place, competent enough also that if they need

12 help they will ask for it, and I think that it does

13 add a lot of burden and expense, and generally, even

14 if there is such a rule, that it's going to be honored

15 more in the breach that the lawyer, the local lawyer

16 is not going to be the main lawyer on the case, and so

17 we are just going to go through the motions of having

18 a local lawyer who is supposedly keeping a watchdog on

19 this case, but in truth that's really not what's

20 likely to happen anyway.

21 So I think that if they are required to

22 notify the Bar that they are practicing out-of-state

23 on a significant basis, we will be able to track that,

24 and the local requirement should not be there.

25 And as far as costs, I think we ought to wait

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1 and see. I would like to see that we not add cost

2 here, because as I seek to practice out-of-state in

3 other jurisdictions, they tend to reciprocate what we

4 do in Michigan. And if it's really not an expense to

5 the Bar, I think we ought not charge for it, because

6 we are just going to see additional costs in other

7 jurisdictions, and we shouldn't be the beginning of

8 that.

9 Now, if, in fact, we track it and it does end

10 up costing money for Attorney Grievance procedures and

11 things like that, then maybe we'll have to charge for

12 it, but I think it ought to be on an as-needed basis.

13 Thank you.

14 MR. ANDING: If I might, just respond to the

15 last comment. This program is envisioned to be

16 self-supporting in the sense that the fees would

17 essentially cover the cost of the additional

18 administration associated with the out-of-state

19 practitioners. Obviously the fees that are paid by

20 each of us as we practice within this state are in

21 part utilized to fund the activities of these

22 commissions.

23 And so the idea here is to create an

24 environment where we are not further burdening the Bar

25 with activities that are not being funded. Obviously

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1 if there is going to be additional need for additional

2 staff, then we are going to have to fund that activity.

3 So I suppose we could argue about what the

4 number is, but at this point it's the number that we

5 are not -- by the way, the Assembly is not passing on

6 what that dollar amount is here today. We are passing

7 on the concept of assessing a fee that would

8 essentially fund these activities, and I would like to

9 think there is very little argument about that.

10 Go ahead.

11 MR. ANDREE: Thank you. Gerard Andree from

12 the 6th circuit. I speak in favor of the pro hac vice

13 proposed amendment, and I also speak as someone who

14 has had rather, in my opinion, considerable experience

15 acting as local counsel for out-of-state attorneys.

16 I think what we are missing in this issue is

17 what we are dealing with here is the orderly

18 administration of justice. Usually national clients

19 will want someone, will -- in essence they want to

20 save money. They don't want to send something to me

21 and have me plow the fields that have already been

22 plowed and reinvent the wheels and all those nice

23 metaphors.

24 They have got someone who already knows the

25 substantive law, and they are going to come in and



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<p>1 take care of the matter. They are looking for a local 2 counsel who knows the local court rules, knows how 3 things should be filed, in what manner they should be 4 filed, et cetera. All they are really doing is asking, 5 you know, we will send someone in who can handle the 6 case, and we want you to make sure it's done in an 7 orderly fashion. 8 And I think to allow out-of-state attorneys 9 to come into the state, and I have no problem if they 10 want to practice on a limited basis and address the 11 issues of the case, but I think for orderly 12 administration of justice you ought to have a local 13 attorney who knows how things are filed, when things 14 are filed, how things are gone about and, in essence, 15 not allow someone to come in here and gum up the works 16 because they don't know the legal practice, and that's 17 really what the local attorney is for. 18 MR. HAROUTUNIAN: Ed Haroutunian from the 6th 19 judicial circuit. I had a couple of questions really 20 in part prompted by some of the other prior speakers, 21 and that is, are there any rules of a like nature that 22 have taken place in other states around us? 23 MR. ARD: Certainly. I know that there was a 24 discussion in Florida. I don't know how common -- we 25 can't speak on that exactly, but certainly this is not</p>	<p>1 counsel is as opposed to suggesting that the local 2 counsel and the out-of-state counsel have the same 3 responsibility, because in many instances that just is 4 not the case. 5 MR. ANDING: Let me just respond to that last 6 point. As a governing body, sometimes we get a little 7 filled up with ourselves in terms of what we need to 8 say and not say in a rule. I think the last point 9 that you made, which deals with the question of 10 whether or not you contractually limit the extent to 11 which you have responsibility under your fee 12 agreement, is probably the most prudent and most 13 practical way to limit the sort of ethical issues and 14 difficulties that a local counsel finds themselves in. 15 I am sure many of you in this room can echo 16 that experience. I certainly from my own experience 17 have found that to be a way of clearly defining what 18 the local lawyer's responsibilities are and striking 19 the appropriate balance between having a local lawyer 20 familiar with local procedures involved in the case 21 and on the other hand limiting your exposure to 22 potential malpractice or otherwise, other complaints 23 from the client if things don't go quite as 24 envisioned. 25 Other comments?</p>
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<p>1 novel at all. As far as the breakdown, I am not sure, 2 but many states do have much more explicit rules on 3 how many appearances you can make. 4 MR. HAROUTUNIAN: I will tell you 5 specifically on the idea of the necessity of 6 affiliating with a member of the local Bar, is 7 there -- 8 MR. ANDING: We actually have a survey that 9 we have conducted of the states around the country, 10 and the vast majority of those states require local 11 affiliation. The ABA Model Rule also, while not 12 entirely clear on its face, its commentary makes clear 13 that they are also envisioning local affiliation. 14 MR. HAROUTUNIAN: Just another comment, and I 15 can understand the comment made by one of the folks 16 that said that the local lawyer being placed in the 17 position of knowing everything about the case when in 18 fact the out-of-state lawyer is really the person who 19 is calling the shots on it, and I would certainly 20 think, although it's not in the proposal for comment, 21 I would think that if the rule passes that, in fact, it 22 should be clear that either the local lawyer either 23 has no responsibility or that that responsibility 24 should be set forth in a written retainer agreement so 25 that it's clear what the responsibility of local</p>	<p>1 MS. STANGL: Terri Stangl again from the 10th 2 circuit. Related to that local counsel issue, my 3 concern is that if the out-of-state counsel's ability 4 to represent the person is partly potentially in the 5 hands of the court and the State Bar, where the State 6 Bar can come in, and depending on the timeliness of 7 that process, whether local counsel will be able to 8 get out of the case if the court or the State Bar 9 successfully challenge the out-of-state attorney. 10 How long is that going to take, and you may 11 contractually say you can get out, but the fact is you 12 would be counsel of record as local counsel, even if 13 the out-of-state counsel was disqualified for too many 14 representations. 15 MR. ANDING: So I understand your comment, 16 not just for my own benefit, but for everyone. Are 17 you envisioning a situation where an application is 18 made for out-of-state approval to practice in a 19 particular case, the State Bar files an objection. 20 MS. STANGL: Correct. 21 MR. ANDING: The State Bar would file an 22 objection to that pro hac vice appearance, and then at 23 that point it would be the judiciary who would make 24 the decision as to whether or not to admit or not 25 admit the person into that case.</p>

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<p>1 MS. STANGL: Correct, but the case would 2 already be filed, and there would be local counsel 3 filed on that case in that court, so there would have 4 to be a separate decision if the case was dismissed 5 or what is the role of local counsel, which may or may 6 not be in local counsel's hands. It's in the court's 7 hand. 8 MR. ANDING: It always is in the court's 9 hands, but the question there is, and this gets back 10 to the observation earlier made about formulating a 11 fee agreement in a manner that would permit you to 12 exit your relationship if it was your desire where the 13 pro hac vice counsel was not admitted. Of course 14 there may be a situation where that's, in that 15 circumstance where the client would decide to retain 16 local counsel, and it seems to me in that situation 17 you have not triggered the concern of having a local 18 lawyer involved in the case that they don't know 19 anything about, because now you have got a local 20 lawyer who may be the only lawyer in the case. 21 So those are just some observations 22 MR. LABRE: Bill LaBre from Cass County, 43rd 23 circuit. Two questions. First, as I read the rule, 24 it appears that local counsel is optional, not 25 mandatory, at least I didn't see any eligibility for</p>	<p>1 Regulation Counsel for the State Bar of Michigan. 2 MS. KAKISH: I have a question related to the 3 fourth item that we are supposed to vote on concerning 4 this issue, and that is the question of should the new 5 rule require a fee to be paid out by the out-of-state 6 attorneys to cover the administrative costs incurred 7 by the state to monitor the compliance? Now is that 8 part of the application fee or is that independent of 9 the application fee? 10 MR. ANDING: I believe it's envisioned as 11 part of the application fee so that essentially you 12 have someone who is, although I can't speak to that 13 definitively, because, as I am looking at what's 14 before this Assembly, we are talking about a fee. 15 Whether or not ultimately it's incorporated as an 16 application fee or as a fee once approved for practice 17 in the state I suppose is an open question. 18 A:MS. KAKISH: I think my confusion arises is 19 because the application fee itself is equal to the 20 dues paid by an active member of the state of 21 Michigan, and those are relatively high for somebody 22 to practice one time here in Michigan. 23 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Again, only because I 24 have some background into why this came to the 25 Assembly, but my understanding is that this fee is</p>
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<p>1 admission requirements insisting upon, like the 2 present rule, that we retain local counsel. Is that 3 correct? That's question one. 4 MR. ANDING: I don't believe that's true. 5 The rule is intended to and does envision in effect 6 what's before this Assembly is a motion that in fact 7 that requirement would be incorporated in the rule 8 when adopted by the Supreme Court. 9 MR. LABRE: And the second question is, 10 Parliamentarian, since I don't want you bored today, I 11 think the young lady from the 3rd circuit was correct 12 that there is a conflict in the proposed rule, so is 13 it appropriate for an amendment that would make our 14 approval contingent upon the removal of the conflict 15 in the rule that the young lady from the 3rd circuit 16 mentioned 17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: With regard to the 18 point of order, the only positions that the 19 Representative Assembly is being asked to take right 20 now are with regard to the questions that are going to 21 be put to vote as to a yes or no. We are not talking 22 about the specific language of an ultimate proposal 23 that's left to the State Bar staff to draft. To the 24 extent you have commentary on that language, you would 25 submit it to, I would suspect, Victoria Kremiski,</p>	<p>1 something that would be charged to the applicant, and 2 the purpose of the fee is merely to cover the expenses 3 of the State Bar administering the program of 4 monitoring, that the person is only practicing for 5 three matters in front of the state. So this is not 6 the equivalent of our State Bar dues. It's purely 7 what the State Bar would assess is the cost it will 8 take us to monitor this program. 9 MR. BERRY: I might add to this as well. 10 John Berry, Executive Director. And, again, the first 11 page of what you are voting on is about a fee. The 12 discussions about how much the fee would be, candidly 13 this Rep Assembly as a policy you can give sort of 14 thoughts about that, but one of the considerations 15 that was given to this is, number one, it should cover 16 the cost or potential cost. Any lawyer, even if they 17 are just out there for one case, potentially could 18 lead to certain costs. 19 One of the considerations also if you recall 20 when we had senior lawyers and we were considering the 21 impact of senior lawyers and whether or not they 22 wanted to practice even one or two cases, the decision 23 was made that active lawyers are active lawyers 24 whether you practice one case or whether you practice 25 a thousand cases to be an active lawyer.</p>

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1 I know it's not exactly the same thing, but  
 2 what we are saying is if you come in from out of the  
 3 state, you come into the state, it's the equivalent of  
 4 you are practicing a case, and that one case may be a  
 5 large case, that you are here for a long period of  
 6 time.  
 7 So it's clearly a policy decision, but it was  
 8 the combination of the issue of the administrative  
 9 cost and potential administrative cost, as well as a  
 10 fairness issue for all lawyers practicing, whether it  
 11 be one case or a lot of cases.  
 12 Various states have various fees, some less,  
 13 some the same as this amount. So sort of the issue is  
 14 there. Thank you.  
 15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Is there any further  
 16 discussion? Seeing none --  
 17 MR. ROMBACH: Excuse me, I have some further  
 18 discussion. Tom Rombach from the 16th circuit.  
 19 I understand that we are here to pass  
 20 judgment on the five proposals before the Assembly,  
 21 but for my own personal comfort level with this  
 22 particular proposal I would like to move that we  
 23 require the proposed rule to be approved by the State  
 24 Bar Representative Assembly before being proposed  
 25 for adoption to the Michigan Supreme Court. In other

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1 words, that rule should come back to us, because I see  
 2 that there is a lot of similar discomfort with this  
 3 proposal as far as the devil being the details. I am  
 4 just asking for clarification if we need that.  
 5 Typically when we propose these types of  
 6 items before the Assembly we have an impact, for  
 7 instance, on our budget, we have an impact on staffing  
 8 levels, we have a lot of other things before this  
 9 comes back and is approved by the Assembly. I don't  
 10 see any of those requirements technically being made  
 11 in this proposal.  
 12 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Our parliamentarian  
 13 has identified that the rule, the language itself will  
 14 automatically come back to us. When it's submitted to  
 15 the Supreme Court they will publish for comment and  
 16 the Assembly would have another opportunity to address  
 17 it at that time, or the State Bar would have another  
 18 opportunity to address it at that time.  
 19 MR. ROMBACH: Again, I seek clarification  
 20 that there is one thing to go to the Supreme Court and  
 21 ask for commentary for us or proposed commentary, but  
 22 this is our own internal proposal, and I don't  
 23 understand why this body --  
 24 JUDGE SCHNELZ: This is not our own internal  
 25 proposal.

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1 MR. ROMBACH: -- of the State Bar of Michigan  
 2 wouldn't be passing on our own proposals to the  
 3 Supreme Court for adoption before it went to them. I  
 4 am not willing to accede our authority to staff and  
 5 then sight unseen go back to the Supreme Court and  
 6 then comment on our own proposal. It doesn't make any  
 7 sense.  
 8 All the other internal matters for State Bar  
 9 consideration that come in front of us have a  
 10 different proposed form. It's different than we  
 11 typically see. I know in drafting these things in the  
 12 past that we say what's the proposed impact on staff?  
 13 What's the proposed fiscal implications. I always  
 14 required that. This proposal doesn't have any of  
 15 that, and some of the concerns within the Assembly say  
 16 that we need to consider these ramifications before we  
 17 pass judgment on this matter.  
 18 JUDGE SCHNELZ: I will give a response. I  
 19 spent 23 years as parliamentarian for this body, and  
 20 as I with a driving up here today I was thinking that  
 21 some of the happiest moments of my life have been  
 22 sitting at the Representative Assembly acting as  
 23 parliamentarian. This will give you an idea of the  
 24 crummy life I actually lead.  
 25 You are not being asked to vote on a rule

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1 today. You are being asked to vote on four specific  
 2 questions for the concept of a proposed amendment.  
 3 Someone will ultimately draft that amendment. It's  
 4 already been pointed out that there are, in fact,  
 5 problems with it.  
 6 The Supreme Court in its wisdom will  
 7 ultimately decide exactly what's going to happen, but  
 8 the rules provide that if they decide to develop a  
 9 rule, they will then publish it and will call for  
 10 comment. At that time it is customary, and I assume  
 11 it will be in the future, I don't know of any reason  
 12 not to, they will send it to the Representative  
 13 Assembly for comment, and at that time you don't like  
 14 it.  
 15 So this isn't your rule going to them. This  
 16 is a particular core questions that you ask do I want  
 17 a new rule added, do I assert the rule incorporated  
 18 provision, should it incorporate another provision,  
 19 should it require fee? Those are the four questions  
 20 you are answering. That's the only imprint you are  
 21 putting on it from the standpoint of the  
 22 Representative Assembly.  
 23 I would suggest if you want to get on to the  
 24 debate to the more interesting questions that are  
 25 actually before you on proposed rules, you might want

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1 to move on.  
 2 MR. ROMBACH: If I am being ruled out of  
 3 order on my motion to amend, then at this time I move  
 4 to table this.  
 5 VOICE: Support.  
 6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: A motion has been made  
 7 and seconded. There is no discussion on it. So it  
 8 calls for vote.  
 9 All in favor.  
 10 Any opposed.  
 11 A two-thirds majority is required. A  
 12 majority is required, and there were a lot of nays, so  
 13 I don't think that that passed. So as chair I am  
 14 saying that did not pass.  
 15 VOICE: Let's stand.  
 16 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Executive Director.  
 17 MR. BERRY: Just for the general information  
 18 again on this issue of cost, I think it was already  
 19 mentioned by Mr. Anding that in general the cost, one  
 20 of the major reasons a rule like this is important to  
 21 have and as soon as you can have it is that you have  
 22 got things floating around this state, you don't have  
 23 a clue what's happening, and so from an initial  
 24 standpoint, just based upon other states and general  
 25 feelings, I don't think this is going to have a major

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1 impact on staffing, but we can't say that for sure  
 2 until we get at it, nor will we be able to do it  
 3 before we propose the rule, because we won't have the  
 4 information as to the exact impact.  
 5 So we won't be able to come back with you  
 6 with any more information about cost impact other than  
 7 the best effort I can tell you is that it would not be  
 8 a significant impact on cost.  
 9 I also understand what you are saying in  
 10 reference to the issue about how much detail before it  
 11 gets to the court. From the Executive Director's  
 12 standpoint, I think these are listed the main issues  
 13 that are involved. It really isn't -- in my opinion  
 14 it's not a matter of the technical drafting of this  
 15 one way or the other. If you instruct us on these  
 16 major issues, I think that's pretty well going to give  
 17 us a direction where to go, but I do understand what  
 18 you are saying, you want more detail before we go  
 19 there, but I would suggest this would cover the main  
 20 issues.  
 21 MR. ANDING: If I could speak on behalf of  
 22 the UPL Committee, as it's termed, and I have been  
 23 chairman of this committee for too long, because I  
 24 don't remember how long. It's probably been five  
 25 years.

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1 Obviously the practice of law is changing,  
 2 and with MJP and with the introduction of out-of-state  
 3 counsel in this jurisdiction, the face of UPL is  
 4 changing, we need the ability to reach and regulate  
 5 lawyers that are coming in from the out-of-state,  
 6 that's a given, and that's one of the issues before  
 7 you.  
 8 And the question is then is how do you pay  
 9 for it? And what seems fairer than having the lawyers  
 10 who are benefiting from practicing in this state  
 11 funding the cost of the regulatory activity necessary  
 12 to monitor their activities? Very little unfairness  
 13 there and no one talking about a particular fee amount  
 14 here; we are talking about the concept.  
 15 And so I only want to encourage you to  
 16 understand the implications of taking a back seat on  
 17 an issue where you have charged the UPL Committee of  
 18 the State Bar with monitoring unauthorized practice of  
 19 law activities and by walking away from this rule you  
 20 are eliminating one of the tools necessary to do our  
 21 job.  
 22 I move for the -- I would move, first of all,  
 23 that we vote on the first proposal, which is should a  
 24 new rule be added to the rules concerning the State  
 25 Bar of Michigan governing pro hac vice practice and

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1 granting jurisdiction of out-of-state lawyers to the  
 2 Attorney Grievance Commission and Attorney  
 3 Disciplinary Board.  
 4 VOICE: Second.  
 5 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: I heard support. Any  
 6 discussion?  
 7 Hearing no discussion, all in favor.  
 8 Any opposed?  
 9 That motion passes  
 10 MR. ANDING: Secondly, I would move for the  
 11 second element of the proposal here, which is a rule,  
 12 a new rule specifically incorporating a provision  
 13 requiring the out-of-state lawyers to affiliate with  
 14 active members of the State Bar who appear in record  
 15 of proceedings in which the out-of-state lawyer is  
 16 seeking pro hac vice permission to appear.  
 17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Do I hear a second?  
 18 VOICE: Support.  
 19 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 20 Hearing none, all in --.  
 21 MR. WILSON: Is there a motion to table this  
 22 portion? Scott Wilson from the 3rd circuit. I move  
 23 to table this particular motion.  
 24 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Parliamentarian has  
 25 said that you are out of order. Just a second, you

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1 are not out of order yet. Parliamentarian has advised  
 2 it requires a second, it's not debatable, so go to the  
 3 mike and stated your name and circuit.  
 4 MR. WILSON: Scott Wilson from the  
 5 3rd circuit moving to table the current motion.  
 6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Do I hear a second?  
 7 VOICE: Second.  
 8 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: There is no  
 9 discussion. All in favor.  
 10 Any opposed.  
 11 I don't believe that passed.  
 12 So now seeing no other discussion, I will  
 13 bring the second part of this second motion. All in  
 14 favor say aye, please.  
 15 Any opposed.  
 16 I am going to ask for a standing vote because  
 17 I can't tell the difference. All in favor, please  
 18 stand, and I have some tellers that have been  
 19 identified. I ask the tellers to please come forward  
 20 Marcia Ross Barbara Weintraub, Bill Ogden, Stephen  
 21 Gobbo, Victoria Radke, and John Reiser. If you could  
 22 please come forward. Two, two, and two, and just  
 23 double checks yours numbers.  
 24 (Standing count being taken.)  
 25 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: All the people who are

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1 in favor can sit down. Anybody opposed to the second  
 2 motion please rise.  
 3 (Standing vote being taken.)  
 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Parliamentarian has  
 5 said the motion fails.  
 6 Thank you. We had 60 in favor and 43 against  
 7 So majority rules and the second part passes.  
 8 MR. ANDING: Now move on, the third element  
 9 of the proposal, should the new rule specifically  
 10 incorporate a provision defining temporary practice  
 11 for out-of-state attorney as no more than three  
 12 separate representations within a 365 day period.  
 13 VOICE: Support.  
 14 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 15 MS. SCHRAND: I am Jennifer Schrand from the  
 16 37th district, and I was wondering if you are were  
 17 foreseeing any exceptions to this rule? For example,  
 18 I manage a legal aid office, and if we have a member  
 19 in good standing from another state that starts in our  
 20 organization, the judges in our county permit them to  
 21 practice pro hac vice while they are waiting for  
 22 reciprocal admission from the State Bar of Michigan,  
 23 and they do more than three cases while they await.  
 24 MR. ANDING: So is your question whether this  
 25 envisions that.

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1 MS. SCHRAND: Whether in the drafted rules,  
 2 since we are just voting on these in particular  
 3 questions, whether the drafted rule would have any  
 4 exceptions to that three.  
 5 MR. ANDING: Again, we are not here to talk  
 6 about what the drafted rule will reflect. I think  
 7 that's an issue that could be addressed with comment  
 8 when the rule is put out for distribution. I mean,  
 9 you are making a point that obviously is one that  
 10 needs to be dealt with, and whether -- Victoria  
 11 Kremski would be a good resource for you to raise that  
 12 issue with, because she will be active in --.  
 13 MS. SCHRAND: But I think whether I vote yes  
 14 or no or maybe whether other people vote yes or no on  
 15 this would depend on whether there are going to be  
 16 exceptions considered.  
 17 MR. ANDING: But that's not the question  
 18 before the Assembly right now. There is the old  
 19 saying, you know, drafting by committee with a group of  
 20 lawyers is the world's worst nightmare. That's really  
 21 what we are talking about here. We are talking about  
 22 policy questions that ultimately will be incorporated  
 23 into a rule which would then be commented on and  
 24 implemented based on that.  
 25 MS. SCHRAND: Okay.

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1 MR. ANDREE: Gerard Andree from the 6th  
 2 circuit. The very exhibit we have received in support  
 3 of this on page two, Exhibit A, indicates that the  
 4 State Bar is not aware of any court that keeps the  
 5 statistics regarding the number of pro hac vice  
 6 applications received and approved, that it is  
 7 impossible to know how many out-of-state lawyers are  
 8 appearing in Michigan courts at any given time, et  
 9 cetera.  
 10 That being the case, I wonder why we are, why  
 11 a new rule should specifically incorporate a provision  
 12 for which it is not known if there is a problem, and  
 13 until I know that there is a problem with attorneys  
 14 abusing or there is a problem we need to address, I am  
 15 not in favor of putting a limitation in.  
 16 MR. ANDING: Thank you. I think you have put  
 17 your finger on the problem, and the problem is, and  
 18 it's so often the case given our nature, is the things  
 19 that we can't see, we don't understand, we can  
 20 speculate about whether there is or isn't a problem.  
 21 We in the UPL Committee believe there is a  
 22 problem. We are the people who are fielding the  
 23 complaints about practitioners coming in across the  
 24 border engaging in activities in this state. We know  
 25 that's happening.

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1 This is a methodology, a mechanism, so to  
 2 speak, that will allow us to get our arms around the  
 3 very question you say is now an uncertain one in terms  
 4 of its answer. We want to know how much of a problem  
 5 it is, and that's why we are seeking to implement a  
 6 procedure that will allow us to monitor the  
 7 activities of out-of-state lawyers here in Michigan.  
 8 MR. ANDREE: I have no problem with a  
 9 provision in the rule that will allow you the means to  
 10 determine the problem, but to put a solution into the  
 11 rule when you don't know what the problem is first I  
 12 think is not appropriate.  
 13 MR. ANDING: Thank you. And just to respond  
 14 to that, the three-day or excuse me, the three  
 15 appearances or three cases per year is a rule that has  
 16 been utilized in other jurisdictions, so we are not  
 17 carving ourselves out new ground on this particular  
 18 element of the proposal.  
 19 MR. ARD: I think we all agree there is going  
 20 to be a number. I mean, a hundred a year, you are  
 21 not -- you are a Michigan lawyer, something like that.  
 22 The question I would think would be is three the right  
 23 number.  
 24 MR. ROGNESS: Proposal has been moved and  
 25 seconded. May we call the question?

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1 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Now call the question.  
 2 Do I hear support?  
 3 VOICE: Support.  
 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: All in favor.  
 5 Any opposed.  
 6 Parliamentarian says that it passes, and,  
 7 therefore, it is -- I still have -- is debate closed  
 8 now? Debate is closed. We bring that to a vote then,  
 9 and I apologize.  
 10 With regard to the third motion, all in  
 11 favor, please say yea.  
 12 Any opposed, please say --  
 13 I am sorry, but I can't tell the difference  
 14 between the yeses and the noes, so all those in favor  
 15 have to stand. We are just going to see whether we  
 16 can tell by a view before counting.  
 17 VOICE: This is for number 3, correct?  
 18 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: This is for number 3.  
 19 Now sit down. All those who are opposed,  
 20 please stand.  
 21 Okay. It's close enough. People who said  
 22 no, please stay standing, and I am going to have the  
 23 tellers count the noes first, then we'll have the  
 24 yeses.  
 25 (Standing count being taken.)

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1 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: The noes can sit down.  
 2 All those in favor of the third motion, please stand.  
 3 (Standing count being taken.)  
 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Everybody can be  
 5 seated while we are waiting for the tally.  
 6 The numbers were 59 in favor, 47 against.  
 7 That passes by a majority.  
 8 MR. ANDING: I would like to move on --  
 9 excuse me. I would like to move on to the fourth  
 10 element of the proposed new rule requiring a fee to be  
 11 paid by out-of-state lawyers to cover the  
 12 administrative costs incurred by the State Bar of  
 13 Michigan to monitor compliance.  
 14 VOICE: Support.  
 15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 16 VOICE: Question.  
 17 MR. HAROUTUNIAN: Ed Haroutunian from the 6th  
 18 judicial district. I am going to presume that after  
 19 these votes that the Unauthorized Practice of Law  
 20 Committee will, in effect, then go back to the drawing  
 21 board, as they say, and ultimately put the final  
 22 proposal together. I would think certainly that with  
 23 regard to the comments that have been made, although  
 24 we are not voting on it, understood, but I would think  
 25 that thought should be given to some of the comments

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1 that we made so that the proposal by the committee  
 2 when it's made ultimately incorporates some of those  
 3 thoughts and certainly if additional comments are  
 4 needed or input required, I am sure that the members  
 5 of this Representative Assembly would be pleased to  
 6 assist in that effort.  
 7 MR. ANDING: Thank you for that comment, and  
 8 that goes without saying. One of the benefits of  
 9 being here and making this proposal here today and  
 10 listening to the discussion is that it does give us  
 11 some insights that ordinarily, quite frankly, we don't  
 12 have when we sit down as a group. So we certainly  
 13 will take what's being said here into account as we  
 14 sit down and reformulate this rule.  
 15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any other discussion?  
 16 Seeing none, all in favor.  
 17 Any opposed.  
 18 Ayes have it.  
 19 Next on the agenda is another proposal with  
 20 regard to the rules concerning the State Bar of  
 21 Michigan regarding confidentiality of State Bar  
 22 programs.  
 23 MR. ANDING: This one I don't think will be  
 24 nearly as noteworthy. This particular proposal has to  
 25 do with confidentiality. It's the beige handout you

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1 received today. I am told by the parliamentarian it's  
2 taupe, not beige.

3 This particular proposal has to do with  
4 implementing a rule that essentially will confer,  
5 ratify what is already in practice, and that is that  
6 communications with various State Bar committees,  
7 ethics hotline, ethics committee, law office  
8 management, unauthorized practice of law, child  
9 protection, and lawyers and judges assistance program,  
10 that those conversations would be confidential and not  
11 subject to subpoena power.

12 Let me give you a concrete example. In the  
13 UPL context we often have individuals come to us,  
14 complain of a particular activity of an individual  
15 within their community. Needless to say, that  
16 individual who is otherwise taking remuneration for  
17 his or her activities is not very happy about the fact  
18 that they have been called on the carpet and may seek  
19 to have disclosed the identity of the complaining  
20 party.

21 Now, whether ultimately that person's  
22 identity would have to come out over the course of the  
23 investigation or prosecution is another question, but  
24 in the first instance we like to avoid the  
25 intimidation that can often occur early in an

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1 investigation by protecting the identity of the person  
2 who has made the complaint.

3 I am sure that for those of you who are  
4 involved in some of the other activities of the State  
5 Bar in the ethics area, in the child protection area  
6 and others, that similar issues come up which would  
7 prompt the same sort of concerns. And so what we are  
8 simply asking for is this body recommend  
9 essentially ratifying an informal practice currently  
10 that we have in place to put a rule in place that  
11 allows us to preserve the confidential communications.  
12 It will be something more that we can point to when we  
13 attempt to resist efforts to get this information  
14 disclosed.

15 Comments, questions? No comments or  
16 questions. I will move for the adoption of the  
17 proposal, essentially new Rule 20, that would creat  
18 confidentiality for communications.

19 VOICE: Support.

20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Hearing support, any  
21 discussion?

22 MR. GARRISON: Scott Garrison, 6th circuit.  
23 You just said something that I think conflicts with  
24 the rule, because as I read what's proposed it's  
25 should there be a rule proposed, and you said that you

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1 make a motion that we add the rule. I am kind of  
2 confused, because what it seems like we are doing --

3 MR. ANDING: Maybe I wasn't clear.

4 MR. GARRISON: It seems like you are asking  
5 us do you want us to do the work to propose a new rule  
6 to you and then we will come back with a proposal.

7 MR. ANDING: No, what we are asking for is,  
8 to answer the question, should a new rule be added  
9 that preserves confidentiality and communications.

10 MR. GARRISON: Then why aren't we voting on a  
11 proposed new rule?

12 MR. ANDING: We don't. That's not our job I  
13 am told. Our job is to make the policy determination.

14 MR. GARRISON: But we just did for two court  
15 rules, right?

16 JUDGE SCHNELZ: Scott, look at the paper.  
17 There is no rule.

18 MR. GARRISON: I know that, and that's why I  
19 am confused. I am wondering what we are doing.

20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: What the Assembly is  
21 being asked to do is to take a policy position with  
22 regard to whether or not the State Bar of Michigan  
23 rules should be amended to have a confidentiality.  
24 The exact drafting of what that rule would be is not  
25 before the Assembly. It's just the policy of whether

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1 or not one should be.

2 MR. GARRISON: Who is responsible for  
3 drafting the rule then?

4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: The State Bar of  
5 Michigan staff.

6 MR. GARRISON: And it never comes back to us  
7 again.

8 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: That's exactly what  
9 happened -- this is what happened with regard to the  
10 positions that were taken on the Court Rules in  
11 October that you have as a handout. We took the  
12 policy positions, and we left it to the staff for  
13 drafting, and then when the drafting was done the  
14 Executive Director sent that off to the Supreme Court.

15 MR. GARRISON: Okay. All right.

16 MR. ROMBACH: Tom Rombach from the 6th  
17 circuit. We have dealt with this matter on the  
18 Commission before. My concern has been that we don't  
19 empower any of these committees, the Ethics Committee,  
20 the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, the State  
21 Courts Committee to go directly to the Supreme Court  
22 without either Representative Assembly approval or  
23 without approval of the Board of Commissioners in the  
24 interim, and I am not quite sure when, the commentary  
25 that I heard from the discussion, that this was going

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1 to go back to the UPL Committee on the things we were  
 2 voting for before, now all of a sudden to staff and  
 3 then that's going to be submitted to the Supreme  
 4 Court.  
 5 Again, I am not sure that's been done in the  
 6 past. Perhaps I stand corrected about other things,  
 7 but typically every committee is required to come here  
 8 for final approval of the rule before its submitted to  
 9 the Supreme Court, and that's all I am asking is for  
 10 clarification, I guess, if this is proposed to come  
 11 back before us, because I don't know of any other  
 12 committee that has that prerogative, whether it's the  
 13 Grievance Committee, which is a special committee. I  
 14 mean, all of these folks have been shot down in the  
 15 past when I sat in the Board of Commissioners, got  
 16 shot done every time, that it has to go to the  
 17 Assembly first, and I am told once we vote on policy  
 18 we don't get to see the official rule, and I don't  
 19 understand how that happens.  
 20 MR. ANDING: I can't speak to the procedural  
 21 elements because I am not sure I can answer your  
 22 question. I can only tell you as a matter of policy  
 23 my committee is asking for this Assembly to approve as  
 24 a matter of policy and allow the State Bar to move  
 25 forward with the drafting of the rule that preserves

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1 confidentiality.  
 2 MR ROMBACH: Is it the intent to bring this  
 3 rule back before the State Bar Representative  
 4 Assembly?  
 5 MR. ANDING: We will do whatever we are told  
 6 to do. We obviously are not an autonomous body. We  
 7 will take this charge, we will go back, we will draft  
 8 a rule, and we will submit it for approval. Obviously  
 9 we don't just --  
 10 MR. ROMBACH: Again, perhaps through the  
 11 chair I could direct the question to John Berry, since  
 12 he is in charge of the staff, and I would like to know  
 13 what the clarification is.  
 14 MR. BERRY: Let me try to add my perspective  
 15 as I listen to both sides of this. I think it's been,  
 16 first of all, done both ways in my experience four and  
 17 a half years here, and you have seen that. You may  
 18 have a rule, and you sit here and you work on it, or  
 19 you may have a policy, and then that policy is  
 20 approved, and that's happened in reference to some of  
 21 the rules recently. It goes to the court, the court  
 22 puts out what it does, and you react. My personal  
 23 understanding is you could do that any way you want to  
 24 do it.  
 25 One of the problems we have concerning this

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1 rule, as a practical one, is that I think that the  
 2 implementation of that rule is probably going to be  
 3 fairly technical, the policies vitally important. We  
 4 have a law office management program that's just  
 5 getting started and some other issues. So from a  
 6 timing standpoint, while we are waiting for that time  
 7 of that technicality, we are going to have these  
 8 things potentially being open that we don't want them  
 9 to be open.  
 10 But your point, my understanding of what your  
 11 point would be, that would be a decision of this body,  
 12 you will either approve it by policy and then we will  
 13 go forward and you react to it, or you could instruct  
 14 the staff to say you don't do that, you bring the bill  
 15 in front of you.  
 16 Now, if I am wrong on that, I would be glad  
 17 to hear from the parliamentarian or from the chair,  
 18 but I have seen it both ways and I think it's this  
 19 body's prerogative to go whichever way you want. I  
 20 will follow whatever.  
 21 MR. ROMBACH: At this time I would like to  
 22 move to require the proposed rule to be approved by  
 23 the State Bar Representative Assembly before being  
 24 proposed for adoption by the Michigan Supreme Court  
 25 Court.

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1 VOICE: Support.  
 2 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Any  
 3 comment?  
 4 MR. ANDREE: I suppose maybe I will comment  
 5 on that as an adjunct.  
 6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: That's what the  
 7 comment is for. It's the comment to Mr. Rombach's  
 8 motion.  
 9 MR. ANDREE: Gerard Andree from the 6th  
 10 circuit. Yesterday I received by e-mail this rules  
 11 concerning the State Bar of Michigan with the new  
 12 proposal, should a new rule be added, et cetera, and  
 13 attached to that was the rule. I mean, it's already  
 14 drafted. It was sent out to everybody. I have got it  
 15 in my hand so what is the idea that we are going to  
 16 give you a policy and you are going to go back and  
 17 write a rule? It's already written, it's already been  
 18 sent to us. What are we doing here if we can't look  
 19 at rule and say whether we agree with it or not?  
 20 (Applause.)  
 21 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any more discussion?  
 22 Seeing none, then I will call that to vote. All in  
 23 favor of Mr. Rombach's motion for the Assembly to  
 24 review the rule before it goes to the Supreme Court,  
 25 please say aye.



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1 Any opposed.  
 2 That passes.  
 3 VOICE: Can we now call the question?  
 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Now having taken that  
 5 motion we go back to the discussion with regard to the  
 6 fourth motion that is on the table, which is the  
 7 fourth motion, should the new rule require a fee to be  
 8 paid by out-of-state attorneys to cover the  
 9 administrative costs.  
 10 VOICES: No.  
 11 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: I am so sorry, we are  
 12 on the confidentiality, and we are done. So sorry.  
 13 Now we vote in favor of the confidentiality,  
 14 thank you, policy.  
 15 All in favor of the confidentiality, the  
 16 policy that is before the Representative Assembly --  
 17 Okay. So does everybody have what we are  
 18 talking about that's on the beige or taupe piece of  
 19 paper. It's on the screen. Thank you very much  
 20 Mr. Romano.  
 21 All in favor please say aye.  
 22 Any opposed, please say no.  
 23 That's passed. Thank you very much.  
 24 Next item on the agenda is item number 7 with  
 25 regard to the Rules of Professional Conduct. First up

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1 is MRPC 1.0.2. I am going to call on our panelists to  
 2 the extent that they have insight as our resources  
 3 here today for this debate, beginning with John Allen.  
 4 MR. ALLEN: Thank you, Elizabeth. As  
 5 currently proposed, the Supreme Court has not provided  
 6 for any transition from the current rules to the new  
 7 proposed rules despite the fact that there are many  
 8 very material changes requiring both compliance and in  
 9 some cases communication to clients.  
 10 This proposal would ask the addition of a  
 11 transition provision which would say that the  
 12 engagements existing as of the effective date of the  
 13 amendment would essentially be controlled by whatever  
 14 the rules were at the inception of that engagement  
 15 unless the client and the lawyer agreed otherwise.  
 16 There may be some things in the new rules that we  
 17 would defer. You can blame me for this one. I  
 18 drafted it and gave it to Elizabeth.  
 19 My purpose was thinking about, first of all,  
 20 those who may be intermediary. Under present Rule  
 21 2.2, you are being abolished, and it doesn't really  
 22 say what you are supposed to do, so I think there  
 23 ought to be a way to continue the engagements that  
 24 are in effect without any concern. If you complied  
 25 with the rule, then in effect when you began that

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1 engagement you are okay.  
 2 And, secondly, I see a potential problem for  
 3 the confirmed in writing requirement if adopted could  
 4 require many, many notices being sent out and  
 5 continuing engagements. The example I like to think  
 6 of is the estate planner who might have hundreds of  
 7 joint estate plans or other files that they consider  
 8 to be continuing client relationships that would  
 9 require written confirmations of any conflict waiver  
 10 as of the date of the rules become effective.  
 11 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Do any of  
 12 the other panelists have any comment on this.  
 13 Seeing none, then I will entertain a motion  
 14 with regard to the proposal addressing MRPC 1.0.2.  
 15 VOICE: So move.  
 16 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: A second, please.  
 17 VOICE: Second.  
 18 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 19 Seeing none, all in favor of the MRPC 1.0.2  
 20 proposal say aye.  
 21 Any opposed.  
 22 That proposal passes.  
 23 Next on the agenda is MRPC 1.4(c). Again I  
 24 will defer to John Allen with regard to clarification  
 25 with regard to the proposal.

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1 MR. ALLEN: Thank you, Elizabeth. This one  
 2 gets blamed on me too. As the chair of the Special  
 3 Committee on Grievance, we look at the issues which  
 4 are most commonly placed before the Attorney Grievance  
 5 Commission and the Attorney Discipline Board, what do  
 6 they spend their time on. Aside from fee disputes and  
 7 maybe not returning phone calls, who is entitled to  
 8 the file is a very common complaint for which there is  
 9 not much clarified guidance in the law, at least as  
 10 applied to lawyers' files.  
 11 When one looks at the law of the state of  
 12 Michigan as to accountant' files or health provider'  
 13 files, there is quite a bit of guidance, and it  
 14 basically is that the client or patient, as the case  
 15 may be, is not entitled to the file itself, they do  
 16 not own the file, rather they are entitled to access  
 17 to the information which is in the file.  
 18 There are some unfortunate informal Ethics  
 19 Committee opinions from years past that say clients  
 20 own files of lawyers. In an electronic age that could  
 21 be especially problematic in that you for a file that  
 22 is entirely electronic the client may have a  
 23 proprietary interest in your C drive. We need to  
 24 bring that up to date.  
 25 To protect the client we have continued the

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1 requirement of formal opinion R-5 that there should be  
 2 in place by every lawyer a client plan or procedure  
 3 governing safekeeping of property, including the  
 4 information that is in the file. As written, that is  
 5 not necessarily required to be in writing nor is it  
 6 required to be in writing under the formal ethics  
 7 opinion, although that might be a very nice idea, and  
 8 it also, again, in permissive terms in the final  
 9 submission suggests that the engagement or the terms  
 10 of engagement may be a good time to inform the client  
 11 about what your rules are and to remind them that they  
 12 do not own the file.  
 13 It also gives the client an absolute right to  
 14 portions of the file they may need, for instance,  
 15 property they gave you or an original that might be  
 16 necessary for a handwriting analysis, something like  
 17 that for nondestructive use. It also clarifies that  
 18 there is no interest even in the information as a  
 19 proprietary right of the client of your internal  
 20 records, that is time logs, drafted statements, things  
 21 of that nature. Of course you can agree to give up  
 22 those things or by a court order or subpoena you might  
 23 be required to.  
 24 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Another  
 25 expert has joined our panel, Judge Brown, who is on

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1 the Ethics Committee for the State Bar of Michigan,  
 2 and I would defer to him for comment as well.  
 3 JUDGE ELWOOD BROWN: My concern with the  
 4 proposal here is whether or it not it belongs in an  
 5 ethics rule. What you are doing is I think addressing  
 6 an area of substantive law. The retaining is a common  
 7 law, is in the common law. There is a lot of case law  
 8 on it. What we are dealing with here is ethics as  
 9 opposed to who owns the file, and I think it's very, I  
 10 think we have to be cautious not putting in an ethics  
 11 rule something involving substantive law as to who  
 12 owns this file.  
 13 If you look at Ethics Rule 1.16, it  
 14 specifically requires that you not harm the client  
 15 essentially when you terminate your representation of  
 16 them. So if you for some reason had a dispute with a  
 17 client and you no longer representing that person and  
 18 that person hires another lawyer to represent them in  
 19 an ongoing case, ethically you cannot harm that client  
 20 by continuing to hang on to the information that he  
 21 needs in order to prosecute or to defend the case that  
 22 he is involved in, and that's made clear in 1.16.  
 23 And I think to put a rule in like this is  
 24 going, or adopt a rule as being proposed, is asking  
 25 for difficulty in weighing, balancing those two

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1 concepts.  
 2 This to me is a substantive issue, it's not  
 3 an ethics issue. So I just point that out.  
 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Don  
 5 Campbell.  
 6 MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you. I am Don Campbell  
 7 with Collins, Einhorn, a firm in Southfield, Michigan.  
 8 My concern is elevating R-5 to the status of  
 9 a rule or a requirement. R-5 is an ethics opinion.  
 10 It's a formal ethics opinion. But even within the --  
 11 nobody ever gets the book, everybody goes online, but  
 12 if you look at the scope of the ethics opinions, it  
 13 says that they are not law and they are not binding,  
 14 but to the extent that they are well reasoned they  
 15 can be relied upon by Michigan practitioners.  
 16 Frankly, R-5 is one of the better opinions.  
 17 It should be, and I believe is, generally relied on by  
 18 most practitioners. It's a great rule to have in  
 19 place as a rule, but not as R-5, and so I want to be  
 20 careful. I think if you just strike the language that  
 21 says that in accordance with R-5, if you are going to  
 22 adopt a rule you have as good a rule as you are going  
 23 to have. But I want to caution you or express my  
 24 concern that in elevating an ethics rule to the,  
 25 excuse me, an ethics opinion to the status of rule is

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1 dangerous and may have some unforeseen consequences  
 2 relative to the 20 or so formal ethics opinions that  
 3 are out there, and I think we are up to 300-some  
 4 informal ethics opinions.  
 5 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. I will  
 6 entertain a motion with regard to the proposal  
 7 MRPC 1.4(c). I will entertaining a motion with regard  
 8 to the proposal MRPC 1.4(c).  
 9 VOICE: So move.  
 10 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Can I hear  
 11 a second.  
 12 VOICE: Second.  
 13 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 14 MR. GILLARY: Randy Gillary from the 6th  
 15 circuit. I would like to echo the judge's comments.  
 16 Typically this is going to come up when a client wants  
 17 to change lawyers. You don't want to be in the  
 18 situation where the old lawyer is holding the file  
 19 hostage, and usually it's because there is a problem  
 20 with the existing representation, and I think it hurts  
 21 the client to make it unnecessarily burdensome to move  
 22 that file. Especially when there is original  
 23 documents, when they are going to be better than the  
 24 copies. I don't think the old lawyer should be  
 25 retaining originals that are needed to prosecute the

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<p>1 case, so I have a problem with that aspect of the</p> <p>2 rule.</p> <p>3 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you.</p> <p>4 MS. POHLY: Linda Pohly from the 7th circuit.</p> <p>5 I rise in support of the motion. This rule also</p> <p>6 governs cases where a lawyer has died, become</p> <p>7 disabled, or disappeared. There is very little</p> <p>8 guidance under those circumstances for people coming</p> <p>9 in to assist in the process of returning files to the</p> <p>10 clients. This gives us more guidance than we</p> <p>11 currently have, gives us a place to start. Thank you.</p> <p>12 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you.</p> <p>13 John, can you clarify with regard to being</p> <p>14 our expert resource here.</p> <p>15 MR. ALLEN: Yes, the reference to 1.16 and</p> <p>16 the need of the client with a succeeding counsel</p> <p>17 relationship to obtain the file, I really don't</p> <p>18 envision this as changing that at all. The only</p> <p>19 difference is what the client is entitled to is the</p> <p>20 information in the file rather than the actual file.</p> <p>21 In other words, you don't have to turn the C drive</p> <p>22 over to the next lawyer anymore than you have to turn</p> <p>23 the original document. It must be a legible copy. It</p> <p>24 must be one that's every bit as accurate as the</p> <p>25 original and every bit as usable.</p>	<p>1 just have a question. What happens to the lawyer's</p> <p>2 notes about the case, handwritten notes or whatever,</p> <p>3 under this proposal? Who owns them? Is it the client</p> <p>4 or is it the lawyer?</p> <p>5 MR. ALLEN: We did not try to distinguish in</p> <p>6 drafting the rule between what was handwritten or</p> <p>7 typewritten or created by the lawyer. I think that</p> <p>8 depends on the materiality of the information that's</p> <p>9 in the file. If it's a note, I think, that's</p> <p>10 something completely internal to your law firm to whom</p> <p>11 you are assigning the work, an accounting ledger,</p> <p>12 something like that, I think the rule would come down</p> <p>13 in favor of that being yours and not the clients. And</p> <p>14 if you had a vote, be it handwritten, typewritten, or</p> <p>15 electronic that was necessary and material to the</p> <p>16 client's use of the file, that's information in the</p> <p>17 file to which they are entitled.</p> <p>18 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you.</p> <p>19 MR. BUCHANAN: Robert Buchanan from the 17th</p> <p>20 circuit. Part of my practice is medical malpractice</p> <p>21 plaintiff's work, and we deal with, you know, getting</p> <p>22 medical records is a big part of what we do in</p> <p>23 evaluating a case. I guess a concern I have with 15</p> <p>24 is, not that I am against the proposal, but maybe</p> <p>25 there should be more specificity about what are the,</p>
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<p>1 I also don't think it changes anything about</p> <p>2 the common law of retaining liens or charging liens.</p> <p>3 If there is a lien, then it's a lien against the</p> <p>4 information too, and that's a separate question to be</p> <p>5 resolved.</p> <p>6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you.</p> <p>7 MR. LARKY: Madam Chair, my name is Sheldon</p> <p>8 Larky from the 6th circuit.</p> <p>9 First just a question to John Allen. John,</p> <p>10 would you mind if we struck out in accordance with</p> <p>11 formal opinion R-5 from this proposed text?</p> <p>12 MR. ALLEN: Not at all. Mr. Campbell's</p> <p>13 recommendation is probably a good one. That was in</p> <p>14 there just to explain to people what I was thinking</p> <p>15 about in terms of a policy.</p> <p>16 MR. LARKY: If that was accepted as a</p> <p>17 friendly amendment to this motion, I believe that we</p> <p>18 should adopt this motion.</p> <p>19 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Does anybody object to</p> <p>20 the friendly amendment? All in favor of the friendly</p> <p>21 amendment.</p> <p>22 Any opposed.</p> <p>23 Further discussion with regard to this</p> <p>24 proposal.</p> <p>25 MS. LIEM: Veronique Liem, 22nd circuit. I</p>	<p>1 you know, is it reasonable costs that the client is</p> <p>2 responsible for.</p> <p>3 In the medical context there is a statute now</p> <p>4 that has given us clarification so it says what is the</p> <p>5 per page cost for the, you know, first 20 pages, then</p> <p>6 it goes down on a graduated rate so that you don't</p> <p>7 have a controversy what it is that should be charged</p> <p>8 to the client or to the patient for those records, and</p> <p>9 I would say five is a little broad and my concern with</p> <p>10 that is it's not modified by reasonable or there is no</p> <p>11 direction as to what the cost is. That's my comment.</p> <p>12 MR. ALLEN: The reason why it's not specified</p> <p>13 is that information these days is kept in so many</p> <p>14 different formats and so many different ways that we</p> <p>15 thought it was impossible. I think reasonable as a</p> <p>16 requirement is certainly implied, if not there</p> <p>17 already, as part of the law. If you have to make one</p> <p>18 page of one photocopy and that's the entire file,</p> <p>19 that's one thing. If you have to translate an old</p> <p>20 Wang program that no one has seen in the last 20</p> <p>21 years, it might be a lot more expensive.</p> <p>22 MR. BUCHANAN: I guess my proposal then would</p> <p>23 be to change and put a reasonable modification in</p> <p>24 paragraph five to address that concern.</p> <p>25 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Is that a motion to</p>

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1 amend?  
 2 MR. BUCHANAN: I am sorry, motion to amend.  
 3 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: And the language is  
 4 what?  
 5 MR. BUCHANAN: I will just say that the  
 6 client is responsible to pay the reasonable cost of a  
 7 copying of the file records.  
 8 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Do I hear a second  
 9 with regard to that motion?  
 10 VOICE: Support.  
 11 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 12 Seeing no discussion, all in favor of that  
 13 friendly amendment.  
 14 Any opposed.  
 15 Ayes have it.  
 16 Any further discussion with regard to the  
 17 MRPC 1.4(c) discussion? Judge Brown, did you want to  
 18 make a comment as resource?  
 19 JUDGE ELWOOD BROWN: Just for thought.  
 20 Before I came here I happened to pull up an Illinois  
 21 Bar Journal article talking about attorneys, liens,  
 22 and when you can retain clients' files. If you look  
 23 around the country in any resource that you can find  
 24 it talks in terms of the clients' files.  
 25 1.16 implies a client's file. What you are

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1 doing, what the proposal is doing is trying to change  
 2 that, and I think the ethics rule is not the place to  
 3 change that. We are dealing with ethics only, not the  
 4 issue of whether or not you should own the file.  
 5 Until you have either a statute or some type of court  
 6 adopted law that says you own the file, you can't  
 7 change it in an ethics rule.  
 8 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further questions?  
 9 MR. HAROUTUNIAN: Madam Chair, Ed Haroutunian  
 10 from the 6th district. Item Number 6, the last clause  
 11 says, Dealing with the plan of procedure, including  
 12 those parts of the representation file which belong to  
 13 the client or for which the client has a need.  
 14 The comment that was made earlier with regard  
 15 to attorney notes in the file, I have always looked at  
 16 that as the thought process. Conceivably some would  
 17 say that that's probably or perhaps the most valuable  
 18 part of the file. Why? Because a lawyer thought  
 19 about all of the objective facts and the circumstances  
 20 and then went forward and put those thoughts together  
 21 and put those thoughts either in handwritten notes,  
 22 typed notes, memos.  
 23 The question is would that language or for  
 24 which the client has a need be, would it include or  
 25 encompass those kinds of notes dealing with the

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1 attorney thought process concerning the file?  
 2 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: John Allen, I would  
 3 ask you to answer this.  
 4 MR. ALLEN: Neither this or any other rule is  
 5 going to resolve every last one of these questions  
 6 because they are all new uniquely fact determinative  
 7 in each instance.  
 8 I go back to the answer I gave before, and I  
 9 think it also happens to be the current law of this  
 10 and most other jurisdictions, and that is if it is  
 11 information in the file for which the client has a  
 12 legitimate and material need to represent their own  
 13 interests, then the client should have access to the  
 14 information that is in that. It may not be the  
 15 handwritten note, it might not even be the whole page  
 16 of notes, but it should be that portion of it for  
 17 which the client has a need. The information in that  
 18 could be, for instance, transcribed or otherwise made  
 19 available to the client so that they have what they  
 20 need to go forward with the representation of that or  
 21 another matter.  
 22 MR. GILLARY: Randy Gillary, again from the  
 23 6th circuit. Again I agree with Judge Brown. I think  
 24 what we are trying to do is change a file from  
 25 belonging to our client to belonging to us with this

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1 rule, which I don't think we have the authority to do  
 2 that, and the first, in number one, it says a lawyer's  
 3 file is owned by the lawyer, but then in number two it  
 4 says a lawyer is entitled to the original, physical  
 5 material in the file. It doesn't say the lawyer's  
 6 file.  
 7 So it seems like we are lumping clients  
 8 material and lawyers material into the same file, and  
 9 I oppose the rule.  
 10 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
 11 discussion? Seeing none, I will entertain a motion  
 12 with regard to MRPC -- oh, sorry, call to order, or I  
 13 mean we will take it to a vote.  
 14 All in favor of the proposal regarding  
 15 MRPC 1.4(c) please say aye.  
 16 All opposed, please say nay.  
 17 We are going to do a count. All those in  
 18 favor, please stand. Tellers would you please count.  
 19 (Standing count being taken.)  
 20 You may be seated. All those saying nay to  
 21 this proposal, please stand.  
 22 (Standing count being taken.)  
 23 You may be seated. And the tellers have  
 24 asked me to remind you that when we are taking this  
 25 vote that you can't be walking around, so while we are

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1 doing the vote you need to either be standing or  
2 sitting in your position. Thanks.

3 And the results on that are 46 yes, 57 no,  
4 which means the majority opinion is no, but we will  
5 report a minority opinion on this because it's more  
6 than 25 percent.

7 The next proposal that's before the Assembly  
8 is MRPC 4.2 with regard to communication. I will  
9 entertain a motion with regard to --

10 VOICE: So move.

11 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. A second.  
12 Do I hear a second with regard to the proposal.

13 VOICE: Second.

14 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Now for  
15 discussion. Again I will refer to John Allen as our  
16 expert resource.

17 Okay. Sorry. Let me explain to you how 4.2  
18 came before us. In November of 2003 the  
19 Representative Assembly debated the proposed language  
20 by the Ethics Committee that was going to be submitted  
21 to the Supreme Court, and in that regard the  
22 Representative Assembly position was, because the  
23 language proposed by the Ethics Committee to the  
24 Supreme Court was to change language within the rule  
25 from party to person. The Assembly took a position

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1 that they were opposed to that.

2 However, if the court decided to change the  
3 language from party to person, then the Assembly took  
4 a position requesting the court to add a comment to  
5 the rule with regard to a law enforcement exception,  
6 which is referenced in this proposal.

7 Ultimately the Supreme Court followed the  
8 Representative Assembly recommendation not to change  
9 the language from party to person, so the language  
10 remains party. However, the Supreme Court listened to  
11 our second recommendation, which isn't relevant  
12 because they listened to our first one because they  
13 didn't change the language, and they posted the law  
14 enforcement exception as an option in the comment.

15 What's before you now is an opportunity to  
16 make a statement with regard to that law enforcement  
17 exception and whether or not it should, in fact, be in  
18 the rule or in the comment, and if you vote no to  
19 either then that's the position that we are saying to  
20 the court, because they have that alternative language  
21 posted there as a result of the Representative  
22 Assembly position, again only because we had said if  
23 you change the language from party to person the  
24 Assembly is recommending that commentary.

25 So, with that background, motion being on the

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1 table and discussion -- actually I apologize, because  
2 during the panel discussions on this John VanBolt has  
3 stood up and talked about that, so I will have him as  
4 our expert resource.

5 MR. VANBOLT: I think expert resource may be  
6 overstating it a little bit. I have watched this rule  
7 in action on the sidelines and nationally at the  
8 National Organization of Bar Counsel, because it is  
9 true that using literally the phrase law enforcement  
10 there has certainly been attention for a long time,  
11 two decades at least between the U.S. Department of  
12 Justice and state ethics and disciplinary enforcement  
13 on whether or not the rule that says that a lawyer  
14 shall not communicate with a represented party,  
15 current rule, shall not communicate with a represented  
16 party without the permission of that party's lawyer.  
17 And the Department of Justice for a long time has  
18 said, but we are different, we are on the front line  
19 against crime, and we need to be able to do that.

20 The Supreme Court, the National Council of  
21 Supreme Court Justices, and various federal courts  
22 have all rejected that argument, and, in fact, there  
23 is an amendment in the United States Statutes called  
24 McDaid amendment that says federal law enforcement  
25 officers do have to follow state ethics guidelines.

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1 This particular rule, my only comment is as  
2 Elizabeth said, that the law enforcement exception in  
3 Proposal B that's been published by the court is in  
4 large part, I will say, not necessary but certainly  
5 not in keeping with what this body's original intent  
6 was. It was an either/or, either keep party rather  
7 than person, but if you don't take our advice and  
8 change it to person, which is the ABA recommendation,  
9 then give us a law enforcement exception.

10 My comment is that while we refer to this as  
11 a law enforcement exception, I think it's worthy of  
12 noting that it, as written, says that this is a rule  
13 which will not apply to government lawyers  
14 investigating civil and criminal matters. That's a  
15 big exception, and that is one of the ultimate issues  
16 is should a rule which applies to most lawyers in  
17 Michigan carve out an exception that says but this  
18 group doesn't have to follow this rule.

19 But there is this drafting port which is  
20 really the reason that it's back here before you.

21 PRESIDENT DIEHL: Nancy Diehl, 3rd circuit.  
22 It is confusing what the Supreme Court did. Some of  
23 you who were here back when we debated this, I got up  
24 and argued against the then proposed rule change from  
25 represented party to represented person, and as has

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1 been stated, the worry was if the court changed it to  
2 represented person we would want it to be clear that  
3 there was a law enforcement exception.  
4 The court has not proposed that change.  
5 Proposal A is the rule as presently written, and as a  
6 prosecutor I have absolutely no problem with that.  
7 Law enforcement, as far as I am concerned, speaking  
8 for the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office, we followed  
9 that rule for years and are happy to continue to  
10 follow it, and I agree, we always have to be careful  
11 when we start --  
12 VOICE: Chipping away.  
13 PRESIDENT DIEHL: -- chipping away, I guess.  
14 Who is that? Is that Matt Abel who said that? So I  
15 spoke, as you recall, requested that you go against it  
16 before, and I appreciated what the Representative  
17 Assembly did, and I will tell you today, I am going to  
18 be voting for Proposal A.  
19 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
20 discussion? Seeing none.  
21 MR. ABEL: Wait, wait. I am Matthew Abel  
22 from the 3rd circuit, and, no, that wasn't me who  
23 spoke up before. But, first of all, and I am half  
24 serious, how many people in this room are law  
25 enforcement prosecutors or investigators or people

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1 who do that? Because I think there is a serious  
2 conflict of interest to allow prosecutors to vote on  
3 this issue, and I am not kidding. People are  
4 laughing, but this is exactly what they do for a  
5 living, make no mistake, and I think it's unfair to  
6 allow the prosecutors to have two bites of the apple,  
7 if you will, doing this.  
8 The Supreme Court has already messed this up.  
9 I don't think we should endorse it, help them,  
10 whatever. It's unconstitutional, ladies and  
11 gentlemen. Whether the Michigan Supreme Court agrees  
12 or not, the federal courts do, so whatever we do in  
13 this regard is probably not going to make any  
14 difference. Thanks.  
15 MS. MCQUADE: Barbara McQuade from the 3rd  
16 circuit. I am speaking in support of alternative B,  
17 because I think it's important that the exception not  
18 be buried in the comment but that it be specifically  
19 stated in the rule. I think the effect of A and B are  
20 the same; however, B makes it explicit in the rule  
21 what we are talking about, and to suggest it's  
22 unconstitutional is just contrary to the language of  
23 the rule, which says this rule does not apply to  
24 otherwise lawful investigations.  
25 To be lawful it must comply with the

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1 Constitution, and lawful investigation requires  
2 compliance with the Sixth Amendment, which prohibits  
3 contact with represented parties after they have been  
4 charged.  
5 The whole purpose of this is to get around  
6 the situation where a lawyer contacts -- I am a  
7 prosecutor -- our office and says, I am just calling  
8 to tell you I know my client is under investigation  
9 and I represent him; therefore, at that point all  
10 undercover activity has to stop, all use of electronic  
11 monitoring, consensual monitoring must stop, because  
12 that would be a contact with a represented person.  
13 Therefore, because it includes the words  
14 otherwise lawful, alternative B is both lawful and  
15 constitutional and enables us to do our jobs, so I ask  
16 for your support.  
17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you.  
18 MR. HAROUTUNIAN: Madam Chair, Ed Haroutunian  
19 from 6th circuit. I think it's important to note that  
20 alternative A is, in effect, a confirmation of what the  
21 Representative Assembly approved the last time this  
22 issue came before it. And, as Nancy Diehl points out  
23 and I concur with, that it in effect adopts the  
24 current rule but puts the exception, because the  
25 exception in effect, because the primary rule was not

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1 changed, the exception in effect didn't mean anything.  
2 So the idea is to leave alternative A, put  
3 the, quote-unquote, exception in the comments, leave it  
4 alone. So I would certainly urge folks to vote for  
5 alternative A and not alternative B.  
6 With regard to the comment that the  
7 prosecutors should not be allowed to vote, almost  
8 everything that the Representative Assembly does deals  
9 with lawyers and deals with how we practice, and it  
10 seems to me that that would mean that where we deal  
11 with certain rules, the criminal defense Bar should be  
12 prohibited from voting, the plaintiff's Bar should be  
13 prohibited from voting, or the defense side, or family  
14 law lawyers should not be able to vote on certain  
15 issues that come before the Representative Assembly.  
16 So I don't believe that that's appropriate  
17 here. I think everybody ought to be allowed to vote.  
18 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you.  
19 JUDGE KENT: Wally Kent, 54th circuit. I  
20 rise in opposition to alternative B. It seems to me  
21 that it's actually substantive law rather than  
22 procedural law and perhaps goes beyond the scope of  
23 the responsibility of this body, but to the extent  
24 that it is part of the responsibility of this body to  
25 act, it still seems like a not very subtle erosion of

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1 constitutional rights that once counsel has been  
 2 retained, that we should not interfere with the  
 3 privacy of the relationship between counsel and  
 4 client.  
 5 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Any  
 6 further discussion?  
 7 MS. WIDENER: Linda Widener, 30th circuit. I  
 8 want to point out I think the lady from the  
 9 3rd circuit made a point about this would interfere  
 10 with contacts that law enforcement has and  
 11 surveillance, and that's not what it says. It  
 12 specifically says communication. Communication is  
 13 direct communication with that party who is  
 14 represented, so I don't think that it would impede  
 15 whatever law enforcement has to do. I think they have  
 16 enough resources, and I don't think that it's  
 17 necessary.  
 18 VOICE: Call the question.  
 19 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: It's been called, the  
 20 question.  
 21 JUDGE SCHNELZ: They have to go to the mike.  
 22 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: I am sorry, you have  
 23 to go to the mike to be recognized.  
 24 MR. HERRINGTON: David Herrington, 52nd  
 25 circuit. As a follow-up to that, what the prosecutor

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1 also said I disagree with in terms of all contact and  
 2 monitoring ceasing. That would only apply if that  
 3 person is a party. If they are a person, that's  
 4 different, and it still allows law enforcement to do  
 5 their thing so long as that suspect doesn't become a  
 6 party. I support Proposal A.  
 7 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
 8 discussion?  
 9 MR. CRAMPTON: Jeff Crampton from the 17th  
 10 circuit. I simply want to point out that those who  
 11 are pointing out the problems with the prosecution  
 12 arguments, both Proposal A and Proposal B effectively  
 13 do the same thing, and you are allowed to vote against  
 14 both of those. I agree with the comments that my  
 15 colleague from the 30th circuit made that it applies  
 16 only to communications and that it wouldn't stop all  
 17 of these other electronic eavesdropping, things like  
 18 that, so long as they have got the appropriate  
 19 permissions. I will be voting against both A and B.  
 20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you.  
 21 MR. HORKEY: Christian Horkey from the 38th  
 22 circuit. I think we are getting confused that we are  
 23 talking about a Rule of Professional Conduct which  
 24 only applies to us, it doesn't apply to law  
 25 enforcement, unless they happen to be lawyers. So

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1 these police officers I don't think, you know, whatever  
 2 they are doing is going to be impacted much by  
 3 whatever we do today.  
 4 MS. MCQUADE: I need to respond. Barbara  
 5 McQuade from the 3rd circuit. It absolutely applies  
 6 to law enforcement officers. They are our agents.  
 7 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: I am sorry, but I have  
 8 to stop you because according to the rules you are  
 9 allowed to speak only once as to an issue.  
 10 MS. MCQUADE: Can I do point of order?  
 11 JUDGE SCHNELZ: Yes.  
 12 MS. MCQUADE: What you said was wrong.  
 13 MR. REISING: Bill Reising, 7th circuit. I  
 14 call the question.  
 15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: It's been called the  
 16 question. Do I heard a second?  
 17 VOICE: Second.  
 18 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: All in favor.  
 19 All opposed.  
 20 It passed. So it's call the question. So we  
 21 have motion with regard to proposal MRPC 4.2 before  
 22 you.  
 23 All in favor of option A, please say aye.  
 24 All opposed.  
 25 We are going to have to do a count. All

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1 those in favor, please stand.  
 2 The people who should be standing are those  
 3 in favor of A. If you are in favor of including the  
 4 law enforcement exception in only the comments, then  
 5 you stand in favor of that.  
 6 MS. MCQUADE: You are going to take a  
 7 separate vote on B?  
 8 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: If you voted yes on  
 9 A, you can't vote yes on B.  
 10 Let me explain why. Can I have your  
 11 attention, please. The reason why you would be able  
 12 to vote no on both if you wanted to vote no on both is  
 13 that you don't think that this law enforcement  
 14 exception should be in the comment or the rule.  
 15 MS. MCQUADE: I think it should be one or the  
 16 other.  
 17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: It is not one or the  
 18 other, and that's the point of our reporting to the  
 19 Supreme Court. You have the ability to vote in favor  
 20 of the comment, and we will report a majority or  
 21 minority opinion, and you have the ability to vote in  
 22 favor of having it in the rules, majority/minority.  
 23 MS. MCQUADE: But you can split people who  
 24 support the concept in camps A and B.  
 25 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: The point is whether

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1 or not it should be in the comments, the rules, or  
2 nowhere.

3 VOICE: Nowhere.

4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: If you think it should  
5 be nowhere, then you vote no to A, you vote no to  
6 B, and both of them fail.

7 Now that you understand that, everybody sit  
8 down.

9 MS. MCQUADE: The noes get two bites of the  
10 apple and the yeses only get one bite, so you can have  
11 people for A and for B but neither prevails.

12 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: You can vote yes on  
13 both. We are going to take them separately.

14 MS. ROSS: Point of order. Marcia Ross, 6th  
15 circuit. Can we vote then to defeat both A and B  
16 first and then otherwise on A and B? I move to if we  
17 are going to vote against both that we call the  
18 question on both at the same time.

19 Can I amend my motion?

20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: It's my understanding  
21 you're making a motion.

22 JUDGE SCHNELZ: With all due respect, I  
23 already said a long time ago, back in January, you are  
24 going to have trouble when you go to vote on this. If  
25 someone wants to make it a motion at this point in

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1 time, although debate has been closed, if nobody  
2 objects to it, you could, in fact, move to have a vote  
3 that indicates no on both of them. In other words,  
4 you are concluding both of them on a yes or no vote.

5 In other words, if the manner in which we  
6 want to vote on this is either yes on both of them or  
7 no on both of them, and let's start with that. In  
8 other words, if a motion would be made to defeat both,  
9 that would be the motion, to defeat both A and B, if  
10 that's what you want to do. If somebody wants to  
11 object because technically we have already closed  
12 debate, they could do so.

13 I am suggesting if you want to move this  
14 along, that is a suggestion. Technically since you  
15 made a point of order, Marcia, you cannot make a  
16 motion, but it was a good point of order.

17 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

18 MR. GILLARY: Could I make a motion that we  
19 vote first as to whether or not the law enforcement  
20 exception should be included either in the comments or  
21 in the rule, and then if that's passed, then we vote  
22 as to whether A gets adopted or B gets adopted.

23 JUDGE SCHNELZ: That's reasonable.

24 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Okay.

25 MS. MCQUADE: That's not what the Supreme

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1 Court wants to hear for us though.

2 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: So we open up for  
3 discussion. Anybody who wants to discuss that?

4 MS. MCQUADE: Barbara McQuade from the  
5 3rd circuit. I think the Supreme Court has framed the  
6 issue as we are going with A or B. If we want to  
7 weigh in on the issue that the Supreme Court is going  
8 to be deciding, we need to choose A or B. If we say  
9 nothing, then that's not the issue that's before the  
10 Supreme Court. They will say thanks and good day. We  
11 either want to make our opinion known or we don't.

12 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: That's not true. I  
13 have to clarify. They didn't even suggest that it  
14 should be in the rule. They just suggested that it be  
15 in the comment. They didn't say anything about it  
16 being in the rule. It's been published.

17 What happened was the Representative Assembly  
18 took a position, and our position was don't change the  
19 language from represented party to represented person,  
20 but if you do, put this exception into the comment.  
21 That was our position. We never talked about putting  
22 it into the rule or anything, okay.

23 The Supreme Court did not change the  
24 language. They listened to us. But what they did is,  
25 in addition to that, even though we didn't ask for

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1 them to put it in the comment if they didn't change  
2 it, they went ahead and posted this out there for  
3 comment, even though they didn't change the language  
4 from represented party to person should we still have  
5 this in the comment.

6 And so this body has the ability now to voice  
7 its position with regard to whether or not it should  
8 be anywhere in the rules. Should it be in the rules,  
9 should it be in the comment, or should it be in the  
10 rules or the comment, and that's what's before the  
11 Assembly.

12 So what's before us right now is to vote on  
13 the fact, on not having this exception in either the  
14 comment or the rules, that's the motion that's been  
15 placed before. Do you understand the motion?

16 MR. GILLARY: That's framed in the negative.  
17 I think it's in the positive whether or not either A or  
18 B should be adopted either yes or no, and then if it's  
19 yes, then we vote on whether it's A or B.

20 JUDGE SCHNELZ: Excuse me, that was not your  
21 motion.

22 MR. GILLARY: I believe that was my motion.

23 JUDGE SCHNELZ: No, your motion was that we  
24 remove it from both A and B. Now, that's what I  
25 heard. If that's not your motion, I apologize.



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<p>1 MR. GILLARY: My motion was that we first 2 vote on whether or not we will include the exception 3 either in the comments or in the rule itself. 4 JUDGE SCHNELZ: That's what I said. 5 MR. GILLARY: First yes or no. 6 JUDGE SCHNELZ: I would rephrase it. I would 7 suggest your motion is to either exclude or include, 8 make your mind up, one or the other. What do you 9 want, exclude or include? 10 MR. GILLARY: I would say include. I would 11 rather do it in the positive, whether it's going to be 12 included, yes or no, and, if so, if it's A or B. 13 JUDGE SCHNELZ: So if you are against it you 14 vote no. 15 PRESIDENT DIEHL: Nancy Diehl from the 16 3rd circuit. Now I am completely confused. I think 17 we would have been done with our voting if we had just 18 proceeded. 19 JUDGE SCHNELZ: That's understandable, Nancy. 20 PRESIDENT DIEHL: And the judge speaks as 21 someone who has known me for a long time, so we have 22 to take that opinion into great consideration. 23 I will tell you that the court has given us 24 two alternatives, and Elizabeth is correct, it's not 25 exactly what we put to them, but there you go. We</p>	<p>1 enforcement exception? If you want a law enforcement 2 exception you vote yes, if you don't want a law 3 enforcement exception you vote no? 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Correct, and if you 5 vote yes, then we will go A or B whether or not it 6 should be in the rule or the comment. 7 Any further discussion on that motion? 8 JUDGE KENT: Wally Kent, 54th circuit. I 9 rise in defense of the Supreme Court, and I am 10 surprised to hear myself say it, but I have on many 11 occasions seen them submit issues such as this for 12 comment and find after hearing the comment that they 13 don't want to do anything. So just because it's being 14 presented to us, if we go back with an answer, said 15 leave it alone, they are entirely likely or it's at 16 least strongly possible they will leave it alone even 17 though they have asked us whether we favor it or not. 18 So please don't think that they have got 19 their mind made up on this issue. 20 MS. WEINTRAUB: Barbara Weintraub, 9th 21 circuit. On the motion that's pending at this moment, 22 I would ask that if the body votes in favor of, or I 23 should say again the law enforcement exception, either 24 alternative, that that somehow be communicated to the 25 Supreme Court that the vote went that way.</p>
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<p>1 give them information, it comes out in a different 2 format. 3 They are telling you where they are at on 4 this. They actually listened to us loud and clearly 5 on taking out represented person. They have 6 represented party back in, and they are even talking 7 about going further. This is where the court is. And 8 that's alternative B, putting that law enforcement 9 exception right in the rule. The comment is not part 10 of the rule. I will go back to the court has said 11 these are the options. Sure, they could do something 12 different, but they have made it pretty clear. 13 I am voting, I think, against your motion, 14 Randy, because, I am not quite sure where we are at. 15 I think we should go back to voting do we want 16 alternative A, which is the rule as it is now only 17 they have added some additional comments that are not, 18 in fact, a part of the rule. Do you want to go 19 further with alternative B. 20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further discussion 21 on the motion with regard to whether or not to include 22 the exception in the comments or rule. 23 MR. CRAMPTON: I guess I need to understand 24 what I am voting on. Are we essentially saying that 25 this vote now is whether or not we want law</p>	<p>1 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Exactly, yes. 2 MS. WEINTRAUB: As opposed to just not doing 3 anything, not choosing A or B. 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Absolutely. 5 Seeing no further discussion -- so this is 6 the motion that is before you now, whether or not, oh, 7 sorry, whether to include the law enforcement 8 exception in either the comment or the rule. If you 9 want the law enforcement exception in the rule or the 10 comment, please stand. 11 The reason why I am counting, there is 37 12 that are in favor of that. That would become a 13 minority opinion that we could report to the Supreme 14 Court. 15 All those opposed to including the law 16 enforcement exception in either the comment or the 17 rule, please stand. 18 I have 64 who are against, so majority rules. 19 It's past lunchtime. We have two more 20 proposals with regard to the rules. I am going to 21 leave it up to you, just by, tell me yes or no, would 22 you like to stop for lunch? 23 VOICES: No. 24 VOICE: Work through it. 25 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: So are you saying you</p>

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1 want to go on and move to the next rule proposal?  
 2 VOICES: Yes.  
 3 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: I will just tell you  
 4 that the food is up there, so we will start at 1.5.  
 5 When we are done with 1.5 we will see where you are,  
 6 and if you want to go up to lunch and break at that  
 7 time, we can.  
 8 Moving forward with Rule 1.5, proposal, I  
 9 will entertain a motion with regard to the proposal  
 10 regarding MRPC 1.5 dealing with fees.  
 11 VOICE: So moved.  
 12 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. A second?  
 13 VOICE: Support.  
 14 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Any  
 15 discussion with regard to the proposal dealing with  
 16 1.5? Pink, although you also have it in green for  
 17 those color blind. They are the exact same thing.  
 18 MR. ALLEN: The proposal before you on the  
 19 pink and green sheets is actually in two parts, the  
 20 first part, sub A, relates to nonrefundable retainers  
 21 or whatever term one wants to use to describe that  
 22 arrangement, and asks that they be defined as  
 23 published in the court's proposal 1.5(f), first of all  
 24 that they be permitted. This particular sheet says so  
 25 long as the conditions set for the in one through four

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1 are fulfilled.  
 2 There is an interesting comment on the  
 3 discussion board package, the orange package that you  
 4 have from, I believe, the Family Law Section. It's  
 5 the very first one, at least in mine, pages one and  
 6 two that says that we might save a lot of time and  
 7 trouble just by deleting conditions one through four  
 8 and requiring that the retainer agreement in these  
 9 instances be in writing. That would be be, I think,  
 10 another way to handle this and, in fact, a way in  
 11 which other jurisdictions have done that.  
 12 The second part B adds two new sub parts to  
 13 the rule on fees. I mentioned earlier that the  
 14 Grievance Commission receives its largest categories  
 15 of inquiries, aside from unreturned phone calls, about  
 16 fee disputes and files. This would be an attempt to  
 17 get some clarification in fee disputes, and this is  
 18 not original or new. It's taken from the Florida  
 19 Rules of Professional Conduct where it's worked well  
 20 for years and was adopted for the same reasons, to say  
 21 that all the factors in 1.5 may go to justify a fee,  
 22 merely time and rate factors alone are not those which  
 23 are exclusively considered, unless, of course, they  
 24 are those that are designated in the fee agreement.  
 25 It also reinforces the fact that fee

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1 agreements are generally enforceable and should be the  
 2 guideline for determining the fee so long as they  
 3 otherwise comply with the rules and are not found to  
 4 be illegal.  
 5 Again, Florida has used that version of the  
 6 rule in order to help resolve many, many items of fee  
 7 disputes that come before it's grievance committees.  
 8 MR. CAMPBELL: If I can make one more comment  
 9 on that. With regard to those provisions one through  
 10 four as cited by the Supreme Court in its commentary  
 11 through it's proposed Rule 1.5 addressing  
 12 nonrefundable retainers, those four conditions come  
 13 from another informal ethics opinion called RI-10.  
 14 That has subsequently been cited in some formal ethics  
 15 opinions as well.  
 16 So it's in the category of R-5 type of  
 17 declaration concerning files; however, unlike the R-5  
 18 declaration that came from a question from a  
 19 practitioner that said what do I have to do in order  
 20 to set up a policy, RI-10 began with an inquiry from a  
 21 lawyer that said here is what I have done and is this  
 22 enough to claim the fees upon payment, and it laid out  
 23 four things, and those are provisions one through  
 24 four.  
 25 However, what the committee said or the panel

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1 of the committee said in the informal opinion was,  
 2 yeah, that's enough if you do that. What we don't  
 3 know is do you have to do all of those, could you do  
 4 other things instead, could there be any combination  
 5 of other factors along with these factors that might  
 6 satisfy the requirements that would be necessary in  
 7 the minds of the Ethics Committee to establish a  
 8 nonrefundable retainer:  
 9 Since that informal opinion RI-10 came out in  
 10 the early '90s it has been interpreted as being a rule  
 11 of sorts, at times by the Grievance Commission where I  
 12 worked at for a period of time, and sometimes also by  
 13 hearing panels of the Attorney Discipline Board.  
 14 However, before it is adopted you really  
 15 ought to look long and hard at that. It was never  
 16 intended in RI-10 to be the only occasions upon which  
 17 you could charge a nonrefundable fee. It hasn't been  
 18 treated as the only occasions where a fee can be  
 19 earned upon receipt by the Attorney Discipline Board  
 20 in its case law following RI-10 and its interpretation  
 21 of RI-10.  
 22 And so this would be a C change or sorts  
 23 regarding nonrefundable retainers in Michigan, and it  
 24 would be a giant step backwards in my opinion from  
 25 where we are currently based on the case law that's

Page 105	<p>1 developed by the Attorney Discipline Board and based</p> <p>2 on the interpretations of RI-10.</p> <p>3 I think the court was right to include the</p> <p>4 discussion of nonrefundable retainers, and hopefully</p> <p>5 it was a good starting off point, but this rule, if</p> <p>6 it's based on this idea that you can only have these</p> <p>7 four factors and must have all four of these factors,</p> <p>8 is not a wisely written rule for adoption, but it's a</p> <p>9 great place to begin that discussion.</p> <p>10 MR. AGACINSKI: The Grievance Commission --</p> <p>11 Bob Agacinski with the Grievance Commission. The</p> <p>12 Grievance Commission already accepts the concept of</p> <p>13 nonrefundable retainers. The board has used that</p> <p>14 language, the courts have used that language. We</p> <p>15 understand that it does indeed exist, and most of the</p> <p>16 concepts in this proposed rule are accepted by the</p> <p>17 commission, but it needs to be understood that just</p> <p>18 because it's called a nonrefundable retainer will not</p> <p>19 preclude review by the Commission. We still look at</p> <p>20 whether it excessive and we still look at whether it's</p> <p>21 actually earned.</p> <p>22 Many attorneys will call it nonrefundable and</p> <p>23 then take their hourly fee from the so-called</p> <p>24 nonrefundable retainer. It's not earned when that</p> <p>25 happens. So this language is being sanctioned, but it</p>	Page 107	<p>1 general retainer, or some way -- and really what this</p> <p>2 tends to be about is lawyers who trying to comply with</p> <p>3 the rules, take a retainer, and they want to know</p> <p>4 where to put it. In some instances it would be</p> <p>5 reasonable to put it in the business account because</p> <p>6 you are starting up your case, then it becomes how</p> <p>7 much.</p> <p>8 These are big, big questions, and I am here</p> <p>9 maybe to gum up the works. Unfortunately I don't</p> <p>10 have -- I started to tinker with this language, and</p> <p>11 then I realized it's not my role, and sometimes not</p> <p>12 maybe it's not your role from what I hear today.</p> <p>13 So we all understand that clients can</p> <p>14 discharge us, we must return unearned fees, and every</p> <p>15 fee must be reasonable or not clearly excessive.</p> <p>16 So that's when it becomes difficult is at the end of</p> <p>17 the representation, wherever that is, and sometimes</p> <p>18 it's earlier than we want, we have to look back and</p> <p>19 say is it reasonable.</p> <p>20 So, unfortunately, taking a simple position</p> <p>21 by using magic words like nonrefundable retainer</p> <p>22 doesn't necessarily work. And that's as far as I can</p> <p>23 go. The board doesn't have a proposal right now, but</p> <p>24 is keeping working on this issue. We have issued an</p> <p>25 opinion that says some engagement fees are reasonable,</p>
Page 106	<p>1 does cause a lot of confusion and has caused a lot of</p> <p>2 confusion when I talk about it to different Bar</p> <p>3 associations, but, again, that's a matter of perhaps</p> <p>4 enforcement not a matter of the principle itself being</p> <p>5 acceptable.</p> <p>6 MR. ARMITAGE: Thank you, Bob. I want to</p> <p>7 applaud John Allen's committee for attacking this</p> <p>8 tough issue. I agree with some things that have</p> <p>9 already been said.</p> <p>10 I am with the Board. I am Mark Armitage,</p> <p>11 Deputy Director, and I want to start out by saying</p> <p>12 that the ADB hasn't taken a formal position on this</p> <p>13 yet, but have written opinions, as Mr. Agacinski just</p> <p>14 mentioned, and I want to clarify one thing Bob said,</p> <p>15 the use of the word -- and the problem with both of</p> <p>16 these proposals that I see, I am not favoring one or</p> <p>17 another, but A is a little more so than B, they both</p> <p>18 use the term nonrefundable retainer, and I am just</p> <p>19 here to report that the term has fallen out of usage.</p> <p>20 There is a national trend for disapproving, and even</p> <p>21 in some states disciplining lawyers who use that term,</p> <p>22 and the reason for it is because no such thing exists.</p> <p>23 You may have in mind -- I see a lot nods, so</p> <p>24 I am glad the message is getting out. There may be</p> <p>25 something else in mind, like an engagement fee,</p>	Page 108	<p>1 and that's what I was talking about. We have held one</p> <p>2 but disapproved the terminology nonrefundable.</p> <p>3 MS. WEINTRAUB: Barbara Weintraub, 9th</p> <p>4 circuit. I am also a current member of the Family Law</p> <p>5 Council, State Bar. I want to say that I agree with</p> <p>6 the comments of John Allen and Don Campbell. I think</p> <p>7 that the concept of a nonrefundable minimum engagement</p> <p>8 fee, which is what I call it, is a good one and is</p> <p>9 important to practitioners, but I think that the</p> <p>10 language of the proposed rule creates a problem.</p> <p>11 Just to give a quick example, if a</p> <p>12 disgruntled client wants to complain about an</p> <p>13 attorney, how do you prove that the client was of</p> <p>14 sufficient intelligence, maturity, and sophistication?</p> <p>15 The client is going to say I wasn't sophisticated</p> <p>16 enough, I didn't understand.</p> <p>17 Another problem of proof is how do you prove</p> <p>18 that you have turned down other cases for a specific</p> <p>19 case, and I also want to clarify, I am not here as a</p> <p>20 spokesperson for the Family Law Council. I am just</p> <p>21 stating my own opinions, but I can see this creating a</p> <p>22 lot of problems for attorneys, particularly solo</p> <p>23 practitioners, people in small law firms who rely on</p> <p>24 these fees, and I would suggest that the language</p> <p>25 proposed by the Family Law Council, which is very</p>

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<p>1 simple and which John Allen also mentioned is --</p> <p>2 obviously that can be interpreted by the Grievance</p> <p>3 Commission or anyone else examining a fee, but I think</p> <p>4 that that would be the way to go, and I would -- I am</p> <p>5 not sure of the procedural point, but I would ask for</p> <p>6 an amendment that the language, and this can be</p> <p>7 found -- well, to read it, the retainer agreement is</p> <p>8 in writing, signed by the client, and clearly</p> <p>9 articulates that the retainer is nonrefundable.</p> <p>10 JUDGE SCHNELZ: If more than six words, write</p> <p>11 it out.</p> <p>12 MS. WEINTRAUB: In any event, I will write</p> <p>13 that out, but I would ask -- and also there are some</p> <p>14 very good comments in this orange packet.</p> <p>15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: At this point I am</p> <p>16 going to do a point of order. We are going to break</p> <p>17 for lunch. We will give you an opportunity if you</p> <p>18 would like to put that in writing and submit it to the</p> <p>19 Assembly for consideration today, and everybody can go</p> <p>20 up to lunch.</p> <p>21 We were supposed to have lunch until 1:00.</p> <p>22 Let's break until 1:15 and try to kind of keep it</p> <p>23 moving.</p> <p>24 (Lunch break from 12:50 p.m. to 1:44 p.m.)</p> <p>25 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: I am going to call us</p>	<p>1 provisions either add Number 5 provision or add as a</p> <p>2 caveat to this proposal, proposed language here, that</p> <p>3 the fee is not freely accessible. Because I think, I</p> <p>4 am afraid what might happen is if the language is left</p> <p>5 the way it is that then you are going to get into a</p> <p>6 situation that, well, it's not excessive if my client</p> <p>7 agreed to it, and I really didn't do all the work I</p> <p>8 needed to do that was anticipated when we got, when we</p> <p>9 agreed to this nonrefundable fee.</p> <p>10 So just to make it clear that you are still</p> <p>11 bound by the language that it's not clearly excessive.</p> <p>12 I think that should be one of the provisions dealing</p> <p>13 with nonrefundable fees. If you don't do that, I</p> <p>14 think you are asking for some difficulty in</p> <p>15 interpretation of this rule.</p> <p>16 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you.</p> <p>17 MS. KAKISH: Katherine Kakish, 3rd circuit.</p> <p>18 I have a comment in support of the recommendation made</p> <p>19 by Barbara, and this support actually comes from the</p> <p>20 Wayne County Family Law Bar Association. This Bar</p> <p>21 association actually met on March 17th of this year to</p> <p>22 specifically discuss this rule, and they opposed as it</p> <p>23 was proposed. Actually they said that they</p> <p>24 unanimously oppose the proposed language of 1.5(f).</p> <p>25 They did submit a recommendation in replace of what we</p>
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<p>1 back into session now, if everybody could please be</p> <p>2 seated. I believe before we broke we had a potential</p> <p>3 motion of the Assembly, and if we could resume there.</p> <p>4 MS. WEINTRAUB: Barbara Weintraub, 9th</p> <p>5 circuit, and this is the motion I am proposing. It's</p> <p>6 on the screens. Do you want me to read the motion?</p> <p>7 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Yes, please.</p> <p>8 MS. WEINTRAUB: I am proposing this for Rule</p> <p>9 1.5(f), a lawyer and a client may agree to a lump sum</p> <p>10 or nonrefundable fee arrangement that is earned by the</p> <p>11 lawyer at the time of engagement or at the time of the</p> <p>12 agreement provided that the retainer agreement is in</p> <p>13 writing, signed by the client, and states that the</p> <p>14 retainer is nonrefundable.</p> <p>15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Do I hear a second?</p> <p>16 VOICE: Support.</p> <p>17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?</p> <p>18 Seeing none -- oh, go ahead.</p> <p>19 JUDGE ELWOOD BROWN: Just a point that I</p> <p>20 would like to bring to your attention, and that is the</p> <p>21 concern, actually it's recognized in some of the</p> <p>22 comments made in this green paper. Whatever you do,</p> <p>23 whether you adopt this or you agree to nonrefundable</p> <p>24 fee at all, if you agree to a nonrefundable fee, I</p> <p>25 think the rule should clearly state that one of the</p>	<p>1 were to vote today, and it almost matches what Barbara</p> <p>2 wrote here, except that Barbara gave it more details,</p> <p>3 which I am sure that the Wayne County Family Law Bar</p> <p>4 Association would agree would serve their interests.</p> <p>5 They provided a very lengthy e-mail letter to</p> <p>6 members of the 3rd circuit, which is Wayne County, and</p> <p>7 they gave all the reasons why the proposal that</p> <p>8 Barbara now wrote and is recommending should be</p> <p>9 adopted. Thank you.</p> <p>10 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: And just for</p> <p>11 information, their commentary is actually included, it</p> <p>12 was posted on the RA discussion board, and it's on</p> <p>13 page three of six under MRPC 1.5.</p> <p>14 Any other discussion?</p> <p>15 MR. PIATT: Paul Piatt, 16th circuit. Just</p> <p>16 in response to Judge Brown's indication of the word</p> <p>17 excessive. I found, as I have been doing this for 35</p> <p>18 years, one person's excessiveness is another person's</p> <p>19 shortfall, so the inclusion of the word excessive I</p> <p>20 don't think would be really much use.</p> <p>21 JUDGE ELWOOD BROWN: In the Rule 1.5(a) it</p> <p>22 defines, gives you some indication of excessive. So</p> <p>23 if you have in (a) that you can't charge a fee that's</p> <p>24 clearly excessive, I am concerned that in (f) that you</p> <p>25 are going to say, well, unless it's a nonrefundable fee.</p>

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1 MR. CAMPBELL: If I could just follow up on  
2 that for a moment. In the context of the one-third  
3 contingencies or other contingencies, the rules don't  
4 have a caveat there about excessiveness, and yet  
5 presumably the same rules would apply, so I understand  
6 the judge's concerns, and it may be something you want  
7 to take action on, but putting it into context with  
8 other fee related rules, that caveat doesn't exist,  
9 and you would have to ask why it's necessary here, and  
10 maybe you are compelled, maybe you are not.  
11 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
12 discussions?  
13 MR. HOGAN: James Hogan, 16th circuit, just  
14 as a point of --  
15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: You have to move the  
16 microphone so that you are speaking right into it for  
17 our court reporter.  
18 MR. HOGAN: I would like to request as a  
19 friendly amendment the parenthetical phrase "or at the  
20 time of the agreement" be deleted, only because after  
21 that comes "provided that the retainer agreement is in  
22 writing, signed by the client." It should be just at  
23 the time of the engagement provided that the retainer  
24 agreement is in writing.  
25 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Are you making a

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1 motion for a friendly amendment?  
2 MR. HOGAN: That's correct.  
3 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Do you accept?  
4 MS. WEINTRAUB: I wouldn't accept, but I  
5 would suggest something else that might clear up the  
6 problem. The word "retainer" could be taken out and  
7 just provided that the agreement is in writing.  
8 The reason I added the language "or at the  
9 time of the agreement" is that sometimes when a client  
10 retains an attorney that may be based on an hourly  
11 rate. Later the case may develop into something or  
12 scope that wasn't anticipated and an additional fee is  
13 required and an agreement was entered into after the  
14 fact, and that's why I added the language that's in  
15 parentheses. Would that solve the problem?  
16 MR. HOGAN: No objection.  
17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Okay. No objection.  
18 Does the body have any objection?  
19 Any further discussion with regard to the  
20 substituted motion, and hold on one second. John  
21 Berry, Executive Director.  
22 MR. BERRY: As someone who spent about 15  
23 years enforcing this rule, I am a little confused  
24 about what aspect -- if it was the intent of this  
25 amendment that there not be any consideration of

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1 reasonableness or not, that basically if it's an  
2 agreement between the two parties, that agreement  
3 lasts no matter what. If that's the intent of it, I  
4 would suggest that is going to be a very serious  
5 problem, because this is, of all the fee areas, this  
6 is one of the ones that's, first of all, the most  
7 difficult for people to understand, most subject to  
8 major abuses.  
9 I mean, for instance, somebody could come up  
10 for a traffic ticket and get somebody to sign an  
11 absolutely ridiculous amount for what was going on.  
12 Every other fee in the subject -- Don's comment about  
13 one-third contingency fee agreements, those agreements  
14 I think it's pretty well clear they are going to be  
15 subject to reasonableness or not, whereas in this area  
16 if you put a rule like this, it would be pretty clear  
17 that people are going to look at it and say, you know,  
18 it's what it says. That fee is there.  
19 So I would be very concerned with this kind  
20 of adoption of this rule.  
21 MR. ROMANO: Vince Romano from the  
22 3rd circuit. It strikes me, isn't there a substantive  
23 difference between a fee and a retainer, and, if so,  
24 shouldn't it be consistent? In other words, in the  
25 first few words we talk about a nonrefundable fee

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1 agreement and conclude with the reference that the  
2 retainer is nonrefundable.  
3 I am just putting that question, isn't there  
4 a difference between a fee and a retainer, and if  
5 there is, then shouldn't this rule be consistent?  
6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Are you making a  
7 motion for a friendly amendment?  
8 MR. ROMANO: I would suggest that the word  
9 "retainer" be replaced with the word "fee" as a friendly  
10 amendment.  
11 VOICE: Second.  
12 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Do you accept.  
13 MS. WEINTRAUB: I accept that, and I think  
14 it's a good suggestion. Thank you.  
15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
16 discussion? Seeing none, I want to make it perfectly  
17 clear what's before the Assembly. What's before the  
18 Assembly is whether or not we substitute the proposal  
19 and make it this rather than what you have on your  
20 pink or your green sheet. That's what's before you.  
21 You are not voting necessarily on this substantively  
22 yet. We are asking you whether or not you want to  
23 substitute this language for the proposal rather than  
24 what we had.  
25 All in favor please say aye.

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1 Any opposed?  
 2 That carries. Now we will vote on the  
 3 substantive proposal that's before us, the substitute  
 4 proposal. Is there any discussion on the substance of  
 5 this proposal?  
 6 MR. ALLEN: Just one to form and not  
 7 substance. The Supreme Court, and now the  
 8 Representative Assembly, has suggested a 1.5(f) that  
 9 was not in there at the time that the part (b) of this  
 10 proposal was drafted on your pink and green sheets,  
 11 and so I believe the sub letters on those paragraphs  
 12 should be changed respectively to (g) and (h) as part of  
 13 1.5 on your pink and green sheets.  
 14 If you look up on the screen --  
 15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: John, it literally  
 16 changes to this. This becomes the proposal, 1.5(f),  
 17 and there is no -- that becomes (f). Everything that  
 18 you did is gone.  
 19 MR. ALLEN: Okay. Thank you.  
 20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any other discussion?  
 21 Seeing none, all in favor of this language,  
 22 which is the substitute motion for proposal 1.5(f),  
 23 say aye.  
 24 Any opposed.  
 25 It passes.

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1 Now the issue becomes with regard to the  
 2 proposal regarding 1.15. 1.15 is the safe keeping of  
 3 property. That was intended to track whatever our  
 4 decision was with 1.5 as opposed to what is proposed  
 5 by the Supreme Court. So basically you would take out  
 6 namely (f), (g) and comment, and it would just become  
 7 should MRPC 1.15(c) require that nonrefundable fees  
 8 comply with the factors set forth in the Assembly's  
 9 recommendation regarding MRPC 1.5, period, and then  
 10 the answer is yes or no.  
 11 I will entertain a motion with regard to that  
 12 proposal.  
 13 VOICE: So moved.  
 14 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Second.  
 15 VOICE: Support.  
 16 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 17 Seeing none, we will bring it to vote.  
 18 All in favor of proposal MRPC 1.15 say yea.  
 19 Any opposed say no.  
 20 And that passes.  
 21 Now we move on to the standards, and I would  
 22 like to also acknowledge that we have a visitor with  
 23 us today, and that's Mark Gates, who is Supreme Court  
 24 Deputy Counsel. Mark, if you could stand up. Just to  
 25 say thank you to Mark for being with us today

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1 listening to this Assembly discussion on all of these  
 2 issues.  
 3 First on the agenda with regard to the  
 4 standards is 1.3 regarding purpose of these standards.  
 5 I will entertain a motion with regard to this  
 6 proposal.  
 7 VOICE: Motion.  
 8 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Support?  
 9 VOICE: Support.  
 10 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 11 Do any of the panelists want to speak to 1.3?  
 12 No. Seeing none, then there is no discussion, then we  
 13 will bring it to vote.  
 14 All in favor, aye.  
 15 Any opposed? 1.3 passes.  
 16 If we can keep up with this pace, I think we  
 17 are going to get done really fast.  
 18 Next up is Michigan Standards for Imposing  
 19 Lawyer Sanctions definitions regarding knowledge. I  
 20 will entertain a motion with regard to that proposal.  
 21 VOICE: So moved.  
 22 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Support?  
 23 VOICE: Support.  
 24 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 25 MR. ANDREE: Gerard Andree from 6th circuit.

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1 With respect to and in light of the Michigan Supreme  
 2 Court's decision this past week which dealt with the  
 3 definitions of knowledge, actual knowledge,  
 4 constructive knowledge, and knowledge supported by  
 5 circumstantial evidence, I would make I guess it would  
 6 be a request, if not a friendly amendment, that  
 7 "knowledge" be, everywhere you make reference to  
 8 "knowledge" that it specifically indicate "actual  
 9 knowledge."  
 10 VOICE: Second.  
 11 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: So did you make a  
 12 motion to.  
 13 MR. ANDREE: I guess that would be what I  
 14 would be doing to avoid any problems, that the term  
 15 "knowledge" should be changed wherever it appears to  
 16 "actual knowledge."  
 17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Just I want to make  
 18 sure that everybody is clear. That really then would  
 19 be an adjustment to the first position, which would be  
 20 (a) which is incorporate the language proposed by the  
 21 Attorney Discipline Board defining knowledge, but  
 22 changing it to actual knowledge.  
 23 MR. ANDREE: It should be defining knowledge  
 24 as actual knowledge.  
 25 MR. CAMPBELL: So you know, in my

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1 recommendation I tracked the ABA's definition of  
 2 knowledge in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,  
 3 which require actual knowledge, and you are saying  
 4 make it even more clear.  
 5 MR. ANDREE: My understanding of what you  
 6 were saying was that it has always been interpreted  
 7 that way.  
 8 MR. CAMPBELL: No, that is the definition, in  
 9 fact, which I think is more than just interpretation.  
 10 MR. ANDREE: For our purposes I would like it  
 11 to be our definition.  
 12 MR. CAMPBELL: For whatever it's worth, I  
 13 don't think there is any inconsistency with the  
 14 version currently published to make the recommendation  
 15 that it be called actual knowledge. The ABA's  
 16 definition that I stole and put it into my version  
 17 says that actual knowledge may be inferred from the  
 18 circumstances. I don't know if you want to treat that  
 19 definition any differently in light of that recent  
 20 Supreme Court case that I am not, I am not versed in  
 21 at all, but to the extent that they agree with me I  
 22 stole from them, that's cool.  
 23 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: What we need to have  
 24 is a specific language that you want to bring before  
 25 the Assembly. If you are saying that you are speaking

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1 in favor of (b) but changing the terminology to "actual  
 2 knowledge," or are you coming up with an alternative (c).  
 3 MR. ANDREE: I suppose it would be an  
 4 alternative (c) then.  
 5 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: And your alternative  
 6 (c) is that wherever the Supreme Court rule as it's  
 7 been published states the word "knowledge," that  
 8 instead of "knowledge" it should be "actual knowledge."  
 9 MR. ANDREE: Correct.  
 10 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Is that your motion?  
 11 MR. ANDREE: That is my motion.  
 12 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Do I hear a second?  
 13 VOICE: Second.  
 14 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion on that  
 15 motion?  
 16 MR. VANBOLT: John VanBolt from the Attorney  
 17 Discipline Board. I need to make a clarification here  
 18 I think.  
 19 There has been references from the floor to  
 20 the rules, and Mr. Campbell refers to the ABA  
 21 definition. Let me back up just one second.  
 22 The Attorney Discipline Board was ordered in  
 23 2000 to review the status of use of standards in  
 24 Michigan and within two years to report to the court  
 25 on whether or not Michigan should have its own

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1 Michigan standards. At the time, that is 2000, the  
 2 Board was directed to use the ABA Standards for  
 3 Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  
 4 In fact, the Board had been using them in one  
 5 form or another since 1986. Since their adoption, but  
 6 in 2000, so that means in about two months should be  
 7 with the fifth anniversary of the Discipline Board's  
 8 consistent use of the ABA standards.  
 9 When the Board was given this direction to  
 10 come up with the question of Michigan standards,  
 11 obviously the first question before the Board was  
 12 should Michigan essentially throw out the ABA  
 13 standards and start from scratch or should Michigan  
 14 take advantage of standards which had been in use  
 15 since 1986 in Michigan and other jurisdictions and  
 16 which are now cited with some degree of regularity in  
 17 at least 30 jurisdictions?  
 18 The Board elected to build on the ABA  
 19 standards. The language that you are being asked to  
 20 consider when it says incorporate the language  
 21 proposed by the ADB is not entirely new by the Board.  
 22 The Board, that was one example of where the Attorney  
 23 Discipline Board looked at the ABA-approved language  
 24 in the standards, and in that instance that definition  
 25 is knowledge is the conscious awareness of the nature

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1 or intended circumstances of the conduct but without  
 2 the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a  
 3 particular result.  
 4 In its further comments to the court the  
 5 Board has actually refined that slightly so that the  
 6 Board's proposal to the court is that knowledge is the  
 7 conscious awareness of the nature or attendant  
 8 circumstances of the conduct but need not include the  
 9 conscious objective of purpose or purpose to  
 10 accomplish a particular result.  
 11 I actually, I am aware of the case that was  
 12 cited, the Michigan Supreme Court case on the  
 13 definition of knowledge, and I am also aware of the  
 14 ABA's definition of knowledge in terms of the rules.  
 15 It is critically important, however, for everybody, as  
 16 we discuss all of these, as you discuss these  
 17 standards, that the rules, the Rules of Professional  
 18 Conduct, which form the basis for liability, for  
 19 disciplinary infractions, are not the standards. The  
 20 standards are what you look at after and only after  
 21 professional misconduct has been established.  
 22 And it is quite possible that there are and  
 23 may be situations where the way a certain term --  
 24 knowledge, injury, neglect -- is looked at in terms of  
 25 deciding what level of discipline to impose after

Page 125	<p>1 misconduct has been established, which may or may not</p> <p>2 be exactly the same as the way that term is used when</p> <p>3 you are looking at was there misconduct or was there</p> <p>4 not misconduct.</p> <p>5 I can't go through and enumerate every single</p> <p>6 example of that other than to say that in this</p> <p>7 particular case the definition of knowledge proposed</p> <p>8 by the Board is based on the knowledge as determined</p> <p>9 and used by other jurisdictions in connection with the</p> <p>10 standards, not the definition of knowledge in a</p> <p>11 particular state by a particular court under a</p> <p>12 particular fact situation in a particular case</p> <p>13 referring to parties in a civil litigation.</p> <p>14 MR. CAMPBELL: What you have to keep in mind</p> <p>15 also though is the ABA when they adopted the</p> <p>16 standards, at the time they were adopted the only</p> <p>17 definition of knowledge was actual knowledge and that</p> <p>18 the ADB's definition that John read at length is not</p> <p>19 a definition that the ABA has ever said is a</p> <p>20 definition that we apply to the standards. Maybe one</p> <p>21 when you wish to apply, you may wish to say actual</p> <p>22 knowledge, but I think that gives you a fuller context</p> <p>23 on the word "knowledge."</p> <p>24 MR. ARMITAGE: If I could just follow up. I</p> <p>25 am not sure what Don meant, but, in fact, the ABA did,</p>	Page 127	<p>1 in this proposal, please say aye.</p> <p>2 Any opposed.</p> <p>3 Ayes have it.</p> <p>4 Now, going back to discussion on this actual</p> <p>5 proposal with regard to (a), (b) and (c), is there any</p> <p>6 further discussion? Seeing none, then we will vote</p> <p>7 for (a) first.</p> <p>8 All those in favor of (a) please say aye.</p> <p>9 Any opposed.</p> <p>10 I need all those in favor to stand to see</p> <p>11 whether or not we have a minority opinion. Can I have</p> <p>12 my tellers. Well, maybe we can do it without tellers.</p> <p>13 All those in favor of (a) stand. People</p> <p>14 continue to stand up. Are you all up now? Thank you.</p> <p>15 Now I want to know all those who are in favor</p> <p>16 of (b). Again, this is just if you voted for (a), you</p> <p>17 can't vote for (b), so if you are in favor of (b),</p> <p>18 please stand, or actually I shouldn't say please</p> <p>19 stand. Those in favor of (b) please say yea.</p> <p>20 What we have is a majority opinion. Oh, I am</p> <p>21 sorry. Now we have got to go for (c). All those in</p> <p>22 favor of (c) please say aye.</p> <p>23 All those opposed. Can those in favor of (c)</p> <p>24 please stand so we can take a vote on those as well.</p> <p>25 VOICE: Point of order. I believe some</p>
Page 126	<p>1 in fact, adopt the definition of knowledge that</p> <p>2 Mr. VanBolt just read to you, and it works together</p> <p>3 with intent and negligence, it's three levels of</p> <p>4 mental state. To pull in a different definition will</p> <p>5 just throw it out of whack and not accomplish</p> <p>6 anything. You need actual knowledge to be found</p> <p>7 guilty of misconduct, and you don't get to the</p> <p>8 standards until that happens. This helps you sort out</p> <p>9 the state of mind once you are in a disciplinary</p> <p>10 phase and it was adopted by the ABA in 1986. That's</p> <p>11 their definition.</p> <p>12 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Just as a point of</p> <p>13 clarification, our rules say that if an amendment is</p> <p>14 greater than six words it has to be in writing, and so</p> <p>15 we have crafted some language. Mr. Andree, if you</p> <p>16 would agree for (c) that instead of those words, it</p> <p>17 says always define "knowledge" as, quote, actual</p> <p>18 knowledge, end quote, that I think meets your needs,</p> <p>19 then we can actually entertain this.</p> <p>20 MR. ANDREE: That will be fine.</p> <p>21 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thanks. Any further</p> <p>22 discussion with regard to adding (c)? Seeing no further</p> <p>23 discussion, then what's before us is whether or not to</p> <p>24 add (c) as an option in this proposal.</p> <p>25 All those in favor of adding (c) as an option</p>	Page 128	<p>1 people voted more than once. You told us on (b) we</p> <p>2 couldn't vote for it if we already voted on (a). You</p> <p>3 did not give the same instruction on (c) and some</p> <p>4 people voted twice.</p> <p>5 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: If you voted yes on</p> <p>6 (a) you cannot vote yes for (c).</p> <p>7 MR. ANDREE: (c) is going to apply whether it's</p> <p>8 (a) or (b).</p> <p>9 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: (a), go ahead and sit</p> <p>10 down. We are really struggling with this, because we</p> <p>11 have adopted some special rules so that we can report</p> <p>12 accurately to the Supreme Court, which is very</p> <p>13 different than what our normal rules would be, so I</p> <p>14 apologize for trying to make sure that what we report</p> <p>15 to the Supreme Court is quite accurate and that we are</p> <p>16 very clear about minority and majority opinions.</p> <p>17 Right now we have 57 in favor of (a), and</p> <p>18 that's a majority opinion, and we did not have enough</p> <p>19 for a minority opinion, and now (c) is, as it would</p> <p>20 apply to (a), and so that's my understanding of how</p> <p>21 it's been presented, is that correct?</p> <p>22 All those in favor of (c), it doesn't matter</p> <p>23 how you voted on (a) or (b), if you are in favor of</p> <p>24 (c), please stand. That's majority. You can sit down.</p> <p>25 Any oppose?</p>



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1 (c) passes as well.  
 2 Going on now to MSILS definition injury,  
 3 potential injury, MSILS 2.3 suspension, and MRPC 1.01  
 4 terminology, I will entertain a motion with regard to  
 5 that.  
 6 VOICE: So moved.  
 7 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Support?  
 8 VOICE: Support.  
 9 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion? Open  
 10 it up to John or Mark.  
 11 MR. ARMITAGE: I will be brief. The proposal  
 12 before you would, (a) would be the version of the  
 13 Supreme Court -- (a) is the version that the ADB  
 14 proposed. It is in line with the ABA version and  
 15 potential injury, just a little bit, again, this is just  
 16 with national case law and with the states that apply  
 17 both the Model Rules and the standards together, and  
 18 unless there are any questions, I will just press with  
 19 that.  
 20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Don.  
 21 MR. CAMPBELL: The issue I want to comment on  
 22 briefly is the question of how you define suspension  
 23 and why that's an issue here. If you have a copy, as  
 24 I am sure you all do regularly refer to them, the ABA  
 25 Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, there is a

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1 commentary to that, and in the commentary under every  
 2 suspension category they list the cases, at least the  
 3 principal cases that they reviewed between 1970 and  
 4 1982 or whatever it was that led them to come up with  
 5 this category of a sanction under that particular  
 6 standard.  
 7 In every single case where they cite a case  
 8 in the level of suspension, it is a suspension from  
 9 the jurisdiction in which the conduct occurred that  
 10 required reinstatement. So where the ABA uses the  
 11 word suspension, and they define it within the  
 12 standards, they define suspension to mean a suspension  
 13 that requires reinstatement proceedings.  
 14 In Michigan, that level happens to be in 180  
 15 days. It used to be in 120 days. In other  
 16 jurisdictions, in Florida -- John can correct me if I  
 17 am wrong -- it's 90 days, or has been at least for a  
 18 period of time.  
 19 So that level changes, and they captured the  
 20 idea of fitness, because that's what reinstatement  
 21 questions, is whether you are fit to practice, when  
 22 you go in front of a panel of judges, lawyers who tell  
 23 us whether you have met the standard of fitness.  
 24 That's what the word was intended to mean within the  
 25 standards.

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1 Michigan defines a suspension or a suspension  
 2 that can be given in discipline cases as anything  
 3 over -- the minimum can be 30 days. In other words,  
 4 you can't have a 29-day suspension, and there is a  
 5 category of cases that fall between 30 days and 180  
 6 which are suspensions that don't question the fitness  
 7 of the lawyer.  
 8 In other documents, and I think it's  
 9 paraphrased some in the ABA standards, those are  
 10 treated by the ABA as being really cost sanctions.  
 11 That's the equivalent, because all they are doing is  
 12 saying you have to stay out of the practice of law for  
 13 a period of time. Not that we think you are unfit,  
 14 because if we thought you were unfit we would have  
 15 suspended you for longer and we would have made you go  
 16 through this process.  
 17 Instead, what they say is, hey, we are going to  
 18 punish your practice by disallowing you to collect  
 19 fees during the period of time you practice law.  
 20 It's a difficult issue to cover in the two  
 21 minutes I am given here, but I hope you have had an  
 22 opportunity to review it a little and understand the  
 23 issue here is broader than just how we are going to  
 24 treat suspensions. Under 2.3 is whether or not in  
 25 Michigan those cases that are 30, 60, 90-day

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1 suspensions are appropriate or whether, in fact, that's  
 2 an abuse, if you will, of power in sanctioning lawyers  
 3 in a way that really just hits them economically and  
 4 doesn't really have anything to do with fitness.  
 5 And the proposal as it was intended would say  
 6 that unless it's a serious violation for which  
 7 mitigation would not apply under the suspension  
 8 category, then those are the folks who should be  
 9 subject to this idea of the suspension level within  
 10 the standards. That was the intention, that those  
 11 lawyers who may engage in conduct that falls initially  
 12 in that suspension category but for whom there is  
 13 mitigation sufficient to write below them, where do  
 14 you take them? To do you take them to 180 days, to  
 15 179, or do you take them from 180 days down to  
 16 reprimand, and that's the issue addressed in 2.3.  
 17 I apologize if I haven't done a good job to  
 18 explain it in 2 minutes.  
 19 MR. VANBOLT: Let me clarify something here.  
 20 You will see that this particular issue which is now  
 21 up for discussion actually has two parts which are not  
 22 clearly related. The first which was discussed was a  
 23 definition of injury where that appears in the  
 24 standards, and that's something that appears all the  
 25 way through the standards.

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1 As you will seeing in the ABA standards, and  
 2 we will get to injury in another context in a minute,  
 3 all the standards do is sort out after misconduct has  
 4 been established where the sanction should generally  
 5 fall in rough categories and then you tweak it with  
 6 aggravating/mitigating factors and case law and all  
 7 sorts of things like that.  
 8 The three categories obviously are  
 9 disbarment, suspension, and reprimand, and generally  
 10 the ABA looks to two mechanisms to get to those  
 11 levels. First there is state of mind, so intentional  
 12 generally results in a higher discipline than knowing,  
 13 and knowing in higher discipline than negligence.  
 14 So those are the three categories there, but  
 15 the ABA standards then also look to the degree of  
 16 harm, the degree of injury. So serious injury  
 17 generally results in higher discipline than simple  
 18 injury, and that's higher discipline than little or no  
 19 injury. So that's the basic scheme.  
 20 So the question of injury, that question  
 21 really that was put before you has to do with do you  
 22 adopt a clearly stated definition of injury, which is  
 23 the one used by the ABA, or do you just let every  
 24 panel make up their definition of injury as they go  
 25 along. That's a separate and discrete question.

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1 What Mr. Campbell is talking about is if a  
 2 panel decides that there should be suspension of some  
 3 kind, should the minimum level be 180 days, i.e.,  
 4 requiring reinstatement.  
 5 I have to had slightly quibble with one thing  
 6 that Mr. Campbell says when he says that the ABA  
 7 standards define suspension as more than 180 days.  
 8 MR. CAMPBELL: It defines it as that  
 9 requiring fitness proceedings following that we would  
 10 call reinstatement proceedings. I said Florida, for  
 11 example, has 90 days.  
 12 MR. VANBOLT: I am still not quite sure  
 13 that -- what the ABA says is suspension is the removal  
 14 of a lawyer from the practice of law for a specified  
 15 minimum period of time, period. And then it says,  
 16 Generally suspension should be for a time equal to or  
 17 greater than six months, generally.  
 18 If the issue is literally should this body  
 19 recommend eliminating the possibility of suspensions  
 20 for six months -- I mean, is that the proposal? Is  
 21 that what people understand the proposal to be? Less  
 22 than six months, if that is the proposal. The fact is  
 23 that the Michigan Court Rule allows a suspension to be  
 24 any fixed period of time over 30 days.  
 25 So this proposed standard language would

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1 effectively invalidate an existing Court Rule.  
 2 Let me just give you some context on  
 3 suspensions currently. In Michigan in 2004 there were  
 4 120 public orders of discipline. Of those there were  
 5 49 suspensions, there were 41 reprimands, and there  
 6 were 28 disbarments. Of the 49 suspensions, 23 were  
 7 for 180 days or more, 26 were for 179 days or less.  
 8 So about 50/50.  
 9 Of the suspensions less than 179 days, more  
 10 than half of those were submitted to panels under the  
 11 consent discipline procedure, which is essentially a  
 12 plea bargain. So short suspensions, i.e., suspensions  
 13 under 180 days, are something that are recognized  
 14 currently in Michigan and are utilized by panels, the  
 15 Board, the Supreme Court, Grievance Commission. To  
 16 eliminate that would be to, or to curtail the use of  
 17 those suspensions would be to put panels, the Board,  
 18 and the Grievance Commission essentially in the  
 19 posture of saying, okay, the case that would have been  
 20 a 30-day suspension or a 60-day suspension, now we are  
 21 really going to look at a longer suspension or a  
 22 reprimand. We are curtailing that middle ground where  
 23 we believe that a shorter suspension may be  
 24 appropriate.  
 25 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further

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1 discussion?  
 2 Seeing none, all those in favor -- and we are  
 3 going to vote on the first one first. Remember that  
 4 there are two parts to this. With regard to the  
 5 first, all in favor of option (a), please say aye.  
 6 All opposed?  
 7 I need all those in favor to stand up so that  
 8 we can take a count.  
 9 Tellers, I need the tellers up here to count.  
 10 Go ahead and be seated.  
 11 All those in favor of (b) would you please  
 12 stand. You cannot vote on both. We don't have enough  
 13 for a minority opinion, so thank you very much.  
 14 Now what we do is we take the second part of  
 15 that proposal, which deals with suspension, (a) and  
 16 (b).  
 17 All those in favor of (a), please stand. I  
 18 think we have a majority. Okay. You can be seated.  
 19 All those in favor of (b), please stand.  
 20 Again, you can't vote for both.  
 21 We do not have enough for a minority opinion.  
 22 Thank you.  
 23 Next up is use of injury within the  
 24 standards. I will entertain a motion with regard to  
 25 that proposal.

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1 VOICE: So moved.  
 2 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Second?  
 3 VOICE: Support.  
 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 5 MR. VANBOLT: I will be real brief on injury,  
 6 other than let me just say that in the Board's  
 7 comments to the court, it's most recent comments,  
 8 there is an accompanying letter of 11 or so pages, the  
 9 Board saw this as really its most fundamental problem  
 10 with the standards as published.  
 11 A minute ago I said that in the ABA standards  
 12 the sorting process depends on gradations of mental  
 13 state and also gradations of injury, and that's how  
 14 you get into the general categories.  
 15 The proposed standards which have been  
 16 published for comment take injury out at this initial  
 17 sorting process. I hope some of you have had a chance  
 18 to read the Board's comments. It's too late now I  
 19 guess if you haven't, but I think that the point to  
 20 make here, and I think the Board's point, is that by  
 21 taking it out at this level what you can get are, if  
 22 you look at some of the individual standards, you get  
 23 what appear to be anomalous results.  
 24 So, for instance, it is misconduct to abandon  
 25 the practice of law. That's under the rules, not

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1 under the standards. So then the standards, you look  
 2 at the standards, what is the appropriate sanction?  
 3 Under the traditional ABA version, the  
 4 traditional approach, you look at whether the conduct  
 5 was intentional, was it knowing, was it negligent, and  
 6 then you look at what kind of harm was caused. If you  
 7 take harm out here, what you end up with is that a  
 8 lawyer who knowingly abandons the practice of law  
 9 consisting of 500 cases causing massive damage to 500  
 10 people should generally come out a disbarment, no  
 11 surprise there.  
 12 But if you take out injury, there is the  
 13 possibility that that initial sorting process results  
 14 in the lawyer who abandons the practice consisting of  
 15 one probate file that needs a letter and there is no  
 16 injury to anybody, then the presumptive level is  
 17 disbarment.  
 18 Now, the so-called fix for that is that level  
 19 of discipline or level of injury is then in the  
 20 mitigating factors. Well, then you look at was it a  
 21 lot of injury or very little injury. But I would call  
 22 your attention in all of these standards where this  
 23 comes up that in the mitigating factors, as published,  
 24 mitigating effect for lack of injury is defined as a  
 25 lack of any level of injury or something along that

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1 lines. But it's essentially if there was not one  
 2 scintilla of injury, then you get credit, otherwise  
 3 forget about it.  
 4 Now, I could go through a number of other  
 5 rules, but I think you get the point. Again, it goes  
 6 back to a fundamental, philosophical issue of whether  
 7 or not to, having made the he decision to propose  
 8 standards based roughly on the ABA standards, do you  
 9 follow through with that or do you abandon one basic  
 10 precept of the ABA standards and try something else?  
 11 MR. CAMPBELL: Let me follow that up, if I  
 12 may. The particular standard that John referred to  
 13 involving client abandonment, it's one where the court  
 14 took a long look at the ADB's version, took a look at  
 15 my version, presumably, and then came up with their  
 16 own, and, frankly, the errors, to the extent they  
 17 could be described as such that occur within that  
 18 standard are really just, I think, some mistake in  
 19 drafting by the court.  
 20 I don't think that's a good rule to use in  
 21 terms of how injury works. The reality is that you --  
 22 I don't believe it makes that much of a difference  
 23 whether the injury is in at that stage or whether  
 24 injury is in at the mitigation/aggravation stage. It  
 25 does take away the chance that somebody might confuse

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1 injury as an actual element in the offense, and I know  
 2 it happens at the stage where sanctions are being  
 3 imposed, but I have been before hearing panels, and I  
 4 think it is possible to be misdirected even  
 5 interpreting the violation.  
 6 That was one of the things that motivated me  
 7 to move, as a suggestion, to the  
 8 mitigation/aggravation area. The court adopted that  
 9 for their own reasons. The Board itself had taken  
 10 injury out of a number of provisions, just not all of  
 11 them, and so I think as you look at it, it's a cleaner  
 12 way of looking at it without considering injury until  
 13 the aggravation/mitigation stage rather than an  
 14 element of the offense, and I think that relative to  
 15 whether it's in some or in others, again, I think the  
 16 court is going to end up cleaning a lot of that  
 17 language up out of the standards where injury can be  
 18 used as an example the way John did anyway, but I  
 19 think you ought to vote more on the grounds of sort of  
 20 the philosophy of where injury is going to be looked  
 21 at.  
 22 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Executive  
 23 Director.  
 24 MR. BERRY: Having spent a lot of years in  
 25 looking at the cases and how these things work, I

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1 think from a factual standpoint to help you out you  
 2 can make a philosophic decision based on impact this  
 3 is going to have. I agree with Mr. Campbell that in  
 4 some respects we are only talking about where it  
 5 applies, whether it's at the front end of the  
 6 definition or later on in mitigation. Why I fall on  
 7 the side of Mr. VanBolt is from my observations of the  
 8 cases, if you believe harm both by being very serious  
 9 should raise the level of potential discipline or  
 10 because it's very minimal to reduce it, then the  
 11 impact of it is going to be much more important from  
 12 my observations at the front end than at the other  
 13 end.

14 Mitigation and aggravating factors many times  
 15 brace discipline up and down some but not quite as  
 16 much on the front end. You are starting with a  
 17 presumption at the front end, bang, it's this. If you  
 18 believe harm is a vital component of the whole  
 19 component of where you are going to start out with  
 20 discipline, I would think you would want it on the  
 21 front end. I think the facts have borne that out.

22 JUDGE KENT: Wally Kent, 54th circuit. I  
 23 would agree with those comments, otherwise I find that  
 24 it appears to be almost favoring mandatory sentencing,  
 25 and as a judge I oppose mandatory sentencing. Thank

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1 you.

2 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
 3 discussion?  
 4 Seeing none, we will put it to vote.  
 5 All those in favor of option (a) say aye  
 6 Any opposed.  
 7 Anybody who voted for (a) cannot vote for  
 8 (b). All I want to know is whether or not we have  
 9 enough for a minority opinion.  
 10 Anybody in favor of (b), I need you to stand  
 11 up so I can see if we have 25. Thank you.  
 12 Next up is use of reprimand within the  
 13 standards dealing with 4.6, 6.1 and 8.0. I will  
 14 entertain a motion.  
 15 VOICE: So moved.  
 16 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Second?  
 17 VOICE: Support.  
 18 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 19 MR. ARMITAGE: Just briefly. The ADB  
 20 proposal would be consistent with option (a), which  
 21 would put reprimand as an option, a disciplinary  
 22 option, in three different kinds of misconduct.  
 23 Tenure for the Board, all I know is that  
 24 truth is stranger than fiction, and even if that's a  
 25 general proposition, reprimand should not be

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1 available, for example, dishonest conduct or whatever.  
 2 Sometimes there are circumstances that arise that make  
 3 it appropriate, so the Board determined to leave that  
 4 in as an option, perhaps circumscribe, but just make  
 5 it an option that's what the intent was.  
 6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Don.  
 7 MR. CAMPBELL: My proposal is the proposal  
 8 the court adopted. It adopted, and I hope for the  
 9 reasons I proposed it, because in Michigan one cannot  
 10 be subject to sanctions for negligently doing  
 11 something that is fraudulent. In other words, they  
 12 create a category of crimes or offenses here and  
 13 punishments for it that don't exist in Michigan.  
 14 So to say that you cannot be reprimanded for  
 15 negligently, fraudulently doing something is really  
 16 just -- it should be obvious. I think it was obvious  
 17 to the court, I hope it's obvious to you. It doesn't  
 18 mean people can't be reprimanded for this offense,  
 19 because if suspension turns out to be the category  
 20 they fall into, and most of us, I think, would agree  
 21 if you do something with actual knowledge that is  
 22 fraudulent and meets all the other conditions for  
 23 a violation of the rules, presumably you should get at  
 24 least 30 days off and upwards of that, that you can  
 25 still mitigate that down under the mitigation factors,

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1 but it would be ridiculous to define an offense that  
 2 cannot occur.  
 3 The ABA does that in their standards. The  
 4 Michigan's proposed rules by the ADB does that. The  
 5 court doesn't do that. I recommend that they not. I  
 6 hope that you follow that lead and say we are not  
 7 going to make offenses, we are not going to make  
 8 sanctions for offenses that cannot occur.  
 9 MR. ARMITAGE: Just have to rebut that, if I  
 10 may. There is no such negligent, fraudulent merger in  
 11 the ABA proposal. In fact, it distinguishes  
 12 between negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent  
 13 misrepresentation.  
 14 I would agree that if there is a fictitious  
 15 form of misconduct, the standards shouldn't address  
 16 that, but that hasn't hand. In all three of these  
 17 they are based on actual forms of misconduct that are  
 18 recognized by the Rules of Professional Conduct.  
 19 Thank you.  
 20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
 21 discussion?  
 22 Seeing none, all in favor of (a) please say  
 23 aye.  
 24 Any opposed.  
 25 I need the nays to stand so I can see if we

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1 have 25.  
 2 Anybody who voted yes on (a) cannot vote upon  
 3 (b). Is there anybody, and I need you to stand to  
 4 determine whether or not we have 25 percent minority,  
 5 so is there anybody in favor of (a), please stand, or  
 6 sorry, (b), I stand corrected, (b) please stand and,  
 7 again, you did not vote in favor of (a), which means  
 8 you can stand for (b).  
 9 Okay. We don't have enough for a minority  
 10 opinion. Thank you.  
 11 Next in your booklet is MSILS the standards  
 12 consent orders and judgments of misconduct. There is  
 13 actually two copies in there, and I would say you  
 14 should pass over the first copy, because it's like a  
 15 laugh line version of it, and that was just a drafting  
 16 version. The next version in there is the final  
 17 version.  
 18 I will entertain a motion with regard to the  
 19 standards of consent orders/judgments of misconduct.  
 20 VOICE: So moved.  
 21 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Second?  
 22 VOICE: Second.  
 23 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 24 MR. AGACINSKI: Now it's probably pretty  
 25 obvious, I was mostly asked to sit here between the

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1 two parties, and I agreed because they gave me a great  
 2 view. On this one topic, though, I did have some  
 3 insight, and I even have my name in the book.  
 4 Drawing upon my experience as a Wayne County  
 5 prosecutor for 27 years, it seems to me when you deal  
 6 with plea bargains or consent judgment you may not  
 7 want to be bound by the guidelines. Many times you  
 8 agree to a plea as a prosecutor or grievance  
 9 commissioner because your case is falling apart, your  
 10 witness shows up drunk, or you're concerned about a  
 11 flaky fact finding, so you would rather take your bird  
 12 in the hand rather than go for the hearing.  
 13 I know in criminal cases at least five years  
 14 ago the courts had ruled that a plea bargain is the  
 15 reason for the DBA and the sentencing guideline  
 16 statutes, because there are those factors that you  
 17 can't go on the record and say I don't trust you and  
 18 to judge the fact of this case when you try to explain  
 19 your reasoning for accepting a consent judgment or a  
 20 plea bargain.  
 21 And so my proposal, my recommendation, was  
 22 simply to withdraw or strike consent judgments as  
 23 being governed by the guidelines, which and I think is  
 24 the way it still work in the criminal law for plea  
 25 bargains.

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1 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Mark or  
 2 John.  
 3 MR. VANBOLT: The opposing way of looking at  
 4 that, I suppose you would start with looking again at  
 5 statistically in Michigan, last year 44 percent of the  
 6 publicly disciplines in Michigan were the result of  
 7 consent discipline proposals which, under the rules,  
 8 have to be agreed to by the Grievance Administrator  
 9 and Respondent, they then have to be presented to the  
 10 Attorney Grievance Commission, which approves them or  
 11 doesn't approve them. If approved, then goes to a  
 12 hearing panel, which approves or does not approve, and  
 13 at that point the order becomes a public order just  
 14 like any other order of suspension.  
 15 And in Michigan last year, just as in every  
 16 year, people consent to reprimands, suspensions,  
 17 disbarments, not surprisingly more people consent to  
 18 reprimands than disbarments, but they cover the whole  
 19 range.  
 20 I think that's -- the point is that when  
 21 those public disciplines are recorded in the Bar  
 22 Journal, the page you look at first when you get your  
 23 Bar Journal, or reported in the newspaper, the public  
 24 the, profession, the courts do not necessarily make  
 25 that distinction between the disciplines which were

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1 decide under the standards by a panel or the  
 2 disciplines which were agreed to by the Grievance  
 3 Commission as part of a plea bargain process.  
 4 And I think really the point of this  
 5 particular vote begs the question really, is the  
 6 rationale for proclaiming to the public that we are  
 7 imposing discipline in Michigan under a set of  
 8 standards, except it's only 56 percent that it applies  
 9 to. The other 44 percent are factors that are known  
 10 only to the prosecutor and the party and the  
 11 commission, and then the panel pretty much needs to  
 12 take it on faith that that's a good deal, because once  
 13 it's reported it has the same force and effect as any  
 14 other form of discipline.  
 15 So, again, I think that's really the  
 16 philosophical difference is do the standards apply to  
 17 a hundred percent of the disciplines or only 60  
 18 percent of the disciplines.  
 19 MR. CAMPBELL: I note here that it says that  
 20 I agreed with the ADB and the court. My recollection  
 21 is I didn't take a position. I see the merits of both  
 22 sides, and as a practitioner I would love to be able  
 23 to do a consent for my client without having to go  
 24 through the standards. By the same token, I would  
 25 love to be able to cite consents in other cases when

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1 other clients aren't lucky enough to be able to  
 2 consent, and say, hey, that's what they did to this  
 3 guy, you ought do the same to mine, give him a break.  
 4 I don't know that there is a right or a wrong  
 5 there, but there should be a consistency, and I guess  
 6 one version or another should be elected to give us  
 7 practitioners an idea how we ought to proceed.  
 8 MR. VANBOLT: Could I just say -- actually I  
 9 have done my own sort of informal surveys among other  
 10 states. Not every state actually has a procedure of  
 11 consent discipline, much to their chagrin, because  
 12 they waste an awful lot of time dealing with cases  
 13 that should be disposed of officially.  
 14 Consent discipline process works. I am not  
 15 criticizing it in any way. Bob and his staff and the  
 16 commission do a terrific job of working with  
 17 respondents to reach the right result in those cases  
 18 that need to be disposed of, whether it's resulting in  
 19 a reprimand or a disbarment.  
 20 But other states that do have these  
 21 procedures, typically there is disclosure or some kind  
 22 of analysis under the standards. It is certainly not  
 23 unusual. There are some states that have lengthy  
 24 forms, 10 or 11 pages, where everything has to be  
 25 spelled out. There are other states where it is

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1 nothing more than a simple declaration in the plea  
 2 agreement, in the consent discipline stipulation that  
 3 the parties hereby stipulate that the proposed  
 4 discipline falls within standard 4.2 and the parties  
 5 have considered the following aggravating and  
 6 mitigating circumstances.  
 7 As a matter of fact some stipulations  
 8 currently submitted by the Grievance Commission use  
 9 that language and often to quite great effect,  
 10 especially in cases where the initial look at the  
 11 stipulation suggests that there is something odd about  
 12 this, and the best example I can give you is a case  
 13 about a year ago.  
 14 The Board has declared in its case law that  
 15 one of the capital offenses of lawyer discipline,  
 16 along with embezzling your client's money, is forging  
 17 a judge's signature. There is language in the cases  
 18 that say we just cannot imagine a worst offense.  
 19 There is, however, a consent case in which  
 20 the stipulation was to a suspension of three years for  
 21 a lawyer who was convicted by a federal court of  
 22 forging a judge's signature.  
 23 Now, that stipulation presented without  
 24 anything further would never have been passed, but  
 25 because it was a much, much longer than normal

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1 stipulation, that stipulation said this would normally  
 2 be disbarment under the standards; however, here is  
 3 three pages every mitigating circumstances, extreme  
 4 supervision under a probation department for a lawyer  
 5 who has some serious substance abuse and emotional  
 6 problems which have now been dealt with, this is an  
 7 unusual case, and this is why it should be three  
 8 years.  
 9 There is now a reported case in Michigan that  
 10 says that a lawyer who committed the capital crime got  
 11 three years, but it was only because of the use of the  
 12 analysis under the standards. So it's not unheard of  
 13 in Michigan and certainly not unheard of anywhere  
 14 else.  
 15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Bob.  
 16 MR. AGACINSKI: The only practical difficulty  
 17 why I am even taking a stand is that the worst you can  
 18 do by going to hearing is getting the exact same thing  
 19 you can consent to, there is no reason to consent  
 20 judgment then. You might as well go to hearing and  
 21 hope for flaky fact finding and that the case falls  
 22 apart. So what you will do is eliminate the basis for  
 23 consents, which is again half of our dispositions.  
 24 MR. ALLEN: I want to point out the  
 25 underlying assumption of this entire exercise is we

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1 ought to have these standards, and the court is  
 2 correct in adopting them. And we are not at that  
 3 level of debate, so I won't start it, but I would  
 4 point out for purposes of that analysis that the  
 5 Attorney Grievance Commission has just explained to  
 6 you why in 50 percent of the cases that they have they  
 7 don't want to use these standards, because they need  
 8 the discretion that is necessary to speak to the  
 9 particular facts and circumstances in each case, but  
 10 in the other 50 percent they don't want the hearing  
 11 panel to have that discretion. Instead they want them  
 12 to be essentially bound by what I call the sentencing  
 13 guidelines and get in trouble for it when I do that.  
 14 And I would submit to you that I think the  
 15 arguments you have just heard, all which are very  
 16 cogent, I think, and very valid, equally apply to the  
 17 other 50 percent of the cases, except it ought to be  
 18 the hearing panel that's exercising that same  
 19 discretion.  
 20 MR. LARKY: What do you recommend?  
 21 MR. ARMITAGE: I think John recommends no  
 22 anomaly.  
 23 MR. ALLEN: I don't have any counter proposal  
 24 in writing, and that's not my purpose here today, but  
 25 I do think the entire concept of the standards that

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<p>1 are drafted out of the mid-1980s based on the Code of 2 Professional Responsibility and not the Rules of 3 Professional Conduct and the reason they have never 4 been updated by the ABA is the ABA has since taken a 5 stance against sentencing guidelines in the criminal 6 context, and it's not about to say we are against them 7 in the criminal context but we want them in the lawyer 8 discipline context for all the same reasons.</p> <p>9 MR. BERRY: I viewed this rule from the 10 context, and I think you probably do as well, from a 11 practical, pragmatic thing. As you are thinking 12 through this you are probably thinking a couple 13 things. One is you want to make sure justice is done 14 and the public is protected, and you also want to make 15 sure a lawyer gets a fair deal out of this process. 16 And what's the most likely way that's going to occur 17 in this process, and if I go one way or the other, 18 what's the most likely event that it won't occur.</p> <p>19 From my experiences, and if you try cases, 20 whether criminally or civilly, you understand there is 21 a difference between what might end up at the end 22 versus the negotiation. Considerations are different, 23 the result may be different, and I think you are 24 mixing apples and/oranges when you expect to have all 25 of the same considerations from a tried case and the</p>	<p>1 But a hearing panel -- I will give you the 2 practical application. A hearing panel has an 3 obligation and a duty imposed by the Court Rules to 4 approve the stipulations before them. Are they to be 5 blindfolded and just told to sign and shut up and 6 approve this. I don't see what function they serve.</p> <p>7 These people volunteer lots of time. They 8 are familiar with the case law. The case law actually 9 dovetails with the standards. It's not quite as bad 10 as the sentencing guideline.</p> <p>11 I was not initially a fan of the standards, 12 because I thought they were so general, but as we have 13 been ordered to use them and have been using them, you 14 find that the generality has some value in that it 15 let's our common law fit within it in cases that are 16 based on individual factors within it.</p> <p>17 So you have got a hearing panel deciding to 18 approve or not approve a stipulated disposition, a 19 consent judgment, and one of the legitimate factors is 20 that this is consent and that the person is 21 cooperating and coming forward.</p> <p>22 I don't know how, as a practical matter, you 23 are going to erase the panel's memory and make them 24 disregard the standards and other case law, and they 25 are going to look at it and say why is this out of</p>
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<p>1 nontried case. That's just the real world.</p> <p>2 One of the things you are concerned about is 3 accountability or transparency, and I think that's a 4 separate issue. I come from two states where I 5 prosecuted these cases where, in essence, we had a 6 rule that said you consider, the standards are 7 considered along with other appropriate considerations 8 for an ultimate resolution and a consent judgment, and 9 then we had a process by which you articulate in some 10 way what those are.</p> <p>11 That's a separate process that you have 12 in front of you, but I would argue that to protect 13 both the public and an attorney who very well may want 14 to do this and it's the appropriate thing to do, if 15 you hold him to these standards, you are ultimately 16 going to force, you are going to force end results 17 that I don't think necessarily are going to be 18 appropriate end results.</p> <p>19 Looks like Mark is ready to take me on.</p> <p>20 MR. ARMITAGE: You really gave me a good 21 entree there. Holding to the standards is not -- that 22 reminds me to rebut something Bob said, that it's a 23 reason to deviate in the state and federal courts, 24 and, yes, it is. No one is saying that there is no 25 distinction.</p>	<p>1 whack, and it's going to have to be explained to them 2 anyway.</p> <p>3 I think the most important thing is that it 4 really would be anomalous to have the smallest sliver 5 that gets the most scrutiny, argument to three peers 6 and tried by professionals, have that held accountable 7 by some rigorous standards and then everything else is 8 subject only to the Grievance Administrator's 9 discretion whether it's probation, admonition, and 10 then now consent judgment, which are initiated by a 11 formal public proceeding. It's by formal complaint, 12 so I am confused about what the role of the panel 13 would be if they didn't apply some sort of guidelines 14 to start with and then deviate as appropriate.</p> <p>15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further 16 discussion?</p> <p>17 MR. ROMANO: Vince Romano, 3rd circuit. Can 18 a hearing panel reject a finding?</p> <p>19 MR. ARMITAGE: Yes.</p> <p>20 MR. VANBOLT: Yes.</p> <p>21 MR. ROMANO: So if it's a consent judgment, 22 can the hearing panel still reject it?</p> <p>23 MR. VANBOLT: Yes. It must be accepted or 24 rejected by the panel. If the panel rejects, then it 25 goes to a new panel for a new hearing, there is no</p>

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<p>1 mention of the agreement, it just starts from scratch.                  2 Typically what happens before that, and I                  3 will say that probably 90, 95 percent of the                  4 stipulations are, in fact, approved, maybe higher than                  5 that, and I think it would be disingenuous to say that                  6 the attitude is not if it's good enough for the                  7 prosecutor, it must be good enough for us, and they                  8 are approved.                  9 Before panels just outright reject, what                  10 generally happens is the panel expresses to the                  11 parties where their concern lies. We need a little                  12 more information about this, what really happened, was                  13 anybody hurt, has there been restitution made, what                  14 does the client think, those kinds of questions, and                  15 in most cases, 99 percent of the time, the question is                  16 answered, the panel says, okay, we understand now, and                  17 then it's approved. But, yes, it can be rejected.                  18 MR. ROMANO: Second question, is the hearing                  19 panel able to question the Grievance Commission staff                  20 as to a possible deviation from a standard?                  21 MR. AGACINSKI: Yes, yes, and if we don't                  22 want to give the answer, this is one of those answers,                  23 then they are free to reject our consent judgment.                  24 MR. ROMANO: Thank you.                  25 MR. VANBOLT: It's actually consent</p>	<p>1 MR. BERRY: I don't know if it's good news or                  2 bad, but I am fine. Thank you.                  3 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: All those in favor of                  4 (b), please say aye.                  5 And opposed.                  6 I think we have to -- we are going to have to                  7 do a count. I assume you did not vote for both.                  8 All those who said aye to (a), please stand.                  9 I don't know the number. I think it's a                  10 split. Then you are saying for (b) just have them                  11 stand in favor of (b). I stand corrected, no                  12 minority, okay.                  13 So (b) passes.                  14 Next up is standards 2.6, admonition. I will                  15 entertain a motion with regard to standard 2.6.                  16 VOICE: So moved.                  17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Do I hear a second?                  18 VOICE: Second.                  19 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Any                  20 discussion? Bob.                  21 MR. AGACINSKI: I recommend a no vote on this                  22 because it is not relevant to the state of Michigan.                  23 Other states -- and our Judicial Tenure Commission has                  24 a unified process where you prosecute and you try the                  25 case all in private, and so you can have private</p>
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<p>1 stipulation, not a judgment. It doesn't become a                  2 judgment until the panel says it's a judgment.                  3 MR. ROMANO: Thank you.                  4 JUDGE KENT: Wally Kent, 54th circuit. Very                  5 simply put, so that there is no question, which of the                  6 alternatives allows the hearing panel more discretion?                  7 MR. AGACINSKI: Neither. One gives the                  8 Grievance Administrator more discretion, but it does                  9 not affect the hearing panel.                  10 MR. VANBOLT: Arguably, including consent                  11 disciplines within the standards gives the panel more                  12 information, but it doesn't affect their discretion.                  13 JUDGE KENT: Which one would affect the                  14 Grievance Administrator's discretion then, in what                  15 fashion? Which one gives the administrator more                  16 discretion?                  17 MR. AGACINSKI: (b).                  18 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further                  19 discussion? Seeing none, we will call the vote.                  20 All those in favor of (a), please say aye.                  21 All those opposed.                  22 I need the ayes to stand to see whether or                  23 not we have enough for a minority opinion.                  24 We don't have enough. Thank you very much.                  25 JUDGE SCHNELZ: He was shocked by the result.</p>	<p>1 admonishments. In Michigan you can't have a private                  2 admonishment unless -- you just can't have it, because                  3 once you issue a formal complaint it's a public                  4 matter, it's on the record and everybody can learn                  5 about the fact there was a prosecution. So it's not                  6 an option that's available to hearing panels.                  7 Also, this makes an admonishment a                  8 discipline, whereas in Michigan admonishments are not                  9 considered discipline. They are considered a warning                  10 or an agreement between the parties to close the case                  11 with an understanding that if you are in trouble again                  12 it can be used in aggravating your punishment the next                  13 time.                  14 So this really does have relevance in some                  15 states, and I think the Supreme Court saw a lot of                  16 states had it, but I don't think it can work in                  17 Michigan where we have the separate systems and a                  18 public hearing process.                  19 MR. VANBOLT: This is an easy one, the                  20 Attorney Discipline Board agrees a hundred percent                  21 with that. Michigan does not recognize public                  22 disciplines; therefore, that language was stricken --                  23 private disciplines, by including admonition;                  24 therefore, the Boards's proposal to the court just                  25 struck that language defining admonition.</p>



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1 For some reason or another it reappeared in  
2 the version published by the court to the extent that  
3 it suggests a change in the rules allowing panels or  
4 the Board to admonish people. We don't believe that  
5 that is the case.  
6 MR. CAMPBELL: Ditto.  
7 MR. LABRE: Bill LaBre, 43rd circuit, Cass  
8 County. Our county is a border county, and I practice  
9 in both Michigan and Indiana, about a third in Indiana  
10 and two-thirds here.  
11 Indiana has private reprimands or  
12 admonitions. You have, if you are going to have a  
13 disciplinary proceeding, you are going to have a  
14 hearing before a hearing officer, it's going to be on  
15 the record, but this becomes a level of discipline,  
16 whether by consent or whether by an actual  
17 recommendation of the hearing officer.  
18 I think it is an excellent quiver to have in  
19 the arrows when you have very minor cases, and I think  
20 we ought to formalize it, and if we formalize it in  
21 this backward way, better to formalize it  
22 somehow than not have the arrow at all. So I  
23 recommend we approve it.  
24 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: So you spoke in  
25 support of (a)?

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1 MR. LABRE: Correct.  
2 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Any  
3 further discussion? Seeing none, we will vote on (a).  
4 All those in favor of (a), say aye.  
5 All those opposed.  
6 I need the ayes to stand just up to see if we  
7 have a minority. We don't have enough. Thank you.  
8 And then with regard to (b), all those in  
9 favor.  
10 There is our majority.  
11 Next is use of interference or potential  
12 interference with the legal proceeding or the outcome  
13 of the legal proceeding within the standards, which is  
14 6.2 and 6.3.  
15 I will entertain a motion with regard to  
16 these proposals.  
17 VOICE: So moved.  
18 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Second?  
19 VOICE: Support.  
20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Any  
21 discussion?  
22 MR. CAMPBELL: My only comment is that after  
23 reading the court proposed rule, I went in and tweaked  
24 a little bit from what I had originally proposed.  
25 It's on pages, I think, 11, 12 and 13 of what is your

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1 attachment to your agenda today, attachment 14,  
2 supplemental report. When you actually get into the  
3 report itself I identify some additional language  
4 changes. I don't know that there is much of a  
5 distinction that amounts to a difference when you got  
6 done comparing that to the ADB. Maybe it's different  
7 routes to the same result. I do think they are  
8 proposals that need a little bit more tweaking than  
9 what has been done already.  
10 MR. ARMITAGE: Well, this kind of relates  
11 back to the injury issue. The verbal formula for  
12 injury in these particular offenses is potentially  
13 serious or significant interference with a legal  
14 proceeding or the outcome of a legal proceeding.  
15 Again, we did follow the ABA here, thought it was  
16 relevant consideration to be considered in the initial  
17 pass at setting the ranges of discipline, and so I  
18 believe the (a)'s are the ADB positions.  
19 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
20 discussion? Seeing none, then we will take the first  
21 portion of this proposal for vote.  
22 All those in favor of (a), please say aye.  
23 All those opposed.  
24 Stand up for ayes, please. Ayes sit down.  
25 Now I need the noes. Okay. Thank you.

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1 Now is the second proposal. It has to do  
2 with -- the result was yes (a), that was the majority.  
3 No minority.  
4 Next is with regard to suspending, and all  
5 those in favor of (a), please say aye.  
6 All those opposed.  
7 MR. VANBOLT: In this general section under  
8 6.2 and 3 there is three choices, one for disbarment,  
9 one for reprimand, one for suspension.  
10 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Actually three  
11 different proposals. Not three choices, three  
12 proposals.  
13 MR. VANBOLT: Three proposals, and each one  
14 there is an (a) and a (b). In each one the (a)  
15 version is the Board/ABA version for the reasons that  
16 Mark stated dealing with considering certain level of  
17 harm to the proceeding before imposing that level of  
18 discipline, so it's essentially the same question  
19 repeated for three levels of discipline.  
20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: The first one deals  
21 with disbarment, the second one deals with suspension,  
22 and the third deals with reprimand.  
23 MR. CAMPBELL: The only thing that I would  
24 add is, again, under 6.1 and 6.3 you have a case where  
25 the ADB, following the ABA, defines a section for

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<p>1 something that is not a violation in Michigan, and 2 Michigan only punishes lawyers for a knowing violation 3 of the Court Rule, they have a sanction for a 4 negligent violation of the Court Rule. Can't happen 5 in Michigan, so why have a standard. 6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further 7 discussion? Now we will put to vote. 8 All those in favor of (a), say ye. 9 Though opposed. 10 I just need the nays to stand up to make sure 11 we don't have enough for minority. Thank you. 12 We need all those who said yea to option (a) 13 for the second portion to stand. We need numbers, 14 because those people who didn't vote in favor of (a) 15 could vote in favor of (b), and you could end up with 16 a minority opinion that way. 17 So could you please stand up if you voted in 18 favor of (a). We need the tellers. And, again, you 19 can't vote for both, so if you are voting for (a) now, 20 then when we vote for (b), you can't vote for (b). 21 Okay. You can be seated. 22 All those in favor of (b), please stand. Is 23 everybody in favor of (b) standing? 24 We don't have enough for a minority opinion. 25 Thank you.</p>	<p>1 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Can you refer to the 2 specific standard that you are talking about. 3 MS. HAROUTUNIAN: I believe it is -- 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: The 6.2, 6.3? 5 MS. LICATA: No, it 4.6, 6.1 and 8.0. 6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Use of reprimand within 7 the standards. 8 MS. LICATA: Yes. I voted with the majority. 9 There is some confusion among some of us who voted for 10 the majority as to exactly why it is we are 11 reprimanding for negligence, and if we could have an 12 explanation and reconsideration is appropriate. 13 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: You have to move for 14 reconsideration. 15 MS. LICATA: I would move for 16 reconsideration. 17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: It requires a second. 18 VOICE: Second. 19 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: It is debatable, so I 20 ask for discussion. 21 Seeing none, then all in favor of the 22 reconsideration say aye. 23 Those opposed. 24 Thank you, Susan. 25 I believe that we left off at standard 4.1,</p>
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<p>1 And then the third portion of this proposal 2 is (a) or (b), yes or no with regard to the reprimand 3 portion of this. 4 All those in favor of the language that is 5 before you right here say aye. 6 Any opposed. 7 Yes has it. 8 And now we move on -- oh, actually at this 9 point we would move on to 4.1. I think everybody 10 needs a break just for maybe ten minutes. We have 11 snacks out there if you want to get them. You want to 12 keep going? You know what, we have got recorders here 13 who have to be able to take just a rest break for a 14 comfort break, so we are just going to take it for 15 five minutes, so 3:15 we resume. You don't want to go 16 anywhere, you don't have to. 17 (Break was taken.) 18 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: If we can reconvene. 19 I understand that there was some confusion with regard 20 to the last proposal. 21 VOICE: Not the last one. 22 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: If someone could come 23 to the mike and we can address this. 24 MS. HAROUTUNIAN: Susan Licata Haroutunian, 25 3rd circuit. The use of the reprimand --</p>	<p>1 failure to preserve property held in trust. I will 2 entertain a motion with regard to that. 3 VOICE: So moved. 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Second. 5 VOICE: Support. 6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion? 7 MR. ARMITAGE: This is a central type of 8 misconduct dealing with misappropriation. The ADB has 9 proposed a draft that is represented in your options 10 as (b) under both choices, not both choices but both 11 proposals before you. It helps immeasurably to 12 distinguish the various types of misappropriation. 13 The published proposal uses one term 14 throughout, and that is failure to preserve property 15 held in trust. This gets back to the distinction 16 between the rules and the standards and the fact that 17 the language doesn't always match. It shouldn't 18 match, because you are at a second a stage here, and 19 once you pass the floor of misconduct, you want to 20 help sort out really, really bad to understandably, 21 you know, you crossed the line. You want the least 22 egregious to the worst, so -- that was not well 23 stated. But the point is this helps sort out the 24 different levels of misconduct, and we urge (b) be 25 adopted, the ADB proposal.</p>

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<p>1 MR. CAMPBELL: The effect of what my language</p> <p>2 proposal does is under the ABA version they divided</p> <p>3 how you treated property, whether it was client</p> <p>4 property or somebody else's. Client property was</p> <p>5 treated under 4.1, and somebody else's property was</p> <p>6 treated under 5.1, a different standard.</p> <p>7 There was significance to that, because in</p> <p>8 the ABA standards a certain level of mitigation needed</p> <p>9 to be present for bringing down a presumptive</p> <p>10 disbarment for taking client funds that was not there</p> <p>11 for taking other people's money. In other words, it</p> <p>12 was less mitigation at least in the commentary that</p> <p>13 seemed to be required.</p> <p>14 My proposal is consistent with 1.15 in the</p> <p>15 Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. Michigan Rule</p> <p>16 1.15 covers both the property of clients and third</p> <p>17 persons. It makes no distinction.</p> <p>18 My proposal under 4.1, likewise, makes no</p> <p>19 distinction in the level of mitigation. The</p> <p>20 substantial litigation that needs to be present to</p> <p>21 decrease the presumed level of sanction is likewise</p> <p>22 for taking somebody else's money, the same as it would</p> <p>23 be for taking the client's money.</p> <p>24 That's really what, in voting in favor of (a)</p> <p>25 what you are saying is just as the rule combines this</p>	<p>1 think the system treats it that way. This really is</p> <p>2 not a big deal in terms of where the misappropriation</p> <p>3 is put. It really is no more complicated than client</p> <p>4 money misappropriation comes under duties to client</p> <p>5 section. The offenses should essentially be the same.</p> <p>6 There is the other issue, though, that the ABA</p> <p>7 standards and, thus, the ADB proposal refers to one</p> <p>8 particular phrase, which is the knowing conversion of</p> <p>9 property, client property or client funds, knowing</p> <p>10 conversion as opposed to failure to hold in trust.</p> <p>11 Failure to hold in trust is not a phrase which appears</p> <p>12 either in our rules or, for the most part, in our case</p> <p>13 law, which is one of the reasons that the Board is not</p> <p>14 a big fan of jumping over that cliff and using new</p> <p>15 language that they have into the used before.</p> <p>16 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further</p> <p>17 discussion?</p> <p>18 MS. POHLY: Linda Pohly from the 7th circuit,</p> <p>19 Genesee County.</p> <p>20 Mr. Campbell, I do not know whether a failure</p> <p>21 to make payroll tax deposits by an employing lawyer</p> <p>22 would be regarded as a failure to preserve property</p> <p>23 and trust resulting in disbarment. Would it be a</p> <p>24 failure to hold property in trust resulting in a</p> <p>25 suspension, or would it be neither?</p>
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<p>1 misconduct so too the sanctions should combine and</p> <p>2 address this misconduct. If you vote in favor of (b),</p> <p>3 you are voting for a bifurcation of that consistent</p> <p>4 with what it was under the old code but not consistent</p> <p>5 with what it is under the rule.</p> <p>6 MR. VANBOLT: I can't tell you exactly how</p> <p>7 many angels dance on the head of this pin, but the</p> <p>8 reason that the ABA standards and the modification</p> <p>9 proposed by the ADB putting these two types of</p> <p>10 misappropriation in two different places is for</p> <p>11 nothing, it's no more complicated than the fact that</p> <p>12 under the ABA standards there are big categories</p> <p>13 dealing with violations. So duties to a client are in</p> <p>14 one section, duties to third persons are in another</p> <p>15 section.</p> <p>16 That is in a nutshell the reason that</p> <p>17 misappropriation of client funds is under the section</p> <p>18 called violations of duties to clients, and</p> <p>19 misappropriation of other people's money is under the</p> <p>20 5.0 series, which deals with personal integrity.</p> <p>21 I can tell you that certainly neither the</p> <p>22 panels, the commission, the board, the Supreme Court,</p> <p>23 as far as I know, has ever said anywhere that it is</p> <p>24 less egregious to steal somebody else's money than</p> <p>25 your client's money. Stealing is stealing, and I</p>	<p>1 MR. CAMPBELL: You are indicating this is</p> <p>2 money that belongs to the law firm that they are</p> <p>3 paying --</p> <p>4 MS. POHLY: Money that is withheld from</p> <p>5 employee paychecks which should be deposited into the</p> <p>6 payroll tax deposit system and it's not so deposited.</p> <p>7 MR. CAMPBELL: So that would be money</p> <p>8 belonging either to the government or --</p> <p>9 MS. POHLY: Correct, or the employee.</p> <p>10 MR. CAMPBELL: Then to a third person?</p> <p>11 MS. POHLY: Yes.</p> <p>12 MR. CAMPBELL: I would have to look at Rule</p> <p>13 1.15 to see how it treats monies. I think it's monies</p> <p>14 that a lawyer comes into possession concerning</p> <p>15 representation. If that limitation isn't there, then</p> <p>16 the scenario you have described may apply. Otherwise</p> <p>17 it seems to me that it wouldn't necessarily be monies</p> <p>18 held in trust as identified here.</p> <p>19 In terms of the ADB's version it wouldn't be</p> <p>20 treated under 4.1. It would be treated under 5.1,</p> <p>21 which talks about criminal activity, taking</p> <p>22 essentially an embezzlement kind of a theory, and if</p> <p>23 that's what you have, it may be treated under there.</p> <p>24 MS. POHLY: So as I understand your answer,</p> <p>25 if 1.15 relates solely to representation, then your</p>

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1 proposal would not govern a failure to make payroll  
2 tax deposits?  
3 MR. CAMPBELL: Within my proposal I identify  
4 the rules, and the court also within their proposal  
5 identify the rules that apply within each section. If  
6 what you have described is not a violation of 1.15, it  
7 would not be treated under 4.1.  
8 MR. VANBOLT: Can I just say, take a look at  
9 Grievance Administrator versus Nichols. In my former  
10 life when I sat at that end of the table as a  
11 discipline prosecutor, I tried that case. The Supreme  
12 Court declined to increase discipline to a disbarment,  
13 maintained the level of suspension, but Justice  
14 Cavanagh actually in oral arguments asked me that  
15 question, why is this not like stealing client's  
16 money, and I agreed with him that it was.  
17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
18 discussion?  
19 MR. VANBOLT: That was when I was  
20 prosecuting.  
21 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
22 discussion?  
23 Seeing none, then this has two parts. The  
24 first part is whether standard 4.1 should provide that  
25 disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer

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1 knowingly, and then you have option (a) and option  
2 (b).  
3 All those in favor of option (a) please say  
4 aye.  
5 All those opposed.  
6 All those in favor of (a), can you please  
7 stand just to see if we have enough for a minority.  
8 No. Thank you very much.  
9 All those in favor of (b), please say aye.  
10 All those opposed.  
11 Okay. (b) passes as the majority. No  
12 minority.  
13 The next proposal, the next part is standard  
14 4.1 should provide that suspension is generally  
15 appropriate when a lawyer.  
16 All those in favor of (a), please say aye.  
17 All those opposed.  
18 VOICE: Can we have discussion?  
19 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: I am sorry, we already  
20 had discussion. We could open it up for discussion  
21 with regard to that second portion of the proposal.  
22 We are still under standard 4.1. We just  
23 dealt with the first portion regarding disbarment, and  
24 now we are talking about suspension.  
25 MS. DIEHL: Nancy Diehl, 3rd circuit. Could

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1 someone address the issue of knowingly or negligently,  
2 and we have had that negligent issue on a number of  
3 other proposals about why in the same, whether you  
4 would be given the same discipline, suspension,  
5 whether you were negligent or whether you knowingly  
6 did something.  
7 MR. VANBOLT: This rule is actually somewhat  
8 different than the other ones, and that is because the  
9 system in general, and I think most systems do look at  
10 money offenses differently, embezzlement, knowing  
11 conversion, intentional conversion, whatever you want  
12 to call it, is seen as sort of the capital offense.  
13 You will notice that in this particular rule,  
14 rather than following exactly the same hierarchy of  
15 intentional generally means disbarment, knowing  
16 generally means reprimand, or a suspension, negligent  
17 conduct generally means reprimand, in this particular  
18 type of misconduct everything is ratcheted up just a  
19 little bit so that the knowing conversion is  
20 disbarment, the -- I am sorry, the intentional  
21 conversion or knowing conversion is disbarment, the  
22 knowing or negligent dealing with client property is  
23 suspension, and then that's one which does say that  
24 reprimand is generally appropriate really only when  
25 there is an isolated incidence of simple neglect.

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1 This is not one of the cases that Don  
2 mentioned, Mr. Campbell mentioned, where there is this  
3 question of are we somehow sanctioning negligent  
4 conduct, which really isn't misconduct, because when  
5 you deal improperly with client funds that's a per se  
6 offense under the Michigan case law.  
7 If you negligently allow your trust account  
8 to be short by \$5 for a day that's misappropriation.  
9 It may not result in suspension or disbarment but it's  
10 still misappropriation.  
11 So that's why this rule is calibrated just a  
12 little bit different, so either knowing or negligent  
13 mishandling of your client money is more likely than  
14 not to result in your suspension.  
15 MR. CAMPBELL: I agree with John and the  
16 reason for the language that I propose today is  
17 because it takes out any question as stated by. It  
18 just says if you fail to do it. It is a strict  
19 liability offense in dealing with money, and that's  
20 why the wording was phrased. I think the wording  
21 knowingly or negligently is a little bit cumbersome  
22 and directs folks to a state of mind that isn't at all  
23 an issue or an element of any offense with regard to  
24 the money.  
25 You see the ADB's proposal here does actually

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1 differ slightly from the original ABA proposal and had  
 2 a different sort of take on it, but I think the  
 3 difference is as John has described.  
 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
 5 discussion? Then we are going to vote on the second  
 6 portion of 4.1, whether or not 4.1 should provide that  
 7 suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer.  
 8 All those in favor of (a) please say aye.  
 9 All those opposed.  
 10 Could I just have the ayes stand up to see if  
 11 we have enough for a minority. Thank you. That's  
 12 enough for a minority opinion.  
 13 All those in favor of (b), please say aye.  
 14 Those opposed.  
 15 And can I get a count on the ayes for the  
 16 (b), please, just so we have a number. All those in  
 17 favor of (b), if you could please stand. We need the  
 18 tellers, please.  
 19 I think we are okay with just saying it's a  
 20 majority. Go ahead and sit down.  
 21 Moving on to standard 4.3 with regard to  
 22 failure to avoid conflicts of interest. I will  
 23 entertain a motion with regard to this proposal.  
 24 VOICE: So moved.  
 25 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Second?

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1 VOICE: Second.  
 2 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 3 MR. VANBOLT: I just want to make one comment  
 4 here. The two questions that you have in front of you  
 5 on the suspension and reprimand, the (a) is generally  
 6 the proposal published for comment by the court and  
 7 the (b) is almost the Discipline Board's proposal.  
 8 The critical language that's missing from the material  
 9 in front of you is that what the Board proposed, which  
 10 is actually identical to the ABA standard, is  
 11 additional language that says, in the case of a  
 12 suspension, and causes injury or potential injury to a  
 13 client. In the case of reprimand it will adversely  
 14 affect another client and causes injury or potential  
 15 injury to a client.  
 16 This is consistent with what we have  
 17 discussed before, which is the Board's approach is  
 18 that degree of injury is part of the initial sorting  
 19 out process.  
 20 So in the language that appears in your  
 21 material, that language dealing with injury is left  
 22 out, so I can't say to you that (b) is the Board, the  
 23 Board's proposal. The Board's proposal is (b) plus  
 24 injury.  
 25 MR. CAMPBELL: I don't have the court's

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1 proposal in front of me, but I see at page six under  
 2 Section 14 that my original proposal for suspension  
 3 under 4.32, which is where this language is taken  
 4 from, has an (a) and a (b) to it, so what you are  
 5 voting on is really just one portion of what I  
 6 proposed, and my recollection is that both my (a) and (b)  
 7 appear as an alternative proposal in the court's  
 8 proposed language. So you can take a look there.  
 9 My (a) reads, A lawyer, a suspension is  
 10 generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a  
 11 conflict of interest and fails to obtain consent from  
 12 the present or former client after consultation. And  
 13 so that was in addition to the information that was in  
 14 the (a), so it wouldn't stand by its own even by my  
 15 own version, if you will.  
 16 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Just so  
 17 that we can have option (b) accurately reflect the  
 18 Attorney Discipline Board position, John, could you  
 19 please give us the specific language that would be  
 20 added to the end of that.  
 21 MR. VANBOLT: Yes. In the ABA standards on  
 22 the board's proposal to the court the additional  
 23 language after --  
 24 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: The word effect?  
 25 MR. VANBOLT: Yeah. (B) is actually, it's

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1 almost like a paraphrase, because the actual rule, the  
 2 actual standard is effect of that conflict, comma, and  
 3 causes injury or potential injury to a client. The  
 4 key language though that's missing in both is the  
 5 phrase "and causes injury or potential injury to a  
 6 client."  
 7 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: I will entertain a  
 8 motion to adjust the language in (b) so that it  
 9 accurately reflects the Attorney Discipline Board.  
 10 THE WITNESS: So moved.  
 11 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Second?  
 12 VOICE: Support.  
 13 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 14 MR. VANBOLT: And that's not just pointing  
 15 out that there is some missing language. I think you  
 16 will see that if that language is put in there that  
 17 there then does become potentially a striking  
 18 difference between (a) and (b), because, of course, (a)  
 19 results in suspension regardless of any degree of harm  
 20 or injury, whereas (b) does require that.  
 21 MR. CAMPBELL: If I may follow that up. It  
 22 also displays some of the problems with both the ABA  
 23 and the ADB approach. If you put that language in and  
 24 you have a case come before you, what happens where  
 25 you have all of the elements under when what is here

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1 as proposal (b) and you have no injury.  
 2 And if you take your eyes down to the next  
 3 (b) provision, it tells you what to do where there is  
 4 a negligent problem with an injury, but it doesn't  
 5 tell you what to do when you have knowledge but no  
 6 injury, and there really is no direction to the  
 7 hearing panel, there is no anticipation for the  
 8 parties, and there is no basis for review for an  
 9 appellate body.  
 10 And that's one of the reasons why the court  
 11 on this provision and others put injury into the  
 12 aggravation/mitigation section, because when it comes  
 13 to a conflict of interest, the issue isn't injury.  
 14 The issue is whether you had the conflict. The  
 15 presence or absence of the injury is important in  
 16 calculating what the ultimate sanction will be, but it  
 17 isn't for determining which chute you fall into or  
 18 fall out of on the standards.  
 19 So John is right, it does change the rule,  
 20 but it doesn't necessarily change it favorably for a  
 21 practitioner trying to understand and counsel the  
 22 client for a lawyer who faces the prospect of having  
 23 to figure out what the sanction is for a hearing panel  
 24 that has to interpret these sanctions or for a  
 25 reviewing appellate body, whether it be the Board or

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1 the court deciding whether the initial decisions on  
 2 these standards were correct.  
 3 In fact, what it means is most of these  
 4 decisions will be made outside the standards because  
 5 it's yet another factor that isn't factored in in  
 6 terms of all of its various forms that may come  
 7 forward.  
 8 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: I have been corrected  
 9 that we didn't need a motion. We have just amended  
 10 the language here, edited it so that it accurately  
 11 reflects.  
 12 MR. LESPERANCE: Kevin Lesperance from the  
 13 17th. I may have some concerns with some of these  
 14 proposals, and I am not even sure if I am on the right  
 15 rule, so I think I am going to have to request  
 16 Mr. Allen's assistance.  
 17 But a number of the attorneys in my firm went  
 18 to local Bar meetings, and they were given a copy of  
 19 your article, Perfect Storm, and I do primarily  
 20 medical malpractice defense, I represent a lot of  
 21 hospitals and doctors, and I believe that this may be  
 22 the rule that we are talking about, but in your  
 23 article you mention that consents must be signed and  
 24 confirmed in writing, and I don't see that that's up  
 25 on the agenda today. Today is my first meeting, so I

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1 don't know if that's something that's been decided.  
 2 But the problem that we saw is that we  
 3 represent a lot of hospitals and then we represent a  
 4 lot of doctors and some cases we will represent one,  
 5 some cases we will represent the other. It would seem  
 6 to be pretty burdensome to us to have to not only  
 7 disclose a potential minor conflict, and they were  
 8 also worried from some of the materials that we have  
 9 reviewed that there was strict liability even if there  
 10 is no injury, and I don't see that in this rule, so  
 11 maybe it's not even on the table today, but we were  
 12 very concerned, because obviously in some cases we get  
 13 the doctor and the hospital is the co-defendant.  
 14 There may technically be a conflict there, even though  
 15 it's never going to hurt them, and that's where my  
 16 concern is. So, John, I don't know if I am off base  
 17 or what.  
 18 MR. ALLEN: Not at all, and the confusion is  
 19 understandable. First of all, understand there is a  
 20 difference between the standards for sanctions and the  
 21 Rules of Professional Conduct. They are aren't the  
 22 same thing. And it is true that if adopted as  
 23 proposed by the Supreme Court a waiver or consent to a  
 24 conflict would have to be confirmed in writing. Not  
 25 signed, but confirmed in writing, and if it was not

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1 confirmed in writing, and the way I read the rule,  
 2 even if there was actual consent, even if there was no  
 3 damage, it would then be an invalid waiver and consent  
 4 and, therefore, it would be a conflict.  
 5 At that point standard 4.3 would apply, and I  
 6 think to understand how it works, if you turn in your  
 7 song books to Chapter 13, which is the beautiful ADB  
 8 report that John VanBolt takes credit for, but I think  
 9 Mark Armitage did. If you look at it on the computer  
 10 it's technicolor and cinemascope, it's in color.  
 11 But if you look at that in the first page of  
 12 4.3 you will see that the columns for both the Supreme  
 13 Court proposal in the left-hand column and the  
 14 alternative proposal, that's Mr. Campbell's proposal  
 15 on the right, start off with a paragraph that cites a  
 16 number of MRPC numbers. Those are the rules for which  
 17 this standard would apply.  
 18 So I think if I can take the context of your  
 19 question, though I am not implying anything about you  
 20 or your firm, if you were to do, if all the rules are  
 21 adopted the way they are proposed, including the  
 22 confirmed in writing requirement, and if you were to  
 23 represent both the doctor and a hospital who might be  
 24 potentially adverse, you disclose to them, they  
 25 consented there was no damage, but when it was all

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1 said and done you had not confirmed it in writing,  
 2 then I think you would be under this standard, because  
 3 you would not have the informed consent that's  
 4 required by the initial paragraph of 4.31, and I think  
 5 you, actually I think when you read through it if you  
 6 knew you hadn't confirmed it in writing, then you  
 7 would be under 4.31(b) which means you would be  
 8 eligible at your first offense for disbarment.  
 9 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: For further  
 10 clarification, being a fairly new Assembly member,  
 11 back in November of 2003 the Assembly debated the  
 12 rules, and I am recalling, and we believe that the  
 13 Assembly took a position already with regard to the  
 14 informed consent and in writing requirements, and we  
 15 were opposed to those and communicated that to the  
 16 Supreme Court, and what the Supreme Court has said  
 17 with regard to those two aspects of the rule, the  
 18 informed consent and in writing requirement, is they  
 19 would like to have more commentary from lawyers across  
 20 the state on that because they haven't necessarily  
 21 made their mind up on that.  
 22 So I would encourage you with regard to any  
 23 concerns about those aspects of the rule, the Supreme  
 24 Court has asked for commentary, that people who are  
 25 interested submit commentary directly to the Supreme

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1 Court.  
 2 Any further discussion with regard to 4.3?  
 3 MR. ARMITAGE: Just one critical point, that  
 4 a vote for (a) here would, I think, because it doesn't  
 5 reference injury, be inconsistent with your earlier  
 6 vote to endorse the consideration of injury in the  
 7 initial sorting process. That's why the Board put it  
 8 in (b). That's all.  
 9 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
 10 discussion?  
 11 MR. CAMPBELL: Well, that's cured by just  
 12 throwing that on the end of (a), pursuant to that  
 13 vote.  
 14 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Don, I didn't hear  
 15 you. I am sorry.  
 16 MR. CAMPBELL: Actually another way to look  
 17 at that is that John's addition of the language here  
 18 is superfluous in light of the earlier vote, that  
 19 everything here you must presume is subject to that  
 20 earlier vote, so (a) would just simply put at the end  
 21 of it and according to injury, or whatever the  
 22 phraseology is.  
 23 As I understood Mark, he was saying you would  
 24 be inconsistent in voting for 4.3 (a) because it  
 25 didn't have the injury language. That would be

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1 inaccurate. You would just add the injury language,  
 2 which doesn't change 4.3 (a). You would just add  
 3 that to -- take in out of the mitigation/aggravation.  
 4 MR. ARMITAGE: If you add it it won't be  
 5 inconsistent, but then you will have the problem that  
 6 John Allen talked about focusing on actual violation  
 7 of the rule, which is like failure to get the  
 8 confirmation in writing and so forth.  
 9 The ADB approach focuses on the disclosures  
 10 you actually make.  
 11 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
 12 discussion? Then we are going to vote on the first  
 13 portion of the 4.3, which is standard 4.3 should  
 14 provide for suspension when.  
 15 All those in favor of (a), please say aye.  
 16 All those opposed.  
 17 All those in favor of (b), say aye.  
 18 All those opposed.  
 19 I didn't hear enough ayes to (a) for a  
 20 minority, so we have a majority opinion with regard to  
 21 (b).  
 22 The second portion of this proposal is  
 23 standard 4.3 should provide for reprimand when.  
 24 All those if favor of (a), please say aye.  
 25 Those opposed.

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1 To be perfectly clear, we had discussion for  
 2 both of these. Does anybody want discussion with  
 3 regard to the second portion of this? I don't want to  
 4 cut anybody off.  
 5 So we had not a majority in favor of (a).  
 6 MR. CRAMPTON: Jeff Crampton from the 17th  
 7 circuit. Are we adding the same language on the  
 8 bottom of (b) on this one?  
 9 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. John, can  
 10 you advise us what the language would be at the end of  
 11 (b) for the second part of this that would make it  
 12 accurately reflect the ADB position with regard to a  
 13 lawyer is negligent in determining whether the  
 14 representation of a client may adversely affect  
 15 another client or be materially affected by the  
 16 lawyer's own interests, and is there any injury  
 17 language that's supposed to be at the end of that.  
 18 MR. VANBOLT: I am not sure I can answer  
 19 that. What I understood, the point of the choice was,  
 20 one was the Supreme Court's versions and one was the  
 21 Board's version. I spoke to the Board's version.  
 22 If Mr. Campbell is correct, if the previous  
 23 vote to add injury is part of the process, then I  
 24 guess you would add identical language to both  
 25 proposals.

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<p>1 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: So then it's kind of 2 incorporated by our position taken earlier today with 3 regard to injury. So all those in favor of -- 4 VOICE: Point of order. 5 MR. MORGAN: Can I bear your indulgence for a 6 second. Don Morgan, 3rd circuit. John, if you are 7 saying that we should do it under the first action we 8 took on this page, add that and causes injury and 9 potential injury to a client, are we also saying we 10 should do it for (b), because that's what I heard, and 11 when I started coming up here it wasn't there on the 12 board. 13 So now is this a friendly amendment so that 14 it is on the board and that's what we are voting on? 15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: It's actually not an 16 amendment; it would be a correction. 17 MR. MORGAN: I understand. It's a 18 supplement -- 19 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Absolutely. 20 MR. MORGAN: -- to what was the prior action. 21 Thank you. 22 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. 23 MS. STANGL: Terri Stangl from the 10th 24 circuit. A related correction. In the draft I am 25 looking at, which says 4.33 under the ADB, there is</p>	<p>1 out talks about is generally appropriate. Maybe I am 2 mistaken about that. 3 But this is now a mandatory, a mandatory -- 4 if you vote on (b) it's now mandatory that there be 5 reprimand. I think the language as John noted was 6 generally. 7 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Then let's 8 stick that in there. Nancy, insert before "a lawyer is 9 negligent" "reprimand is generally appropriate when." 10 I think that's the better place to put it. 11 Do we have it correct now? 12 MR. VANBOLT: Your point is well taken. 13 Actually, every single standard, as far as I know, 14 starts with disbarment, reprimand, or suspension is 15 generally appropriate, because the whole point of this 16 is it's not exact until you apply the aggravating and 17 mitigating factors. So you can almost -- actually you 18 can read generally in every single standard, but the 19 only problem we are having here is the difference 20 between a paraphrase and the exact language. 21 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Okay. Any more 22 discussion? This is with regard to the reprimand. We 23 will change the language so it says generally for the 24 first portion regarding suspension so that it's 25 consistent with ADB position.</p>
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<p>1 another phrase which is or whether the representation 2 will adversely affect another client. So if we are 3 going to be looking at the entire ADB proposal, I 4 think that language needs to be added as well, if 5 that's the intention of what we are correcting. 6 MR. VANBOLT: She is correct. My point was 7 just, rather than paraphrase, that is the actual 8 language. 9 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Let's just type it up 10 there for you so everybody can see it. 11 John, is that the exact language there? 12 MR. VANBOLT: Correct. 13 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Nancy, you would take 14 out reprimand is generally appropriate when, so that 15 after option (b) would be "a lawyer is negligent." 16 Then that's the actual language. 17 MR. BUCHANAN: Rob Buchanan from the 17th 18 circuit. I think part of the problem of taking that 19 out is if you look at the paragraph that defines (a) 20 and (b), it doesn't say generally appropriate. It's 21 more -- if you go up and you look at it, it doesn't 22 say generally appropriate. Like in the first one it 23 says, I think it says disbarment is generally 24 appropriate. Here it just says should provide for 25 reprimand, but the language that you just had her take</p>	<p>1 All those if favor of (a), again, with regard 2 to reprimand. 3 MR. BIEBERICH: Ken Bieberich, 37th circuit. 4 I think to be consistent, we have got to go 5 back to the first one, because that doesn't provide 6 for generally. 7 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: We just said that we 8 are going to change that. We will edit it so it 9 accurately reflects the ADB proposal. 10 So with regard to 4.3, should provide for 11 reprimand when. 12 VOICE: Is this (a) or (b)? 13 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: (a). Did we vote for 14 (a) already? It went down now. Now we are voting for 15 (b). 16 All those in favor of (b), say aye. 17 All opposed 18 That passes. 19 Next is standard 4.5. There are two 20 different alternatives, lack of competence and 21 charging illegal or clearly excessive fees. 22 I will entertain a motion with regard to this 23 proposal. 24 VOICE: So moved. 25 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Support?</p>



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1 VOICE: Support.  
 2 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Any  
 3 discussion? Don.  
 4 MR. CAMPBELL: To be honest, I don't even  
 5 understand the motion, and I wrote one of the  
 6 proposals.  
 7 Essentially what you have here is the -- one  
 8 of the criticisms of the ABA standards is that it's  
 9 time bound by those cases that they looked at in  
 10 establishing them, and one area that was not well  
 11 covered apparently during the decade or so worth of  
 12 cases they looked at was illegal or clearly excessive  
 13 fees, and, in fact, is what the ADB came to define as  
 14 unreasonable fees under their format of 1.5. And  
 15 so -- because 1.5 didn't exist, it was, again, under  
 16 the old code, which was not all that scrupulous as far  
 17 as fees.  
 18 Now you have a rule in place addressing fees.  
 19 How did the folks deal with it when they put together  
 20 the standards? They stuck it under I think the  
 21 general standard of 8.0, which is duties to the public  
 22 or something like that, and what I have done in my  
 23 version is I created a separate standard for fees,  
 24 because that's one of the things that have developed  
 25 under the new ABA rules adopted in Michigan as the

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1 Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, felt it was  
 2 important enough, significant enough, and we have  
 3 already had some comment here about most of the, or  
 4 many of the complaints to the Grievance Commission  
 5 have to do with fees, that it is worth its own  
 6 standard.  
 7 And so I put together the competency --  
 8 diligence, competence and communication in one  
 9 standard, which if you ever have seen, been lucky  
 10 enough to see an Attorney Grievance Commission  
 11 complaint, obviously as a member of a hearing panel,  
 12 not as a respondent, then what you will see is they  
 13 always join those charges together, so it makes sense  
 14 to put them all under one standard and then I carved  
 15 out of that a separate standard of fees, and I  
 16 renumbered them a little bit.  
 17 With the court then, when it took a look at  
 18 it, felt that the issue of competency was not  
 19 highlighted enough, and if you look at my Section 14  
 20 here in your materials, I have a discussion under  
 21 Section 3 of my memorandum, which opens the materials,  
 22 where I describe my approach to 4.4, 4.5 and why I did  
 23 what I did and what proposed change, which really only  
 24 goes to the name of the rule, to highlight the fact  
 25 that competency is actually covered under 4.5.

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1 The other point to make is that the ABA in  
 2 Michigan diverged with regard to their rules  
 3 concerning competency under 1.1. They are very  
 4 different rules. Again, Michigan took a different  
 5 approach relative to the treatment of competency.  
 6 It's not covered at all by the ADB's provision because  
 7 the ADB follows the ABA standards which talks about  
 8 ABA language and ABA concerns, and it's different. So  
 9 that's one of the reasons why I think it needs some  
 10 adjustments.  
 11 MR. VANBOLT: I agree entirely with  
 12 Mr. Campbell about the ABA standards adopted in 1986  
 13 looking at prior case law, not a lot of cases then on  
 14 fees. The problem is that in 2005, if we go back and  
 15 look at 20 years of case law in Michigan, you are  
 16 still going to find not a lot of cases on fees. There  
 17 just is not a developed set of cases.  
 18 I have mentioned in some of the road show  
 19 presentations, as we have called them, where we have  
 20 gone to local Bars, that you might want to keep in  
 21 mind that in Michigan and most states year after year  
 22 50 percent of the public disciplines are for people  
 23 who display some sort of neglect, lack of diligence,  
 24 look of competence. Those three categories combine  
 25 into a general competence, diligence problem.

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1 Failure to return phone calls will certainly  
 2 bring you to the attention of the Grievance  
 3 Commission, but it really has to be pretty much  
 4 flagrant neglect, abandonment of your caseload before  
 5 you are brought before the Discipline Board.  
 6 But that's 50 percent. Fifteen percent are  
 7 criminal convictions of lawyers, 15 percent are money  
 8 offenses. That only leaves 20 percent for everything  
 9 else. The fact is that the Discipline Board system,  
 10 or the Discipline Board in Michigan does not deal with  
 11 a lot of competence, or I am sorry, conference cases.  
 12 We try to deal with competence of ourselves and other  
 13 lawyers. Conflicts we don't see, money offenses we  
 14 don't see, confidences and secrets we don't see. So,  
 15 frankly, no, the Board did not carve out a new  
 16 standard for fees because there is no more case law  
 17 available to us now than there was to the ABA in 1986.  
 18 Mr. Campbell, I don't fault him for that. I  
 19 think there should be, as the case law develops, there  
 20 clearly should be more guidelines in terms of fees.  
 21 One problem that resulted, however, was that in  
 22 order to find a place to plug in a new standard on  
 23 fees he took a look at diligence and competence and  
 24 said, well, they are pretty much the same thing let's  
 25 ditch competence. He didn't really. He is correct

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1 that he did combine the two offenses in one standard.  
 2 The problem was then that the court looked at that and  
 3 jumped on both of our agencies actually and said, oh, my  
 4 God, you forgot about competence, you are not taking  
 5 this seriously, and we had to point out that, indeed,  
 6 we do take competence seriously, but that actually is  
 7 the second part of the Board's position, which is that  
 8 competence is different than diligence, it does  
 9 deserve its own standards by any measure in terms of  
 10 harm to the public and just recognizing the reality of  
 11 what it is that we deal with. Competence is a big  
 12 part of what we do.  
 13 So in effect the Board's position then is  
 14 keep fees where it is and keep competence where it is.  
 15 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Which would be (b)?  
 16 MR. ARMITAGE: As (b).  
 17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
 18 discussion?  
 19 Then all those in favor of (a), say aye.  
 20 All those in favor of (b), say aye.  
 21 Passes with majority. I suppose we should  
 22 see whether or not we have a minority for (a). We  
 23 don't need to worry about that. We are all set.  
 24 Never mind. It's getting late, isn't it?  
 25 Standard 5.1, failure to maintain personal

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1 integrity. I will entertain a motion with regard to  
 2 5.1.  
 3 VOICE: So moved.  
 4 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Second?  
 5 VOICE: Second.  
 6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion?  
 7 MR. CAMPBELL: 5.13, again, I address it in  
 8 more detail in my memorandum, and I point out that if  
 9 you adopt 5.13 as the Board has proposed, it actually  
 10 requires you to go in and change, or at least address,  
 11 the fact that under 4.13 and 4.12 you have already  
 12 taken up some of this, some of these issues.  
 13 With regard to -- and that's my footnote 4,  
 14 again, in my memorandum if you go through it and take  
 15 a look under Section 2.  
 16 The central issue here is, and this has been  
 17 a low grade war between the Board and the court as far  
 18 as background.  
 19 The attorney discipline system began to  
 20 approach drunk driving as an offense for which there  
 21 would be a sanction under the ethics rules in the late  
 22 1990s. Prior to that I am not aware of a drunk  
 23 driving case having been the subject of a discipline,  
 24 and when those cases went before the Attorney  
 25 Discipline Board, the argument was, well, when you read

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1 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct it says  
 2 that only the violation of a law that reflects  
 3 adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice should be  
 4 the subject of discipline.  
 5 There is also a Court Rule 9.104 (5) at the  
 6 time, and I think it's now (a)(5), that says the  
 7 violation of any law of the United States or of a  
 8 state of the United States is misconduct and the  
 9 grounds for discipline.  
 10 Those two rules, it was argued, were in  
 11 conflict and that the Rule of Professional Conduct  
 12 ought to prevail, meaning that there is a fitness  
 13 requirement when it comes to violations.  
 14 The Board agreed with that argument and went  
 15 up to the court. The court said, no, you are wrong,  
 16 they are not in conflict, it's obvious, and it was at  
 17 least to the court, these two rules aren't in  
 18 conflict, so we are going to impose, we are going to  
 19 say it's okay to impose discipline for a violation of  
 20 drunk driving that had nothing to do with driving a  
 21 client around or on firm time or anything like that.  
 22 So Board's version, as I read it, does not  
 23 allow for that ruling to really have full effect  
 24 within the proposal.  
 25 Mine just takes notice of that and says we

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1 recognize that, in fact, under 1.13 where you are  
 2 engaged in criminal conduct that does not meet the  
 3 requirements of 8.4(b), that is not defined under 5.13  
 4 or 5.12 or 5.11 above, that, yes, there is a category  
 5 of offenses for which a lawyer can be disciplined, and  
 6 I think it's the Nichols case, correct me if I am  
 7 wrong, John, that said you are a lawyer 24 hours a  
 8 day, 7 days a week, and that's essentially the  
 9 attitude or the position the court took in late 1990s  
 10 when it decided the drunk driving cases in the  
 11 disciplinary field, and it just takes recognition of  
 12 that and it's a recognition, I think, that's not  
 13 present in the Board's original version of 5.13 as  
 14 they proposed it. That's all.  
 15 I don't expect, by the way, given my record  
 16 here, that that position is very popular, but it's  
 17 just recognition of what the rules are.  
 18 MR. ARMITAGE: I just want to take issue with  
 19 the comment that the Board is at war with the court,  
 20 because we are not. The Court Rules are at war with  
 21 themselves. He pointed out 9.104(5) says any violation  
 22 of the criminal law is misconduct. 8.4(c) says those  
 23 violations of the criminal law which reflect adversely  
 24 on your fitness is misconduct, and that's the way it  
 25 is in every other state in the country.

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1 MR. CAMPBELL: For (b)?  
 2 MR. ARMITAGE: (b), good point. I am sorry.  
 3 So he is right, the case came before us and  
 4 the Board and it dealt with it. When it went up, in  
 5 the Deutsch (sp) case went up, the court in fact split  
 6 3/3 on the issue of whether of fitness should be  
 7 required.  
 8 So that issue is probably still out there.  
 9 The Board took the position that Michigan should, that  
 10 8.4(b) is still there in the rules and that fitness,  
 11 application on fitness, adverse reflection on fitness  
 12 is usually required. It's certainly the practice.  
 13 Under 9.120 we are all required to report  
 14 convictions of ourselves, so Bob, the Commission, and  
 15 the Board get things like the person who was ticketed,  
 16 I think it's a criminal offense, DNR ticketed them for  
 17 not having some sort of label on his fishing shanty,  
 18 his ice shanty. Now, I have long thought that the  
 19 profession needs to crack down on anonymous ice  
 20 fishing, but apparently Bob disagrees. That is  
 21 sarcasm for the court reporter.  
 22 The Commission does not pursue cases that  
 23 don't reflect adversely on a lawyer's fitness to  
 24 practice law, and the Board believed that the  
 25 standards ought to reflect the actual practices, so

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1 that's why that's there.  
 2 This is also, again, I don't want to get in  
 3 trouble with Mr. Campbell, but I think he just did say  
 4 that, given your vote on 4.1, which puts client  
 5 misappropriation into 4.1 and sort of sends  
 6 misappropriation from nonclients to 5.1, this (b),  
 7 which is the Board position, is consistent with your  
 8 earlier vote in that regard too. Thank you.  
 9 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
 10 discussion? Okay. With regard to standard 5.1, the  
 11 question is whether or not it should contain the same  
 12 provisions outlined in the, and then all in favor of  
 13 option (a), please say aye.  
 14 All opposed.  
 15 All those in favor of (b), say aye  
 16 That's the majority.  
 17 There is another copy of 5.1 that was  
 18 mistakenly in the agenda packet, so you can disregard  
 19 that.  
 20 And then the next standard is 3.2 regarding  
 21 isolated acts of negligence. I will entertain a  
 22 motion with regard to this proposal.  
 23 VOICE: So moved.  
 24 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Do I have a second?  
 25 VOICE: Second.

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1 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Any  
 2 discussion? John Allen. Oh, hold on.  
 3 MR. ALLEN: The purpose of the proposal is to  
 4 clarify that isolated acts of negligence are not  
 5 intended to be the subject of discipline at all, really,  
 6 and that except in very limited circumstances where  
 7 they are part of a course of conduct or negligence  
 8 combined with other factors when taken in the  
 9 aggregate that provide a basis for discipline. In  
 10 other words, an error, isolated, even a serious error,  
 11 maybe taken care of through and in other cases so  
 12 when the disciplinary system is approached with that,  
 13 because of the wording of some of the rules,  
 14 particularly as proposed, one could find an isolated  
 15 act of negligence without any causation of injury as  
 16 authorizing discipline.  
 17 The purpose of this proposal was to say that  
 18 if it is, indeed, isolated and unaccompanied by a course  
 19 of conduct or other factors in the aggregate which  
 20 authorize discipline, that it should not be commenced  
 21 to begin with.  
 22 MR. AGACINSKI: I don't think I disagree with  
 23 most of what John said. I don't you think really  
 24 prosecute many times for isolated acts of negligence  
 25 except intense misconduct. That is a standard of

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1 discipline, and I am not sure this statement belongs  
 2 in the sentencing aspect. It should maybe be a MRPC  
 3 amendment, if that's where the body wants to go. I  
 4 don't think it belongs where it's at, because it's  
 5 after finding of misconduct that we first approach  
 6 3.2.  
 7 Also, I think you should never say never, so  
 8 to make a salute rule like that I think is also  
 9 philosophically something I would oppose, but, more  
 10 importantly, I don't think it belongs under the  
 11 sentencing standards.  
 12 MR. VANBOLT: I think the Board would agree a  
 13 hundred percent with that. This rule that purports to  
 14 say when somebody should be found or committed  
 15 misconduct has no place in guidelines for sanctions.  
 16 They are just two entirely different things.  
 17 I also agree that generally when you talk  
 18 about the possible hypothetical, what if type of  
 19 sanction, the words "always" and "never" should probably  
 20 be avoided.  
 21 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further  
 22 discussion?  
 23 MR. LARKY: Madam Chair. In light of the  
 24 comments by our panel, I would move that the State Bar  
 25 of Michigan recommend a modification to the Rules of

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1 Professional Conduct by adding the language here.  
 2 VOICE: Second.  
 3 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: So the motion is to  
 4 make this a Model Rule of Professional Conduct  
 5 proposal?  
 6 MR. LARKY: Correct.  
 7 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: To add this language  
 8 to the Model Rules?  
 9 MR. LARKY: Yes.  
 10 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: We have second. Any  
 11 discussion on that?  
 12 Hearing none, all in favor of making this  
 13 proposal, rather than something for the standards,  
 14 something for the rules, all those in favor, say aye.  
 15 Opposed.  
 16 Okay, now we are going to vote on actually  
 17 this as being -- we are going to vote on whether or  
 18 not this should actually be proposed in the rules.  
 19 Any discussion?  
 20 VOICE: Standards.  
 21 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: No, we just said that  
 22 it's not going to be in the standards, it would be in  
 23 the rules.  
 24 Mr. Larky, your motion was just that this be  
 25 a part of the Model Rules as opposed to the standards,

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1 correct?  
 2 MR. LARKY: That's correct.  
 3 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: It's been changed  
 4 now, rather than a standard, it's a rule, not  
 5 necessarily 3.2, but just something that should be  
 6 incorporated into the rules, the Model Rules of  
 7 Professional Standards, and that is what's before you  
 8 now, whether or not this language that disciplinary  
 9 proceedings -- how much of this?  
 10 MR. ROMANO: Point of order. I understand  
 11 the motion to move this provision to the Rules of  
 12 Professional Conduct, but don't we have to dispose of  
 13 it somehow as it is proposed to be a part of the  
 14 standards?  
 15 You are asking the parliamentarian. I am in  
 16 trouble.  
 17 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: This is what my  
 18 understanding is, and I believe I have this  
 19 accurately, please correct me if I am wrong. The  
 20 motion before us was whether or not we change this  
 21 proposal that said a new standard should be  
 22 established to a new rule should be established within  
 23 the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, and that  
 24 is the motion that passed.  
 25 Now what we would vote on is, or discuss, is

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1 the proposal that would be a rule, a Michigan Rule of  
 2 Professional Conduct should be established to provide,  
 3 and that's should be before there.  
 4 MR. ROMANO: So in effect the yes vote on the  
 5 motion removed it from it's consideration as a  
 6 standard. I can ride with that.  
 7 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: So is there any  
 8 discussion with regard to the new proposal now, which  
 9 is a Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct should be  
 10 established, dot, dot, dot?  
 11 Seeing none, all those in --  
 12 MR. VANBOLT: I guess those of us from the  
 13 discipline agencies are kind of sitting here in  
 14 stunned disbelief, I guess. If requested, I  
 15 personally will do everything in my power not to serve  
 16 on the committee that would have to go through every  
 17 single Rule of Professional Conduct and determine  
 18 which one would appropriately be subject to this rule.  
 19 I mentioned one rule now that is a per se rule,  
 20 mishandling of client funds.  
 21 It doesn't matter under the case law in  
 22 Michigan, it doesn't matter under the rules what your  
 23 state of mind was when you misplaced your client's  
 24 thousand dollars or \$10 for that matter.  
 25 Now, it may or may not be prosecuted and you

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1 may or may not be publicly disciplined, but it's a  
 2 violation and there is nothing -- my mind boggles. I  
 3 can't get the words out to say how you would  
 4 incorporate this rule into basically a rewrite of  
 5 every other Rule of Professional Conduct in the United  
 6 States and Michigan.  
 7 MR. CAMPBELL: Also given my record, I have a  
 8 sense you guys are in favor of this, so I am going to  
 9 support it.  
 10 MR. ALLEN: I have a question for John  
 11 VanBolt and maybe Bob Agacinski too, and that is, I  
 12 think the intent is obvious, and it was really stated  
 13 probably more forthrightly the first time around that  
 14 we weren't trying to change every rule, we were trying  
 15 to make it clear that disciplinary proceedings would  
 16 not be commenced for that purpose. If the standards  
 17 is not the right place and the Rules of Professional  
 18 Conduct are not the right place, where is the right  
 19 place?  
 20 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any further discussion  
 21 with regard to --  
 22 MR. GIGUERE: Yes, Gary Giguere from the 9th  
 23 circuit. I would move to table the discussion since  
 24 we changed it to the Model Rules of Conduct from the  
 25 standards, which is what we came to discuss, so we can

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1 have appropriate input from those around the state who  
 2 would be impacted by such a change, so I would move to  
 3 table.  
 4 VOICE: Support.  
 5 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: No debate on that.  
 6 All in favor, say aye.  
 7 Any opposed.  
 8 There you go.  
 9 Now hold on one second because we missed one.  
 10 I am so sorry, but we have your yellow piece of paper  
 11 in front of you which is ADM File Number that was  
 12 supposed to go under the rules. Sorry, that's been  
 13 withdrawn. It was duplicative. Thank you.  
 14 So ADM File Number 2003-62, which is the  
 15 proposed adoption of the new rules, I will entertain a  
 16 motion with regard to this proposal.  
 17 VOICE: So moved.  
 18 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. And a  
 19 second?  
 20 VOICE: Support.  
 21 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Yep. Any discussion?  
 22 Hearing none, all in favor of (a), please say  
 23 aye.  
 24 Any opposed.  
 25 That would be the majority.

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1 I have one point of order and that is --  
 2 actually I have two points of order. Mr. Hogan came  
 3 shortly after we had passed on the Committee on the  
 4 Libraries Legal Research and Legal Publications. He  
 5 just wanted to make sure to the extent anybody had any  
 6 questions with regard to the report he was here to  
 7 answer them, and so, because he has been waiting the  
 8 entire day, I thought it would be important for us to  
 9 give him that opportunity, so if we can just hold off  
 10 for a couple of minutes.  
 11 MR. HOGAN: Thank you very much. I promise I  
 12 will be very quick. The Law Libraries Committee,  
 13 which is a standing committee of the Bar, did a survey  
 14 of the various law libraries of the state. We  
 15 established certain needs and from those needs we  
 16 adopted the Michigan online self help site that now  
 17 appears in conjunction with the State Bar's web site.  
 18 It's where people can go, not just people off the  
 19 street, but also attorneys that have identified needs  
 20 for certain forms, certain data bases, certain free  
 21 materials that might be available on the internet, as  
 22 well as references to legal aid programs that are out  
 23 there. That appears as item number four in your  
 24 materials.  
 25 The Law Library Committee has formed a

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1 subcommittee in order to maintain the web site and  
 2 maintain the documents, make sure everything is up to  
 3 date. We are having a meeting this coming Saturday,  
 4 so a week from today, and I have got two Saturdays  
 5 tied up. If anyone has any feedback of any sort, if  
 6 you could let me know, e-mail would be fine, and I am  
 7 published in the directory and any questions anyone  
 8 has here or concerns. Okay. That works.  
 9 (Applause.)  
 10 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: I believe that covers  
 11 everything on your agenda. Your Vice Chair has asked  
 12 for a moment to speak with you. Oh, and Bob Gardella  
 13 pointed out that we missed one individual who was on  
 14 our list of appointments that wasn't named officially  
 15 on the record, so we should add that person officially  
 16 on the record so that we can get that individual a  
 17 member of the Assembly.  
 18 MR GARDELLA: Bob Gardella from the 44th  
 19 circuit and chair of the Nominating Awards Committee.  
 20 When we were nominating to fill vacancies earlier we  
 21 forgot to put in there to fill the vacancy of the 4th  
 22 judicial circuit, Lineas Baze of Jackson, so I would  
 23 move that Lineas Baze of Jackson be allowed to serve  
 24 the vacancy in the 4th judicial circuit.  
 25 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you. Any

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1 second.  
 2 VOICE: Second.  
 3 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Any discussion? All  
 4 in favor.  
 5 Thank you very much. Your Vice Chair has  
 6 asked for a moment to speak with you before we  
 7 adjourn.  
 8 VICE CHAIR BUI TEWEG: Good afternoon. I have  
 9 heard all of you loud and clear say recently that you  
 10 don't want to hear thank you speeches, but it would be  
 11 wrong not to acknowledge Elizabeth's efforts in  
 12 getting us to where we are today, and I am not going  
 13 to let that wrong happen. I am going to stand here  
 14 and try to do Elizabeth some justice for the amount of  
 15 work and effort that she has put into this endeavor.  
 16 She has almost single handedly taken it under  
 17 her wing to -- it was about two years ago when Special  
 18 Issues met and talked about whether or not this was  
 19 something that Rep Assembly could even possibly bite  
 20 off and chew, and the majority of the Special Issues  
 21 Committee back then said no way, we can't even  
 22 possibly get our arms around this thing, we would have  
 23 to be all octopuses to manage that, and we just can't  
 24 do it.  
 25 But Elizabeth said there is no way we can't,

1 we have to. As a matter of fact we have got to take  
2 this on. This is so important to the profession, and  
3 she has taken the ball and she has run with it ever  
4 since then.

5 Now I am going to get all choked up about it.

6 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: That's because she is  
7 up until 1:00 in the morning with me working on this,  
8 so it's not just me alone.

9 (Standing applause.)

10 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you, all. I  
11 will entertain a motion to adjourn.

12 VOICE: So moved.

13 CHAIRPERSON JAMIESON: Thank you, and I just  
14 want for the record, although we have to approve that,  
15 all in favor say aye.

16 We are early. I said 4:30, and it's not  
17 4:30.

18 (Proceedings concluded at 4:27 p.m.)  
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20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 STATE OF MICHIGAN )  
2 )

3 COUNTY OF CLINTON )

4 I certify that this transcript, consisting  
5 of 213 pages, is a complete, true, and correct transcript  
6 of the proceedings and testimony taken in this case on  
7 Saturday, April 16, 2005.

8 April 28, 2005 \_\_\_\_\_

9 Connie S. Coon, CSR-2709  
10 5021 West St. Joseph, Suite 3  
11 Lansing, Michigan 48917  
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22  
23  
24  
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